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PREFACE  
 
 
“Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas” 
Virgil, Georgics, 490 
 
 
 
 
Understanding the causes of social and economic phenomena is not always easy to do. The 
words of the Latin poet Virgil suggest that he is “fortunate who was able to know the 
causes of things”. That is, somehow, another way of saying that the full acknowledgement 
of the causes is a difficult, or almost impossible, process. Such complexity is attributable to 
the fact that social and economic phenomena usually display a multiple conjunctural 
causal nature: multiple causes may determine an effect, as well as different combinations 
of causes may lead to the same effect. This form of causal complexity poses a number of 
challenges to decision-makers, both in business and in policy. However, the adoption of a 
holistic approach and the use of adequate tools that are able to unpack this composite 
nature may be very useful for reducing, albeit not solving, the complexity of phenomena 
under investigation. In doing so, remarkable opportunities arise for research and practice 
aimed at improving certain outcomes of interest.  
With this in mind, the present dissertation delves into the complex causal nature of a 
phenomenon over-debated in both political and academic arenas: the underrepresentation 
of women on boards of directors. Lying outside from making a “business case” for women 
on board, it re-conceptualizes this subject as the outcome of a conjunction of specific 
institutional antecedents. The guiding idea stems from the importance of acknowledging 
the existence of institutional interdependencies to design the “right” policies for the 
promotion of female representation on boards. Starting from such considerations, this work 
requires a twofold effort in adopting, at first, a configurational perspective and, later, a set-
theoretic approach to deeply explore the intersections of the causes that result in the lack of 
women in top corporate positions. The logic of sets and the adoption of a holistic view 
allow for developing a unique and comprehensive conceptual framework that takes into 
account the complex relations between “bundles” of causes that influence women’s rise to 
the boardrooms and the enactment of policies and practices that can facilitate such a rise. 
 
Michela Iannotta
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The representation of women on the boards of directors has become a prominent issue 
in both political and academic debates. In the wake of financial scandals and failures of 
companies (e.g., Enron, WorldCom, Lehman Brothers), many scholars have posed their 
attention on the importance of board composition, especially with regard to gender 
diversity on corporate boards (Terjesen, et al., 2009). Despite the last decades have seen a 
progressive increase of equal opportunities legislations, nowadays workplaces and 
corporate boards continue to be male-dominated (Grosvold, 2011; Williams, 2000), 
women are still not equally represented in the boardrooms (Terjesen et al., 2014), and their 
presence in directorship bodies is actually worse than many surveys can suggest (Adams 
and Kirchmaier, 2013).  
In order to increase the number of women in top corporate positions, several countries 
have introduced affirmative action policies. Without doubt, since Norway enacted gender 
quotas on boards, “a snowball started rolling” (Huse and Seierstad, 2014, p. 38) and gender 
quotas legislation has become de facto a socially expected policy to promote the number of 
women in board positions. In this wake, EU Institutions have asked listed public 
companies to increase the quota of female representation on boards to 40% within 2020 
and some countries have followed the Norwegian example. However, the introduction of 
gender quotas for boards of directors was not always straightforward, whereas many 
countries have shown great scepticism and political disagreement towards quotas (such as 
Germany, Finland, and Denmark). The most common argument used by politicians and 
academics to support the adoption of gender quotas is the economic utility of gender 
diversity on boards, in terms of higher and sustainable economic growth, improved firm 
performance, better decision-making on boards, and better use of the talent pool at hand 
(European Commission, 2012a). Taken together, these arguments have made a “business 
case” for female directorship. Although the subject of women on boards holds a profound 
social nature, debates about gender quotas have especially delved into the business case, 
                                                          

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neglecting the importance of social justice rationales, which refer instead to principles of 
equal treatment and non-discrimination, and to the promotion of equality in society. 
However, the “negative” literature about gender quotas on boards has revealed that such 
affirmative action policies may cause drops in the stock price, reduce firm value or lead to 
worse organizational performance (e.g., Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Bøhren and Staubo, 
2014; Matsa and Miller, 2013). This contrasting evidence has led to be sceptical about the 
economic approach and to question the business case for women on boards. To that regard, 
some scholars have argued that, before claiming the necessity of gender quotas for boards 
of directors, it is important to understand the causes underlying female underrepresentation 
on boards (Adams and Kirchmaier, 2013), and to explore the institutional and historical 
context where gender quotas should take place (Huse and Seierstad, 2014). Whilst 
recognizing the importance of importance of existing national configurations for the 
introduction of new regulatory policies, surprisingly very few studies have addressed the 
relationships between institutional antecedents of female underrepresentation on boards 
and the use of public regulatory policies (e.g., Seierstad et al., 2015), leaving usually 
separated these two streams of research. 
On the one hand, the institutional literature on gender diversity on boards has offered a 
more systematic understanding of the structural barriers to female representation of women 
on boards (Grosvold and Brammer, 2011). It has revealed that the representation of women 
on boards is affected primarily by three institutional factors, namely welfare states, labour 
markets, and national cultures. Moreover, a long tradition of studies in law, management, 
sociology, and psychology research has systematically shown a close interdependence 
between these three institutional domains. In other words, multiple interconnections have 
been found to exist between prescriptive norms about the role of women in society, welfare 
provision related to childbirth and childcare, and female employment in the labour market. 
This state of affairs suggests that these institutional sets may show important 
complementarities between them and they may have synergistic effects on female 
representation on corporate boards. Despite acknowledging such interrelations is important 
for designing the “right” measures of intervention to promote female representation on 
boards (which may include not necessarily mandatory quotas), corporate governance 
research has completely neglected to investigate the joint influence of such institutions. 
Consequently, a deepened investigation on why, whether, and which institutional 
conditions are jointly and causally connected with female representation on boards is still 
needed.  
On the other hand, the institutional literature on gender quotas for boards of directors 
has documented that the adoption of such affirmative action is linked, somehow, to the 
existence of critical junctures (Teigen, 2012) and national coherence between institutions 
(Terjesen et al., 2014). Moreover, some scholars have questioned that gender quotas are 
not sufficient on their own to achieve a higher number of women on boards, but they may 
require to be integrated or complemented by other interventions, such as work-life balance 
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policies (Adams and Kirchmaier, 2013; Bergstø, 2013). If these studies suggest a sort of 
complementarity between gender quotas and national institutions, other research underline 
their supplementary function in national configurations, since gender quotas may 
compensate the deficiencies of other institutions to pursue high levels of female 
representation on boards (e.g., Grosvold and Brammer, 2011).  
The relative partition of these two streams of research has prevented to learn more about 
the function that gender quotas for boards of directors actually have in promoting female 
representation on boards. Indeed, when a new regulatory policy or institution is enacted 
into a given national system, it may fail to gain the expected objectives, because synergic 
effects produced by institutional complementarities might slow down the intended change 
(in line with Deeg, 2007). Therefore, it is still vague whether gender quotas are necessary 
or sufficient conditions to pursue a higher level of female representation on boards and 
what role they play in the existing national institutional systems (i.e., are gender quotas 
complements or substitutes in relation to the other institutions?). 
Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to answer the following research questions: 
 
RQ1: Why and how are certain institutional domains causally and jointly related to 
women on boards? 
RQ2: Are there complementarities between these institutional domains?  
RQ3: What type of complementarity is it? Are these institutions synergic or substitutes? 
RQ4: Which conditions in each institutional domain are in conjunctural causality with 
the representation of women on boards? 
RQ5: Which combinations of country-level conditions lead to a higher number of 
women on boards? 
RQ6: What is the role of gender quotas for boards of directors in the existing national 
configurations? Are they necessary and/or sufficient conditions to achieve a 
higher number of women on boards? 
 
In order to answer the alleged research questions, this study adopts a unique and 
comprehensive conceptual framework that takes into account both the interrelated forces 
existing between welfare, labour, and cultural institutions in shaping women’s rise to 
corporate board positions, as well as the role of affirmative action policies in supporting 
such a rise. The aim is to better inform policies and practices aimed to promote gender 
diversity on boards.  
By adopting a multiple theoretical lens, this study theoretically informs and empirically 
verifies the existence of complementarities between different institutional domains and 
their joint causal effects on female representation on boards. The core assumption is that 
the more gender-neutral are cultural, welfare and labour institutions, the higher will be the 
number of women on boards of directors. The underlying logic is that, the presence of 
complementarities leads institutions to complement and mutually reinforce their similar 
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non-gendered structures, thus creating positive synergistic effects on the distribution of 
opportunities and power in society, and then on the number of women that hold top- 
management positions. This research draws on institutional complementarities theory to 
support these arguments and it proposes women on boards as the outcome of a conjunction 
or combination of certain country-level causal conditions. In doing so, it adopts a set-
theoretic approach to study women on boards in terms of causally complex relations. 
Indeed, referring to the existence of complementarities underlies a causal mechanism 
between institutions, because complementarities imply that the effect of one institution 
depends on the presence or absence of another (complementary) institution. Moreover, 
national institutional conditions can combine in different ways, by generating several 
national configurations. Analyzing such configurations may result in different conjunctions 
or combinations of causal conditions (conjunctural causality) that can equally lead to a 
higher number of women on boards of directors (equifinality). The corresponding insights 
may be relevant to assess whether or not there is a superior national model for female 
representation on boards, as well as to evaluate the role of gender quotas policies within 
the existing national configurations.  
In order to corroborate the alleged theoretical propositions, this work presents a 
qualitative empirical investigation. More exhaustively, it performs a fuzzy sets/Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA) between the 27 EU countries. Considering that exploring 
complex causal relations essentially means finding necessary and sufficient conditions and 
their combinations for a given outcome (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012), this research 
approach allows for the causal interpretation of the phenomenon of gender diversity on 
boards. To that effect, the adoption of fs/QCA leads to map countries (cases) as 
configurations of institutional attributes (causal conditions) and to analyze each causal 
condition in terms of necessary and/or sufficient condition for the outcome under 
investigation. In this way, it is possible to explore the alleged existence of institutional 
complementarities and joint causation in terms of multiple conjunction of country-level 
causal conditions where the effect of a single condition may unfold only in combination 
with other conditions, i.e. where single national conditions may be neither necessary nor 
sufficient to achieve a higher number of women on boards. The corresponding findings 
reveal the existence of a unique, almost “ideal”, configuration of national institutional 
conditions that is sufficient to achieve a higher number of women on boards. Conversely, 
gender quotas for boards of directors are found to be neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for gender diversity on boards. Overall, these results support the alleged 
existence of institutional complementarities and conjunctural causation, but not the 
occurrence of other equifinal pathways that can equally lead to a comparatively higher 
number of women on boards across EU countries. This is the most notable result for this 
research, since it provides strong support to the assumption that a more equal division of 
gender roles within families, labour and cultural institutions can lead to a greater presence 
of women on boards, more than the single enactment of gender quotas does.  
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By filling important gaps in extant literature, this work contributes to the corporate 
governance research in several ways. From a theoretical perspective, it refines and 
advances previous insights on the institutional view of gender diversity on boards. In 
detail, it contributes to shed light on the existence of institutional complementarities in 
shaping female representation on boards, and to assess the actual necessity and sufficiency 
of board gender quotas. In this way, it also contributes to the controversial and still open 
debate about the function of gender quotas in the existing national configurations. 
Furthermore, this research presents important policy implications. By providing 
meaningful insights on the mix of policies that may be more effective to advance female 
representation women in board positions, it contributes to better drive the choices of both 
politicians and practitioner aimed at promoting gender diversity on boards. Overall, this 
work suggests that a more effective mix of policies to promote gender diversity on boards 
may go beyond the enactment of gender quotas at board level, and it may require initiatives 
that deconstruct the presence of gender in many other institutions. Indeed, policy initiatives 
should take into account that the presence of institutional complementarities contributes to 
enhance their stability over time and introducing a new regulatory policy in a set of stable 
and mutually reinforcing institutions might fail to achieve the intended objectives. More 
rational legislative initiatives should consider that the introduction of gender quotas might 
be not sufficient to promote female representation on boards of directors, if gender persists 
in other institutions. 
 
This thesis contains a total of six chapters and it has been structured as follows. 
  
Chapter 1: Literature Review 
This chapter reviews the main themes related to the subject of gender diversity on 
corporate boards, by articulating them into two mainstreams: 1) characteristics, impact, 
rationales, and antecedents of women on boards; and 2) forms, impact, rationales and 
antecedents of gender regulatory policies for boards of directors. The state of the art 
reveals some areas of research that still need further investigations. Although corporate 
governance research has recognized the importance of welfare, labour and cultural 
institutions in shaping gender diversity on boards, it has almost neglected the existence of 
complementarities between these three institutional domains and their potential synergistic 
effects on female representation on boards. Moreover, one of the most unsolved issues 
refers to the functional performance of gender quotas for boards of directors. The 
controversial effects that gender quotas may have of firm/board performance have led to 
great political disagreements and some academic scepticism on their actual necessity and 
sufficiency as appropriate mean to achieve a higher number of women on boards. Clearly, 
designing public policies that are suitable to promote gender diversity in boardrooms 
requires a deepened understanding of the institutional antecedents of female 
underrepresentation on boards. Unfortunately, very few studies have addressed the 
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relationships between institutional antecedents of female underrepresentation on boards 
and the use of public regulatory policies, thus leaving completely separated these two 
streams of research. These unsolved issues appear to intersect intimately each other and 
they suggest the need for adopting a comprehensive and unique conceptual framework to 
solve them. Indeed, existing national configurations really matter for the introduction of 
new affirmative action policies. When a new regulatory policy or institution is enacted into 
a given national system, it may fail to gain the expected objectives, because of the synergic 
effect of complementarities. This state of affairs represents the starting point of the present 
work. 
 
Chapter 2: Theories and Propositions 
This chapter details the assumptions of three theories involved in this research: 
institutional complementarities theory, configurational theory, and set theory. The 
adoption of a multiple theoretical lens has a twofold aim: 1) to develop explicit theoretical 
arguments about the causal mechanisms that link women on boards to a bundle of multiple 
interconnected institutions; and, 2) to argue the consequences of these linkages in terms of 
necessity and sufficiency of the introduction of gender quotas at board level. The existence 
of complementarities between welfare, labour and cultural institutions is argued according 
to their similar gendered structures. The presence of gender in each institution reinforces 
the presence of gender in the others, thus generating strong complementarities and synergic 
effects on the national outcome of interest (i.e., women on boards). The assumption that 
complementary institutions have mutually reinforcing effects on female representation on 
boards underlies a claim of conjunctural causation, intended as the conjunction or 
combination of multiple causal conditions for the outcome at hand. In this way, the 
interdependence of institutions poses a problem of causal complexity, defined in terms of 
multiple conjunctural causal relations where no single cause may be either necessary or 
sufficient. For this reason, the development of propositions is informed by the assumption 
of set theory, particularly suitable when the inquiry concerns the study of causally complex 
relations. Overall, this work assumes the existence of two equifinal and mutually non-
exclusive bundles of causal conditions that can equally lead to a higher number of women 
on boards. More exhaustively, the first proposition suggests a sufficient combination of 
“gender neutral” national conditions that can lead to a higher number of women on boards, 
without the need for enacting gender quotas at board level. With regard to the functional 
performance of gender quotas for boards of directors, this study proposes that they are a 
sufficient, but not necessary condition to achieve a higher number of women on boards. 
 
Chapter 3. Method 
By using a fuzzy sets / Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA), this study compares 
national configurations of the 27 EU countries. The essential scope is to empirically verify 
the existence of institutional complementarities and joint causal effects. To that end, this 
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chapter describes the main steps and procedure of fs/QCA and it stresses the importance of 
using this method as both a research approach, and an analytical technique. It presents the 
criteria that were used for selecting cases (EU countries) and causal conditions (maternity 
leave, paternity leave, parental leave, childcare services, female employment, female part 
time employment, level of gender equality in the overall society, and forms of regulation 
for female representation on boards) to be involved in the analysis. After defining the 
research setting, it describes the measures that were chosen to quantitatively express both 
causal conditions and outcome. At the same time, this chapter provides a detailed 
description of the criteria and qualitative anchors that are required for the process of 
calibration, i.e. the transformation of conventional variables into fuzzy sets. In particular, it 
focuses on the “direct method” of calibration, which transforms interval-scale variables 
into the metric of log odds, and then into the degree of membership in the target (fuzzy) 
set. This method requires to establish three important qualitative anchors according to 
theoretical and substantive knowledge at hand: 1) the threshold for the full membership of 
countries in the target set; 2) the cross-over point where cases are neither in nor out the set; 
and 3) the threshold for the full non-membership of countries in the target set. 
 
Chapter 4: Analysis and Results 
This chapter describes the remaining steps of fs/QCA. In particular, these steps pertain 
to the construction and analysis of the truth table, which contains all the logically possible 
combinations of causal conditions for an outcome, and where each row represents a unique 
configuration. Afterwards, this chapter presents the results of the analysis of sufficiency 
and necessity. On the one hand, the analysis of (individual) sufficiency and necessity 
shows that, taken one at time, each elected institutional condition is neither a sufficient nor 
a necessary condition on its own to achieve a higher number of women on boards. This 
means that gender quotas for boards of directors result to be neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for gender diversity on boards. Conversely, the truth table analysis 
(analysis of sufficient conditions), reveals the existence of a unique configuration of 
national institutional conditions that is sufficient to achieve a higher number of women on 
boards. In sum, these results provide support for the assumptions related to the existence of 
institutional complementarities and conjunctural causation, but not for the occurrence of 
other equifinal pathways for achieving a comparatively higher number of women on 
boards. 
 
Chapter 5. Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter presents an extensive discussion related to the empirical evidence emerged 
from the qualitative comparative analysis between the 27 EU countries. The most notable 
finding is that the unique configuration resulting from the empirical analysis almost exactly 
overlaps with the “ideal” conjunction of causal conditions that was formulated in 
Proposition 1 (excepted for the condition “high level of female part time employment”). 
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Since this configuration reflects theoretically-informed assumptions, it can be considered 
an (almost) “ideal type” of national model for gender diversity on boards. Overall, this 
chapter offers a detailed description of the main contributions of the research and it 
emphasizes a number of theoretical and practical implications. Finally, it shows some 
limitations of this study and illustrates a new research agenda to investigate the existence 
of hierarchies between complementary institutions, as well as dynamics and directions 
concerning the institutional change for women on boards. 
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CHAPTER 1 LITERATURE REVIEW 
OVERVIEW: This chapter reviews the main themes related to gender diversity on 
boards of directors, in terms of characteristics, impact, rationales and antecedents 
of both female representation and gender regulation policies. Overall, corporate 
governance research is now recognizing the importance of national institutional 
domains for gender diversity on boards, as well as the complexities of their 
interconnection and their underlying causal mechanisms. However, very few 
studies have dealt with this complexity and many research questions still need to 
be answered. Filling these gaps contributes to better understand the interrelated 
forces that shape female representation on boards, hence allowing for a more 
rational design of regulatory policies aimed at promoting gender diversity on 
boards. 
1.1 Women on boards of directors 
Corporate governance research has explored several issues related to women on the 
boards of directors. The first comprehensive review on this topic was provided by 
Terjesen et al. (2009), who highlighted that very few contributions have addressed 
theoretical development, making this stream of research mainly descriptive. Indeed, 
primary attention was posed on three subjects: 1) the diverse characteristics of men and 
women directors; 2) the performance effects of gender diversity on boards; and 3) the 
antecedents of women on boards. In the next paragraphs, the main studies on these 
topics are reviewed. 
1.1.1 Characteristics  
A considerable stream of research has explored the diverse characteristics of men 
and women directors. From a demographic perspective, women directors appear 
significantly younger than men directors do (Peterson and Philpot, 2007; Sealy et al., 
2007; Sealy et al., 2008). In contrast, the findings concerning their marital status are 
divided. Whilst Burke and Kurucz (1998) have reported that just 47 per cent of 
women directors in a Canadian sample were married, a later study has shown that 
between 65 and 71 per cent of women directors in Australia, U.S.A. and Canada are 
married (Burgess and Tharenou, 2002).  With regard to the number of children, Burgess 
and Tharenou (2002) have found that 44% of women directors in Austalia have 
(dependent) children and 70% in U.S.A and Canada have (any) children. Furthermore, 
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the authors emphasize that Australian women directors appear to have larger families 
(average 2.9 children), compared to UK and Canadian counterparts.  
A consistent result in the extant literature is that women directors are well qualified 
and better educated than their male counterparts are (Peterson and Philpot, 2007; Singh 
et al., 2008). For instance, Singh et al. (2008) highlight that women are more likely to 
have an MBA degree and international experiences, compared to male directors. 
Nevertheless, they often lack of opportunities to gain business experience (Terjesen et 
al., 2009). Generally, female directors hold more multiple directorships (5 per cent) than 
men (< 1 per cent); this means that just a few number of women become experienced as 
directors (Sealy et al., 2007; Terjesen et al., 2009). Moreover, the representation of 
women on the boards of directors is more likely in non-executive positions (Singh et al., 
2008; Adams and Kirchmaier, 2013; Sealy and Vinnicombe, 2013). Interesting findings 
also concern the independence of directors. Adams and Ferreira (2009) report that 
women directors are more independent than men and they represent tough monitors of 
CEOs; female directors are found to have better attendance records than male directors 
and to be more likely to join monitoring committees. However, independence cannot be 
interpreted as a female trait, because it might be explained by other unobserved 
characteristics (such as social or business networks) (Ferreira, 2015). 
By analyzing the director taxonomy of the 2002 Fortune 500 list of top United States 
companies, Peterson and Philpot (2007) have found that in most cases female inside 
directors are founder or family member (45.5 per cent), unlike of men (12.9 per cent). 
To that regard, “women (non-CEO) insider directors appear to be treated as if they offer 
lesser value” (Zelechowski and Bilimoria, 2004, p. 341). Despite the same level of 
experience-based qualifications of board or company tenure, women inside directors are 
found to: 1) hold fewer multiple directorships; 2) disproportionately serve in staff 
function; 3) hold less powerful corporate titles, and 3) earn considerably less than men 
inside directors, with very low chance to be in the list of top earners as their male 
counterparts (Zelechowski and Bilimoria, 2004).  
1.1.2 Impact 
A central tenet in studies concerning the effects of board composition on firm 
performance is that, since board members have a strategic influence on decision-making 
and/or supervisory roles, the board of directors is likely to affect organizational 
performance (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). Starting from such a rationale, some 
scholars pointed out that gender diversity in the boardroom may lead to better decisions 
through the exchange of a variety of viewpoints and ideas, as well as of heterogeneous 
experiences and opinions (Arfken et al., 2004; Erhardt et al., 2003). In other words, 
extensive gender homogeneity among board members might lead to the exclusion of 
certain talents, making the corporate board rather suboptimal (Burke, 1997). If working 
structure and team processes are key elements for board performance (Huse, 2007), then 
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women directors may enhance board development activities, to the extent to which they 
“spend more time preparing for board meetings, trying to understand the nature and 
logic of board work, devote time to board evaluation, and identify areas with potential 
for improvement” (Nielsen and Huse, 2010, p. 140). Moreover, the presence of female 
directors can lighten the atmosphere of boards (Huse and Solberg, 2006), reduce 
conflicts (Nielsen and Huse, 2010), and it may influence board creativity through 
thoughtful discussions (Huse et al., 2009).  
However, to assess whether diversity in the boardroom affects firm performance has 
provided ambiguous results. Academic studies have documented that diverse 
demographic characteristics in boards of directors are positively associated with return 
on investment and/or return on assets (e.g., Erhardt, et al., 2003; Carter et al., 2010), 
although significant relationships with financial performance have not always been 
detected (see for example the mixed results obtained by Carter et al., 2010). Similar 
mixed findings have been reported in the extant literature on gender diversity on boards. 
For instance, Carter et al. (2003) have found that the presence of women on the board of 
directors in a sample of US firms was positively associated to firm value. Moreover 
they have shown that, compared to all-male boards of directors, firms with two or more 
women directors performed better on both firm value (1.58 versus 1.03) and ROA 
(5.2% versus 2.5%). Positive relations between the presence of women in top 
management positions and firm performance have also been observed by Dezsö and 
Ross (2012), but only when firm’s strategy was focused on innovation. By investigating 
non-financial firms in Spain, Campbell and Mìnguez-Vera (2008) have confirmed the 
positive effect of gender diversity on firm value and they have firmly argued that a 
higher number of female board members may generate economic gains. In a later study, 
these authors have also verified that the appointment of female directors is related to a 
positive short-term reaction of the stock market and it is positively associated with long-
term firm value (Campbell and Mìnguez-Vera, 2010).  Similar correlations have been 
found trough the analysis of listed Australian corporations (Nguyen and Faff, 2012).  
Many other contributions explored the relation between women on boards and firm 
performance by making reference to a critical mass threshold. The critical mass theory 
states that when a minority group reaches a certain number-threshold, its influence 
grows and it may have an impact on group interactions (Kanter, 1977a; Kanter, 1977b; 
Grey, 2006). In studies of gender diversity on boards, empirical evidence have 
suggested that having three or more women on the board of directors normalizes their 
presence and enhances their contributions to both board dynamics and processes 
(Konrad et al., 2008). In this vein, a number of research have supported that a critical 
mass of three or more women on boards is positively related to firm innovation (Torchia 
et al., 2011) and firm performance (Joecks et al., 2013). Hence, three has become the 
“magic number” of women in the boardroom (Joecks et al., 2013). 
As opposed to the “positive” research, several studies have reported mixed or 
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negative performance effects (e.g., Shrader et al., 1997; Rose, 2007; Francoeur et al., 
2008; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Mìnguez-Vera and Martin, 2011). The underlying 
explanations refer to the fact that diversity on boards may fragment working team by 
increasing conflicts and factions (Adams et al., 2015), or that “perception of women as 
unequal board members may limit their potential contribution to board decision-
making” (Nielsen and Huse, 2010, p. 16). Therefore, decision making in board of 
directors may not be very effective. In this vein, whilst Shrader et al. (1997) have found 
that a higher percentage of women managers were related to higher financial 
profitability measures, their results did not support the same for women in top 
management team and on the board of directors. Another interesting study has revealed 
that a high proportion of women officers were associated to positive and significant 
returns, while women on corporate boards or on both corporate boards and top 
management did not have a significant impact on financial performance (Francoeur et 
al., 2008). Adams and Ferreira (2009) have reported that female directors substantially 
affect board inputs and board governance, but “the true relation between gender 
diversity and firm performance appears to be more complex” (Adams and Ferreira, 
2009, p. 308). More in depth, their results suggest that the greater is the gender diversity 
of the board, the worse the firm performance. Mìnguez-Vera and Martin (2011) have 
noticed the same negative impact in a sample of Spanish small and medium enterprises. 
Other research indicates that shareholders react more negatively to the announcements 
of female rather than male CEO appointments (Lee and James, 2007), and that “firm 
creates more value for its owners when the board has no employee directors, when its 
directors have strong links to other boards, and when gender diversity is low” (Bøhren 
and Strøm, 2010, p. 1281). Finally, no significant relationship between female members 
on boards and firm performance has been found by Rose (2007) and Chapple and 
Humphrey (2014).  
Given the differences in measures of performance, time, methodology, contextual 
issues, empirical specifications and omitted variables, this set of studies has appeared 
rather heterogeneous (Ferreira, 2015; Adams et al., 2015). More recently, Post and 
Byron (2015) have performed a meta-analysis of 140 contributions on the relationship 
between female board representation (defined as the number, proportion, or presence of 
women on boards of directors) and firm financial performance (both accounting returns 
and market performance). Their statistical investigation has highlighted: 1) a positive 
relation between female board representation and accounting returns, especially in those 
countries where stronger shareholder protections occur; and 2) positive effects on 
market performance in countries with greater gender parity; otherwise they are near-
zero, or negative in countries with low gender parity.  
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1.1.3 Rationales and antecedents  
Deepening causes and antecedents of the underrepresentation of women on boards 
was the aim of a numerous contributions, which explored the factors that mainly affect 
this shortage. Academic research has addressed these issues at four levels: individual, 
firm, board and industry/environment (Terjesen et al., 2009). Whilst the majority of 
studies have focused on the micro (individual directors) and meso (boards and firms) 
levels, mostly in single-country settings, little research has addressed macro-level issues 
(concerning industry and environment), with very few contributions to the country-level 
antecedents of women on boards (Grosvold and Brammer, 2011; Terjesen and Singh, 
2008). Moreover, an interesting approach has been provided by Gabaldon et al. (2015), 
who have analyzed the causes of gender imbalance on board from a supply and demand 
perspective, by considering board directors as a labour market. Concerning the supply-
side barriers, the aforementioned authors have underlined the importance of gender 
differences in values and attitudes, gender role expectations, and work-family conflict. 
The demand-side barriers refer to gender discrimination and gender-based bias at firm 
level, as well as to the influence of institutions at environment-level. 
Overall, the major arguments for female underrepresentation on boards of directors 
include:  
 1) the lack of human and social capital (e.g., Burke, 2000; Doldor, et al., 2012; 
Farrell and Hirsch, 2005; Sheridan and Milgate, 2005; Singh and Vinnicombe, 
2006);  
2) flawed appointment processes (e.g., Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994; Kanter, 1977; 
Oakley, 2000; Westphal and Zajac, 1995); 
 3) attitudinal and organizational biases affecting women’ career advancement (e.g., 
Morrison et al., 1992; Ryan and Haslam, 2005; Terjesen and Singh, 2008; Williams, 
2003); and  
4) national institutional environment (e.g., Adams and Kirchmaier, 2013; Grosvold 
and Brammer, 2011; Terjesen and Singh, 2008).  
 
Human and social capital. Rooting in human capital theory1, a common argument for 
the lack of gender diversity on boards is the assumption that women do not have 
adequate competences, qualifications and experience that are essential for board 
positions (Burke, 2000; Doldor, et al., 2012). This is true especially in “male-
dominated” environment, where male leadership roles prevail, by making more difficult 
for women to emerge and build profitable relationships and to be accepted into 
                                                          
1
 According to human capital theory, the stock of education, skills and experience can benefit both the 
individuals and their organizations.  
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influential networks (Carli, 1990; Eagly, 2007; McPherson et al. 2001). Therefore, it is 
persistent in extant literature the idea that there are not enough qualified women in the 
pipeline of potential directors or that women have not been in the pipeline long enough 
(Doldor et al., 2012). To that regard, Farrell and Hirsch (2005) suggest that the limited 
number of qualified candidates may be due to the extensive presence of women in 
multiple directorships. In this way, just a small pool of women with the “right” 
qualifications emerges. 
The underrepresentation of women on boards is also explained by their exclusion 
from social networks, which are critical in the election to board positions through 
sponsorship and recommendation mechanisms (Terjesen et al., 2009). The importance 
of business expertise, personal connections, business contacts, and visibility for the rise 
to top positions has been emphasized by several contributions (e.g. Sheridan and 
Milgate, 2005; Singh and Vinnicombe, 2006).   
 
Appointment process. Flawed appointment processes represent other important 
antecedents, such as unclear selection criteria, unconscious bias in the selection process, 
excessive importance of social capital and personal reputations (Doldor et al., 2012). 
Overall, gender-based stereotypes and sexual discriminations may seriously affect the 
process of selection to top positions (Oakley, 2000). Kanter (1977) states that men in 
powerful position are more likely to choose other men. In doing so, they replicate male-
dominated board structures and foster the homosocial reproduction. This behaviour is 
predicted by self-categorization theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1986), according to which 
individuals provide a higher evaluation for “in-group” members, because of similar 
characteristics. Confirming such a rationale, Westphal and Zajac (1995) have found that 
when incumbent CEOs are more powerful than their boards of directors, new appointees 
are likely to be demographically similar to the CEO. Conversely, when boards are more 
powerful than their CEOs, new appointees resemble the existing board. These findings 
suggest that both CEO and board members favour new directors with similar 
demographic characteristics. In a similar vein, Bilimoria and Piderit (1994) have 
reported that the presence of systematic sex-based biases against women in the selection 
of board committee members is pervasive.  
 
Career advancement. Another vigorous stream of research dealt with attitudinal and 
organizational biases that may hinder women’ career paths and their rise to the top. The 
metaphor of the “glass ceiling” refers to these biases as invisible barriers to women’ 
advancement and states that women are kept from reaching top corporate positions not 
for their ability to handle this job, but just for being women (Morrison et al., 1992). 
Since changing attitudes takes a long time, workplaces persist to be largely male-
oriented (Williams, 2003), and women are more likely to be employed in low-paying 
sectors, in less strategic areas and in non-executive directorships (Peterson and Philpot, 
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2007; Adams and Kirchmaier, 2013). Moreover, women are more likely to be appointed 
in boards of companies that suffer poor performance and downturn. Researchers refer to 
this circumstance as the “glass cliff” phenomenon, because of their risky or precarious 
positions (Ryan and Haslam, 2005; 2007). This means that women are seriously limited 
in the acquisition of adequate human capital and social capital for board positions. 
According to Ragins et al. (1998, p. 29), “commitment to breaking the glass ceiling, 
while important, is not sufficient; for change to occur, CEOs must also have a clear 
understanding of the subtle and overt barriers women face in their advancement”. As a 
result, the female talent pipeline to executive roles and the related barriers are become a 
central issue in studies of gender diversity on boards (Sealy and Vinnicombe, 2013). To 
this end, a relevant contribution has been made by a plethora of research in law, 
management, sociology, and psychology tradition. These studies have provided strong 
support for the role of stereotypes, prejudices and prescriptive social norms in affecting 
women’s professional career (e.g., Swiss and Walker, 1993; Williams, 2000: 2005). 
Among the others, primary attention has been posed on the presence of gender-based 
stereotypes and gendered social systems (Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004). 
Gender-based stereotypes affect the perception of women in workplaces, the way 
they handle their job and their career advancement (Williams, 2000; 2003). For 
instance, the fact that women have to bear and nurse children determines a functional 
asymmetry in marital roles (Pearson and Bales, 1955). “The related presumption then is 
that men, who cannot perform these biological functions, should specialize in the 
instrumental realm of work” (Barnett and Hyde, 2001, p. 782). Such prescriptive social 
norms represent the foundations of the “breadwinner” and “caregiver” stereotypes. In 
other words, traditionalist roles associated with men and women have a twofold 
consequence: 1) family responsibilities and childcare are associated with women; and 2) 
work and career are associated with men. Accordingly, women’s family responsibilities 
“hinder or are perceived to hinder their commitment to the organisation and their lack of 
involvement in corporate networks that provide access to powerful people” (Terjesen 
and Singh, 2008, p. 56).  
In this regard, Williams (2003) argues that much of the gender inequality depends on 
the way in which the relationship between work and family is organized. Whilst the 
prescriptive norm of the “ideal worker” is associated with full-time and full-force for 
working, the prescriptive norm of the “ideal mother” refers to full-time and full-force 
for childbearing and childrearing. Clearly, they are two contrasting and gendered social 
norms (Williams, 2003). The most tangible result is that the “ideal workplaces” are 
shaped on men’s bodies and men’s traditional life patterns, with direct discrimination 
against women (Williams, 2000; Guillaume and Pochic, 2007). For instance, managerial 
careers require full-time availability and geographical mobility: “the typical 
organizational career pattern, linear and progressive, ignores individual life cycles and 
implicitly assumes that managers are male” (Guillaume and Pochic, 2007, p. 22). 
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Empirical evidence has also supported that work–family conflict and gender imbalance 
in family responsibilities hinder women from reaching senior managerial positions 
(Linehan and Walsh, 2000). Taking parental leave or flexible work arrangements could 
have negative effects on career advancement and managerial ambitions of women 
(Drew and Murtagh, 2005; Manchester et al., 2010). 
Interestingly, Williams (2003, p. 13) argues that the glass ceiling is created, in part, 
by the “maternal wall”. The latter concept was coined by Swiss and Walker (1993) and 
it has been used by Williams (2005) to embrace all the prescriptive stereotypes 
associated with the maternal role of women and to the wrong assumptions that women 
cannot succeed in multiple roles (e.g. statistical discrimination, hostile as well as 
benevolent stereotyping, stereotype by perceived competence, caregiver stereotype). 
Women are discriminated in the workplace because of their past, present and even 
future pregnancies, or because they take parental leave or they prefer part-time job 
(Williams and Westfall, 2006). Ganguli et al. (2011) confirm that women face three 
gaps in their labour force participation:  the ‘labour force participation gap’ (between 
women and men), the ‘marriage gap’ (between married and single women) and the 
‘motherhood gap’ (between mothers and non-mothers). The reconciling of motherhood 
and marriage with a job requires cultural attitude changes and public policies that 
encourage the work-life balance. Motherhood, as a source of discontinuity in work, may 
lead employers to lower investment in skills, associated with a lower employee’s value 
and, therefore, fewer opportunities for career (Lyness et al., 1999). Therefore, the few 
"wonder women" who are able to reach high-level careers are well paid, but at the 
expense of their individual social life: "not having children or outsourcing childcare" 
(Terjesen et al., 2009, p. 331). Conciliation is now being recognized to have tangible 
effects on the number of potential candidates for board positions (Gabaldon et al., 
2015). 
 
Environment. In general, studies addressing the influence of environmental contexts 
on female representation on boards have mainly focused on the role of institutions 
(Terjesen et al., 2009). On the one hand, this research approach is well suited with a 
long tradition of economic studies that recognize the influence of institutional contexts 
on several corporate governance phenomena (see for example, Aguilera and Jackson, 
2003; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Alon, 2013; Denis and McConnell, 2003; 
Judge et al., 2008; Judge et al., 2010; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Zattoni and Cuomo, 
2008; Zattoni et al., 2009). On the other hand, institutional approaches have offered a 
more systematic understanding of the structural barriers to female representation of 
women on boards (Grosvold and Brammer, 2011). For instance, by using data from 43 
countries, Terjesen and Singh (2008) have explored whether women’s representation on 
corporate boards may be shaped by the social, political and economic structures of 
national environment. Their findings show that countries with more women in senior 
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management positions and less gender pay gap between women and men have a higher 
representation of women on boards. This is an interesting result, since women are more 
likely to gain board positions in countries where women and men earn similar amounts. 
Conversely, high levels of female representations on boards are less likely in countries 
with a longer tradition of women’s political representation. In a similar vein, Grosvold 
(2011) has analyzed the impact of institutional contexts on the prevalence of women on 
boards. She finds that politically and culturally liberal countries, where women have a 
major access to education and where religion is less pervasive, have more women on 
boards. Moreover, she suggests that “firms should also evaluate the type of national and 
industry institutional climate they operate in and bear in mind that certain contexts make 
it harder to pursue executive careers” (Grosvold, 2011, p. 542). 
In order to assess whether national institutional systems were related to the 
proportion of women on boards, Grosvold and Brammer (2011) have performed a cross-
country analysis that included 38 countries and covered the years 2001-2007. By 
drawing upon five different national systems (economic, business, legal, governance 
and cultural systems), the authors find that culturally and legally-oriented systems play 
the most relevant role in shaping gender diversity on boards of directors. In detail, their 
results reveal that French and Germanic legal heritages, where generous welfare 
provisions encourage women to balance work and family, have fewer women board 
directors. Looking at national cultural systems, Nordic European and Eastern European 
culture-oriented countries are significantly related to a greater percentage of women on 
boards. This is due to their lower levels of gender differentiation, meaning “the degree 
to which men and women are viewed differently in a given” society (Grosvold and 
Brammer, 2011, p. 121).  
Similar results appear in the study of Adams and Kirchmaier (2013), showing that 
national culture is significantly related to female directorship, at the extent to “the more 
people believe that women’s role is at home, the lower director participation will be” 
(Adams and Kirchmaier, 2013, p. 20). In addition, the authors find that presence of 
(non-executive) women on boards is positively related to female labour force 
participation, by excluding part-time and unemployed workers. Such evidence 
recommends the importance of national policies that promote full-time female 
employment and family services to generate a pipeline of potential women for top 
corporate positions, as part-time jobs could undermine women’s professional careers. 
This work represents the first attempt to empirically assess the linkages between the 
under-representation of women on boards and their role in the labour market. Indeed, 
Adams and Kirchmaier (2013, p. 1) start from the assumption that “the list of barriers to 
female representation in management is analogous to the list of barriers to female labour 
participation”, such as discrimination, human capital, culture and psychological 
attributes.  
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It is interesting to note that European institutions support this tenet. The European 
Parliament has enacted a resolution on eliminating gender stereotypes2, recognizing the 
disproportionate involvement of women in flexible and part-time jobs and the 
persistence of the traditional belief that women carry the main family responsibilities. 
Indeed, the resolution emphasizes that “gender stereotypes have a tendency to be self-
fulfilling and that, if women are never given the chance to prove themselves, they will 
never manage to break the barriers blocking their way”. For these reasons, the European 
Union asks member states to deconstruct gender stereotypes, by providing: 1) a major 
number of inexpensive and high-quality childcare and eldercare facilities; 2) suitable 
forms of parental leave for both men and women; and 3) establishing binding quotas for 
increasing the presence of women in positions of responsibility in the largest listed 
companies and in decision-making bodies in the political and business worlds. 
1.2 Gender regulation for boards of directors 
Despite the last years have seen a growing commitment in fostering gender equality 
in the boardroom, women are still not equally represented on the boards (Terjesen et al., 
2014) and their presence in directorship positions is actually worse than many surveys 
can suggest (Adams and Kirchmaier, 2013). To change this direction, EU Institutions 
have asked listed public companies to increase the quota of female representation on 
boards to 30% by 2015 and 40% by 2020. Clearly, the application and the enforcement 
of law greatly differ across European countries and they are likely to determine different 
results. Generally, supporters of gender quotas regulation for the board of directors 
often make a “business case” for women on boards (Ferreira, 2015), assuming female 
representation in the boardroom as positively related to firm performance. However, the 
ambiguous results associated with the impact of board gender quotas (e.g., Ahern and 
Dittmar, 2012; Matsa and Miller, 2013) have led to some scepticism and to the 
corresponding doubt about their effectiveness. Therefore, the debate about gender 
quotas is controversial and still open. Beyond the “business case”, the importance of 
reframing this debate using both utility and justice arguments is now being recognized 
(e.g. Seierstad, 2015; Ferreira, 2015) and several theoretical perspectives about the 
adoption and diffusion of gender quotas are spreading in academic literature (e.g. 
Teigen, 2012; Terjesen et al., 2014). I detail these issues below. 
                                                          
2
 European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2013 on eliminating gender stereotypes in the EU. 
Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2013-
0074 +0+DOC +XML+V0//EN  
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1.2.1 Forms  
The institutional intervention of states through public policies aims to protect 
individuals and their families from insecurity and uncertainty (Girotti, 1998). Laws on 
maternity protection are clear examples of a primarily protective perspective. However, 
over the last decades, State intervention has moved from protection to promotion of 
women's representation in politics, labour markets, and top management positions. 
Regarding labour markets, states can intervene in two ways to support gender equality 
(Chang, 2000). First, states can intervene in the private sphere, by providing 
“substantive benefits” that help women in work-life balance, such as maternity leave 
and other services for working mothers. Second, they can ensure “equality of access” in 
public sphere, by legislating different measure to promote female participation in the 
labour force (e.g., antidiscrimination laws, equal pay, and so on). The strongest forms of 
such interventionism are affirmative action policies that mandate an equal gender 
representation across occupations (Chang, 2000). Generally, these affirmative action 
policies consist of either legislative or voluntary measures. Narrowing the attention on 
board gender legislation, Seierstad and Opsahl (2011) distinguish between: 1) soft 
policies for “equality of opportunity”, such as corporate governance codes or voluntary 
quotas; and 2) hard policies for “equality of outcomes”, typically gender quotas and 
targets.  
In order to get information about the variety of forms that gender regulation for 
boards of directors can have, a deepened documentary analysis was conducted (Bailey, 
1994; Payne and Payne, 2004; Scott, 1990). In detail, it referred to: 1) legal texts, 
including national laws, administrative regulations, and corporate governance codes; 2) 
official documents (e.g., European Commission National Factsheets, 2013; European 
Commission, 2012a); and 3) previous academic contributions (e.g. Terjesen et al., 
2014), by taking into account the latest updates. In the choice of the documentary 
sources, the four control criteria described by Scott (1990) were followed, namely: 
authenticity, credibility, representativeness, and meaning. Since primary reference was 
made to public and official sources, the analysis was particularly careful and reliable. 
Below is a more detail description of the resulting review, while Table 1.1 summarizes 
the main differences across countries. 
 
Legislative measures. Since Norway enacted gender quotas on boards, “a snowball 
started rolling” (Huse and Seierstad, 2014, p. 38). Some countries have followed the 
Norwegian experience, while other countries are wondering whether similar measures 
should be adopted. However, across countries, gender quotas legislation for boards of 
directors differs for target, time and penalties for non-compliance (Terjesen et al., 
2014).  
 
CHAPTER 1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
25 
 
Norway. In Norway, the law of 40% female quotas was proposed in 2003. It was 
definitively enacted in 2006 for state-owned companies and 2008 for publicly traded 
companies. The Norwegian law provides sanctions for non-compliance; exactly 
companies are dissolved (Terjesen et al., 2014). However, “despite Norway’s reputation 
as a country of gender equality, the use of gender quotas within the private sector in 
Norway was controversial and debated” (Huse and Seierstad, 2014:38). Indeed, the 
Norwegian initiative has been defined as “coercive approach”, due to the use of 
legislation (Seierstad and Opsahl, 2011).  
 
Spain. In 2007
3
, Spain aimed to achieve 40% female quotas by 2015 only for 
large publicly traded companies (with more than 250 employees). The law appears as 
recommendation, with no relevant sanctions for non-compliance, except for some 
effects on the consideration for public subsidies and state contracts (Terjesen et al., 
2014).  
 
France. In France, the objective was to achieve 20% of female directors by 2014 
and 40% by 2017
4
. This rule is applied to companies with at least 500 workers and more 
than €50 million of revenues. For non-compliant companies, the French government 
established that any board appointment is revoked and fees to directors are suspended.  
 
Italy. In 2011
5
, Italy required up to one-third (33%) of each sex on the 
management board and supervisory board by 2015. The rule includes companies listed 
on the stock exchange and state-owned companies (Cuomo and Mapelli, 2011). The 
National Securities and Exchange Commission (Consob) guarantee the enforcement of 
the law with fines and forfeiture of elected directors.  
 
                                                          
3
 Organic Law 3/2007 of 22 March 2007 on effective equality between men and women. Source: 
European Commission (2012:18). Available at : http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/women-
on-boards_en.pdf. 
4
 Loi ° 2011-103 du 27 janvier 2011 relative à la représentation équilibrée des femmes et des hommes au 
sein des conseils d’administration et de surveillance et à l’égalité professionnelle publiée au Journal 
Officiel du 28 janvier 2011. Source: European Commission (2012:17). Available at : 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/women-on-boards_en.pdf. 
5
 Act No. 120 of 12 July 2011, published in Official Journal No. 174 of 28 July 2011 (Legge 12 luglio 
2011, n. 120, “Modifiche al testo unico delle disposizioni in materia di intermediazione finanziaria, di cui 
al decreto legislativo 24 febbraio 1998, n. 58, concernenti la parità di accesso agli organi di 
amministrazione e di controllo delle società quotate in mercati regolamentati”, GU n. 174 del 28-7-2011). 
Source: European Commission (2012:18). Available at : http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-
equality/files/women-on-boards_en.pdf. 
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Belgium. Similarly, in 2011
6
 Belgium introduced an amendment to the Company 
Code requiring at least on third (33%) of each sex among board members of publicly 
listed companies (by 2018) and state-owned companies (by 2012). Specific sanctions 
for non-compliance are provided: 1) the suspension of any benefits to directors; and 2) 
any appointment that does not comply with quota target is void.  
Finland. Since 2005, Finland required state-owned companies, government 
committees, working groups, advisory boards, commissions and municipal bodies to 
appoint at least 40% women in their boards of directors. Moreover, “body, agency or 
institution exercising public authority, or a company in which the Government or a 
municipality is the majority shareholder has an administrative board, board of directors 
or some other executive or administrative body consisting of elected representatives, 
this must comprise an equitable proportion of both women and men, unless there are 
special reasons to the contrary”7. On 20 October 2008, the Finnish Corporate 
Governance Code, applicable to listed companies, replaced the Corporate Governance 
Recommendation (2003). The revised version requires “both genders shall be 
represented on the board”8. There are no penalties for non-compliance, but a “comply or 
explain” principle is applied: companies have to explain the deviation from the Code. 
 
Germany. Germany reacted very late to the debate about gender regulatory 
policies for the board of directors, with strong political disagreement on the enactment 
of gender quotas (Seierstad et al., 2015). Originally, the German government opted for 
self-regulation, by asking the supervisory board to determine targets in terms of the 
share of women on the management board. Many individual businesses have set up 
voluntary target or quotas to increase the number of women on their boards. Among the 
others, Deutsche Telekom, Henkel and Bayer have shown a great commitment to that 
effect (European Commission, 2012a). However, the change of political parties in 
power has led the new coalition to agree on the enactment of gender quotas law. On 
March 2015, the law on equal participation of women and men in leadership positions 
in the private and public sector has been adopted. Currently, the German Corporate 
                                                          
6
 Law modifying the law of 21 March 1991 on the reform of certain public economic enterprises, the  
Company Code and the law of 19 April 2002 concerning the rationalisation of functioning and 
management of the National Lottery aiming to guarantee the presence of women in the boards of 
autonomous public  enterprises, listed companies and National Lottery, published in Moniteur 
Belge/Belgisch Staatsblad of 14 September 2011, p. 59600. Source: European Commission (2012:17). 
Available at : http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/women-on-boards_en.pdf. 
7
  Act on Equality between Women and Men, No. 609/1986 as amended up to 488/2011 included, Section 
4a (232/2005), “Composition of public administration bodies and bodies exercising public authority”. 
Available at: http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1986/en19860609.  
8
 An English version of the Finnish Corporate Governance Code can be accessed in: Securities Market 
Association (20 October 2008), “Finnish Corporate Governance Code”, web source: 
http://cgfinland.fi/files/2012/01/cg-koodi_2008_eng.pdf. 
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Governance Code, as amended on May 20159, states: “In listed companies for which the 
Codetermination Act, the Codetermination Act for the Iron and Steel Industry or the 
Codetermination Extension Act apply, the Supervisory Board shall comprise at least 30 
percent women and at least 30 percent men”, with effect from 1 January 2016. The 
other companies covered by the Equality Act the Supervisory Board are asked to 
determine targets for the share of women by 30 September 2015, and to comply by 30 
June 201710.  
 
Other countries. Gender quotas for board of directors were also enacted in Israel. 
The Government required 50% women on boards for state-owned companies, and 1 
female director for publicly traded companies (Terjesen et al., 2014). In Québec 
(Canada), the boards of directors of state-owned enterprises should include “an equal 
number of women and men”11. Therefore, 50% women on boards are required. On 
August 2010, Kenya has introduced the rule of 33% female quotas, applicable to state-
owned companies (Terjesen et al., 2014). In this way, “more than two-thirds of the 
members of elective or appointive bodies shall be of the same gender”12. In Iceland, 
gender quotas for boards of directors passed in 2010: 40% from each sex is expected by 
2013 from both state owned and publicly traded companies with more than 50 employees. 
These countries have not provided any sanction for non-compliance. Conversely, the 
debates about gender quotas have been limited in the media and parliaments of certain 
countries, such as Japan, Indonesia and Mexico (Terjesen et al., 2014).  
 
Voluntary measures. Beyond the enactment of gender quotas legislation, affirmative 
action policies include voluntary initiatives, such as corporate governance codes, 
voluntary targets, charters and business initiatives (for example, mentoring, training and 
networking programmes). Since gender quotas legislation, as “hard” strategy, is not 
appropriate in certain countries, voluntary measures represent the “liberal approach” to 
gender diversity on boards (Seierstad and Opsahl, 2011).  
                                                          
9
 The English version of the Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex, as amended on May 5, 2015, is 
available at: http://www.dcgk.de/en/code.html. 
10
 These deadlines were established according to the “Law on Equal Participation of Men and Women in 
Private-Sector and Public-Sector Management Positions”, Section 25 Subsection 1 EG-AktG 
(Introductory Law of the German Stock Corporation Act), German Federal Gazette I. 2015, 642, 656). 
Further information can be accessed at: http://www.dcgk.de/en/code/current-version/supervisory-
board.html.  
11
 Bill 53, 2006, An Act Respecting the Governance of State-Owned Enterprises and Amending Various 
Legislative Provisions. Available at http://www2.publicationsduquebec.gouv.qc.ca/dynamicSearch/ 
telecharge.php?type=5&file=2006C59A.PDF. 
12
 The Constitution of Kenya (2010), Revised edition, Published by the National Council for Law 
Reporting with the Authority of the Attorney General, chapter 4, part 2, art. 27, section 8, p. 25. Available 
at:  https://www.kenyaembassy.com/pdfs/The%20Constitution%20of%20Kenya.pdf. 
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 United Kingdom.  In 2011, the Lord Davies Report contributed to the promotion 
of female representation in the UK boards of directors. The report recommended, “All 
Chairmen of FTSE 350 companies should set out the percentage of women they aim to 
have on their boards in 2013 and 2015. FTSE 100 boards should aim for a minimum of 
25% female representation by 2015 and we expect that many will achieve a higher 
figure”13 (p.4). Afterwards, the UK Corporate Governance Code was amended14 to 
require listed companies: 1) to establish a policy concerning boardroom diversity and 
measurable objectives for implementing the policy; and 2) to provide annual report of 
the progress made in achieving the objectives. The rule of “comply or explain” 
requirement ensures the disclosure of any appointments that diverge from the 
recommendation. Moreover, other voluntary measures taken in the United Kingdom 
include the mentoring programme “FTSE 100 Cross-Company Mentoring Scheme”, in 
order to support senior female directorship, and the initiatives of the “30% Club”, a 
non-commercial organization that promotes a higher female representation in the boards 
of directors (European Commission, 2012a). As noted by Seierstad and Opsahl (2011), 
the cooperation among various stakeholder groups in the UK is a typical example of a 
“collaborative approach” to gender diversity on boards.  
 
 Sweden. According to the Swedish Corporate Governance Code (point 4.1), 
applicable from 1 February 2010, “the board members elected by the shareholders’ 
meeting are collectively to exhibit diversity and breadth of qualifications, experience 
and background. The company is to strive for equal gender distribution on the board”15. 
In order to improve the initiatives taken on the subject of gender diversity in the 
boardroom, the Swedish Code has been revised on May 2014, with effect from January 
2015. New rules mainly concern the work of nomination committees, which have to 
“provide specific explanation of its proposals with respect to the requirement to strive 
for gender balance contained in rule 4.1”. Sweden has also promoted the 
entrepreneurship of women through national programmes, while the programme 
“Styrelse Kraft” (meaning “board power”) taken by the State owned company ALMI 
Företagspartner, has provided board training, networking and mentorship initiatives in 
                                                          
13
 The Lord Davies Report (2011) can be accessed at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31480/11-745-women-on-
boards.pdf.   
14
 The emended version of the UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council, September 
2014) is available at: https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-
Corporate-Governance-Code-2014.pdf. 
15
 Swedish Corporate Governance Code, Section 4, Point 4.1, page 17. The English version of the 
Swedish Corporate Governance Code is available at: http://www.corporategovernanceboard.se/the-
code/current-code. 
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order to foster women on board positions (European Commission, 2012a). Finally, it is 
interesting to note that the actions taken by individual companies mainly regard the 
implementation of network and the intervention on the recruitment and promotion 
process, rather than voluntary targets or quotas.   
 
Denmark.  The Section 11 of the Danish Gender Equality Act (2000)16 states that 
“boards, assemblies of representatives or similar collective management bodies within 
the public administration should have an equal gender balance”. Moreover, “to the 
extent possible, boards, assemblies of representatives or similar collective management 
bodies of independent institutions, partnerships and limited liability companies which 
are not part of the public administration, should have an equal gender balance. This 
shall apply where the expenses relating to the independent institution are mainly 
covered by government funds or where the state holds a majority interest of the 
company”. Later, the Committee on Corporate Governance have provided some 
recommendations in order to ensure a formal and transparent process for selection and 
nomination of candidates to boards, to integrate new talent and to guarantee diversity in 
relation to international experience, gender and age17. Some Danish companies have 
voluntarily chosen to establish a target of women in top management positions or to 
create networks groups for female managers (European Commission, 2012a). Moreover, 
Denmark provides a database aimed to increase the visibility of female potential 
candidates for board positions and the “Charter for more women in management” can 
be signed by Danish companies to foster the rise of women to management positions 
(European Commission, 2012a). 
 
Austria. Concerning the board composition, the Austrian Corporate Governance 
Code requires that reasonable attention have to be given “to the aspect of diversity of 
the supervisory board with respect to the representation of both genders and the age 
structure, and in the case of exchange listed companies, also with a view to the 
internationality of the members”18. On 15 March 2011, the Council of Ministers decided 
to implement gradually gender quotas for boards of state owned companies. In detail, 
the (non-binding) targets stem from an administrative decision and they require a 
representation of 25% of women on boards by 31 December 2013 and a representation 
of 35% by 31 December 2018. If the latter target is not achieved, the Austrian 
                                                          
16
 Gender Equality (Consolidation) Act, Consolidation Act No. 553 of 2 July 2002. Available at: 
http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/6520. 
17
 Section 5, Point 5.1 of the “Recommendations on Corporate Governance” (April 2010). The text 
(English version) is available at: http://www.ecgi.org/codes/code.php?code_id=290 
18
 Section 5, Point 52, Austrian Corporate Governance Code, July 2012. Available at : 
 http://www.wienerborse.at/corporate/pdf/CG%20Codex%202012_v5_englisch.pdf. 
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government will take legislative measures. Furthermore, in order to foster gender 
diversity in the boardroom several Austrian institutions have provided programmes of 
professional networks, leadership training and databases of female candidates for boards 
(European Commission, 2012a).  
 
The Netherlands. The Dutch Corporate Governance Code19 (2008, section III.1.3) 
encourages a balanced composition of the boards of directors with regard to gender, age 
or nationality diversity.  On 6 June 2011, the act amending the Civil Code has 
established that larger private and public limited companies20 need to take into account a 
minimum target of 30% of each gender in both the executive and supervisory board of 
directors. This is a temporary rule that has become effective in January 2013, but it will 
expire on 1 January 2016. Companies are subjected to the “comply or explain” 
principle, without penalties for non-compliance. Among the others, an important 
voluntary initiative in the Netherlands consists of the Dutch charter “Talent to the Top”, 
which can be signed by companies to support the establishment of qualitative goals for 
female representation in senior management positions (European Commission, 2012a). 
 
Poland. In Poland, the regulation of gender in the boardroom is set out by 
recommendations and voluntary initiatives. On the one hand, the Polish Code of best 
practice for WSE21 listed companies recommends public companies to ensure a 
balanced proportion of women and men in management and supervisory functions. On 
the other hand, the confederation of private employers has developed the “Diversity 
Index” for assessing the level of diversity in their organizations and a number of 
programmes to promote female entrepreneurship have spread (European Commission, 
2012a). 
 
Luxembourg. According to the Principle 4 of the “X principles of corporate 
governance of the Luxembourg Stock Exchange”22, an appropriate representation of 
both genders is required for the appointment of directors and executive managers in 
Luxembourg listed companies. Moreover, some networking initiatives have been taken 
in order to encourage the rise of women in management positions in the private sector, 
such as the network on decision-making “DivBiz” (European Commission, 2012a). 
                                                          
19
 Available at:  http://commissiecorporategovernance.nl/download/?id=606. 
20
This rule is not applicable to small and medium-sized companies, i.e. those companies that, according 
with art. 2:397 paragraph 1 Civil Code, meet two of the following three criteria: 1) the value of the assets 
according to its balance sheet does not exceed € 17.500.000; 2) net sales for the financial year does not 
exceed € 35.000.000; 3) the average number of employees for the financial year is less than 250. 
21
 Warsaw Stock Exchange. The Code is available at: http://www.gpw.pl/WSE_corporate_governance. 
22
 Available at: https://www.bourse.lu/corporate-governance. 
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Greece. On 28 June 2013, the Hellenic Corporate Governance Code was amended 
by the Hellenic Corporate Governance Council in order to sustain the competitiveness 
of Greek corporations and enhance credibility of the Greek market. Among the others, 
recommendations for diversity of boards of directors were included to ensure “the 
efficient achievement of the company’s targets on the basis that the company gains 
access to a wider talent pool”23. The Code asks the nomination committee to take 
transparent procedure in the nomination of board members and to propose board 
diversity policies including gender balance. Conversely, in accordance to the Law 
2839/2000, imposes that at least one third of each sex should be ensured among board 
members or members of administrative bodies of public and private entities appointed 
by government, the public entities and the local and regional authorities (European 
Commission, 2012a). Finally, several Greek institutions have promoted initiatives 
aimed to the sensitization of social partners and individual businesses on the importance 
of equal opportunity policies, and to the diffusion of good practices (European 
Commission, 2012a).  
 
 Slovenia. The Slovene “Regulation on criteria for respecting the principle of 
gender balanced representation”24 recommends the representation of each sex at least 
40% in nominating or appointing government representatives of public enterprises and 
other entities of public law. It is an administrative regulation, applicable to both 
supervisory boards and executive boards. Conversely, the Slovene Corporate 
Governance Code25 does not contain specific recommendations for gender balance in 
the boardroom. It generally refers to “the adoption of quality decisions based on the 
diversity of its members' experience and skills” (point 6.1). However, Slovenia honours 
those companies involved in promoting gender equality and women in management 
(European Commission, 2012a). 
 
USA. In the United States, the political and academic debate about gender balance 
in top corporate positions has been often focused on professional and technical skills of 
women, rather than on their sexual diversity. To that regard, the qualitative study of 
Bilimoria and Huse (1997) documented that the “U.S. women directors made any 
                                                          
23
 Section A, Point II of the “Hellenic Corporate Governance Code” (October 2013), available at: 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/hellenic_cg_code_oct2013_en.pdf. 
24
 Uredba o o kriterijih za upoštevanje načela uravnotežene zastopanosti spolov (Uradni list RS, No 
103/04). Available in the original language at: http://www.uradni-
list.si/1/objava.jsp?urlid=2004103&stevilka=4407. 
25 
The Slovene Corporate Governance Code can be accessed to: http://www.zdruzenje-
ns.si/db/doc/upl/corporate_governance_code_531.pdf. 
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reference to sexual behaviours at all, instead referring to the need to be professional and 
gain power and respect on the basis of technical/operational expertise” (Bilimoria and 
Huse, 1997, p. 74). Moreover, “U.S. women corporate directors denied any such 
differences in board functioning, saying that they were always treated as equals, that 
there was no exclusionary “golf club”, and that social relations were professional, 
friendly, and cordial between themselves and the men on their boards” (Bilimoria and 
Huse, 1997, p. 75). Adopting this perspective and taking into account its general free-
market orientation, it is not surprising that the United States considers gender quotas as 
a cultural and legal oddity, a “European transplant unlikely to take root here” (Alstott, 
2014, p. 40). Indeed, the American government was always oriented to reduce 
inequality from the bottom (for example, the Paycheck Fairness Act26) rather than from 
the top (e.g. through quotas or target). Concerning the promotion of gender diversity on 
boards, the political debate in the USA has supported the adoption of diversity 
management practices rather than affirmative action policies (Seierstad and Opsahl, 
2011). 
 
Other countries. As documented by Terjesen et al. (2014), some 
recommendations for gender composition in corporate boards were also adopted in 
Malawi (2010), Australia (2011), Malaysia (2012), Nigeria (2011), and South Africa 
(2009). On the contrary, Corporate Governance Codes of many countries do not make 
any references to or recommendations for gender balance on the boards of directors: this 
is the case of Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Portugal, Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia 
and Hungary (Gennari, 2015). However, some voluntary initiatives were taken to 
sensitise social partners or business. For instance, Lithuania and Estonia promote gender 
training for both employers and trade unions, while Portugal organizes awards for 
companies engaged in supporting gender equality (European Commission, 2012a).  
Table 1.1 - Forms of regulation for gender diversity on boards of directors 
Countries Legislative 
Measures 
Recommendations of Corporate 
Governance Codes 
Other voluntary 
initiatives 
Australia - X - 
Austria - X X 
Belgium X - X 
Bulgaria - - - 
Croatia - - - 
Cyprus - - - 
Czech Republic - - - 
                                                          
26
 The Paycheck Fairness Act mainly concerns prohibitions against sex discrimination in the payment of 
wages. Available at: https://search.usa.gov/search?affiliate=usagov&query=paycheck+faireness+act. 
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Denmark - X X 
Estonia - - X 
Finland X - X 
France X - - 
Germany X X X 
Greece X X X 
Hungary - - - 
Iceland X - - 
Indonesia - - - 
Israel X - - 
Japan - - - 
Kenya X - - 
Lithuania - - X 
Luxembourg - X X 
Malawi - X - 
Malaysia - X - 
Mexico - - - 
Nigeria - X - 
Norway X - X 
Poland - X X 
Portugal - - X 
Québec X - - 
Romania - - - 
Slovakia - - - 
Slovenia - - X 
South Africa - X - 
Spain X - - 
Sweden - X X 
The Netherlands X X X 
United Kingdom X X X 
USA - - X 
1.2.2 Impact 
The variety of forms that gender regulation for boards of directors takes, can 
determine different results. It is clear that legislative measures are likely to have 
stronger impact on female representation on boards, than voluntary initiatives. This is 
one of the reasons have led Norway to enact gender quotas legislation. Although the 
introduction of quotas law was proposed since 2003, the great disagreement of both 
politics and businesses led the Norwegian Parliament  to establish that “the amendment 
for a gender balance on publicly listed companies boards would be withdrawn if the 
companies voluntarily complied by July 2005” (Huse and Seierstad, 2014, p.  38). 
Despite this “sunset law”, and despite other several voluntary initiatives to promote 
gender diversity on boards, there were not significant changes in Norway and quotas 
law was enacted in 2006 (Huse and Seierstad, 2014; Seierstad et al., 2015). To this 
regard, many studies have confirmed that, in Norway, the introduction of gender quotas 
at 40% has had a considerable impact on the number of women in boards positions, and 
that the presence of strong sanctions has enhanced these results (Hoel, 2008; Rasmussen 
and Huse, 2011; Seierstad and Opsahl, 2011; Storvik and Teigen, 2010; Wang and 
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Kelan, 2013). Conversely, voluntary initiatives, such as mentoring, board training, and 
networking are considered weak means to get substantial changes in numbers (Huse and 
Seierstad, 2014). However, Vinnicombe et al. (2014) recognize that the 
recommendations in the Lord Davies Report may have had some effects on the number 
of women on boards. Indeed, they document that, after the introduction of the Lord 
Davies Report, the percentage of women on boards in England has risen from 12.5% in 
2011 to 27.7 % in 2014. On this wake, Adams and Kirchmaier (2013) find that both 
quotas and corporate governance codes are correlated positively and significantly with 
female participation in board positions. They affirm, “Policies matter, even when they 
are voluntary” (Adams and Kirchmaier, 2013, p. 5). 
Narrowing the attention on legislative measures, Pande and Ford (2011) suggest that 
gender quota for boards of directors may improve the allocation of talent in the labour 
market in several ways: 1) by breaking down the discrimination effects; 2) by enhancing 
women’s professional experience on board tasks hence leading to a higher female 
representation on boards; and 3) by changing social norms and attitudes. They also 
argue that gender quotas may create a “role model” for other women, as well as they 
may help women to overcome self-imposed stereotypes and invest much more in their 
human capital (Chung, 2000; Spencer et al., 1999) with positive influence on their 
career choices. In a similar vein, psychological research has made important 
contributions to understanding the effect of quotas on women’s self-image and self-
perceived competencies. Past studies have found that beliefs associated with affirmative 
action are negatively related to the self-perceived competencies of beneficiaries, hence 
supporting the existence of a stigma of incompetence (e.g. Heilman et al., 1987; 
Heilman et al., 1992). The rationale is that, when women are selected because of their 
gender, they report more negative perceptions of their ability and competence. Unzueta 
et al. (2010) have experimented that believing in affirmative action quotas can benefit 
women’s self-image, when they think of themselves as non-beneficiaries of such a 
policy. Furthermore, the authors have found no support for the stigma of incompetence, 
specifying that such stigma occurs as long as affirmative action does not explicit that 
women are selected based on merit and not gender. Clearly, these beliefs may affect the 
behaviour that women take in the boardroom (Hillman, 2015), and plausibly the 
performance of boards of directors. Finally, Bøhren and Staubo (2013) have analyzed 
the relationship between female directors and board independence in boards with 
mandatory gender balance, then reporting that quotas significantly affected the increase 
of board independence (with 84 percent of the female independent directors, while only 
50 percent of independent men directors). However, other questions still need to be 
answered “to truly understand boardroom diversity” (Hillmann, 2015, p. 106). In 
particular, Hillman (2015) wonders whether “incumbent males behave differently if a 
new female colleague was selected by them voluntarily without regard to gender than if 
“had” to select a female due to quotas” (p.2). Moreover he suggests that more studies 
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should explore whether differences exist between boards that early adopt gender 
policies (substantively) and boards that late follow this behaviour (symbolically).  
On the dark side of gender quotas, much research has made negative claims about the 
adoption of mandatory regulation for gender diversity on boards. First, gender quotas 
might be perceived as an improper intervention into the private property right, they 
could represent a discrimination against other minorities that are not equally protected 
(such as ethnic minorities), and they might lead to the appointment of women without 
appropriate competence (Huse and Seierstad, 2014; Terjesen et al., 2014). Second, since 
women are more likely to sit in monitoring committees, mandatory quotas can reduce 
the value of well-governed firms, where over monitoring is counterproductive (Adams 
and Ferreira, 2009). Third, a number of scholars have documented the negative effects 
of the introduction of quota law in Norway. Ahern and Dittmar (2012) have reported 
that the announcement of gender quota in Norway has caused negative market reactions, 
with serious drop in the stock price. By using financial data for publicly listed firms, 
Matsa and Miller (2013) have found that firms affected by the quota experienced a 
decline in short-term profits. Moreover, about 50 percent of the firms exposed to the 
Norwegian legislative measure, have changed their organizational form to avoid legal 
requirements (Bøhren and Staubo, 2014).  
Overall, the ambiguity of research concerning the impact of gender quotas has led 
some scholars to question its plausibility. In his recent commentary, Ferreira (2015) 
discusses five difficulties to use the experience of Norway in that sense: 1) timing; 2) 
choice of control group; 3) sample selection; 4) other contemporaneous governance-
related reforms; 5) different explanations of the causal mechanism that link quotas to 
firm performance. For these reasons, the debate about gender quotas has become rather 
controversial and maybe it requires some changes in the rationales underlying the 
enactment of mandatory gender policies.  
1.2.3 Rationales and antecedents 
The most common argument used by politicians and academics to support the 
adoption of affirmative action policies, such as quotas, is the utility of gender diversity 
on boards. On the one hand, utility justifications include human capital arguments, 
which assert the importance of women capacity and competence for boards of directors 
(Seierstad, 2015). On the other hand, they mainly refer to the “business case” for female 
directorship (Seierstad, 2015). The latter rationale pays attention on the economic utility 
of gender diversity from a macro-economic perspective, in terms of higher and 
sustainable economic growth, as well as from a micro-economic perspective, in terms of 
improved firm performance, better decision-making on boards, or better use of the talent 
pool (European Commission, 2012a). Indeed, the business case for women on boards 
usually consists of citing research showing a positive relationship between female board 
representation and firm performance (Ferreira, 2015).  
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Conversely, individual and social justice rationales offer different perspectives to 
support affirmative action policies (Seierstad, 2015). Whilst the former refers to the 
protection of the individuals, for example according to principles of equal treatment and 
non-discrimination, the latter concerns the promotion of equality in society (Seierstad, 
2015). Although the profound social nature of women on boards suits well with these 
tenets, the debates about gender quotas have especially delved into the business case, 
neglecting the importance of social justice rationales. Moreover, as noted by Huse 
(2013), the economic arguments to support affirmative action are often used when 
social reasons are not accepted. This circumstance confirms a sort of presumption of 
mutual exclusion between these rationales. However, the need and the importance of 
integrate them is now being recognized (e.g. Seierstad, 2015; Ferreira, 2015).  
Another important justification for gender quotas on boards is that they can support 
the increase of women in business, by affecting their career decisions. This tenet has 
been taken by some scholars (e.g., Pande and Ford, 2011; Chang, 2000), but there is no 
empirical evidence to that effect, and it remains rather unclear “why the board is the 
place to start policies that aim to promote better female representation in business” 
(Ferreira, 2015, p. 3). On the same wake, considering that the list of barrier for women 
directors is similar to the list for female workers, Adams and Kirchmaier (2013) wonder 
why affirmative action policies should target just boards of directors and whether they 
can be effective on their own. In their word, “If the costs of managing work-life balance 
are important deterrents to female representation in management, a more effective 
policy might target those costs directly” (Adams and Kirchmaier, p. 3). For instance, 
Bergstø (2013) suggests that mandatory action at the board level should be integrated by 
other interventions that foster work-life balance, one of the main barriers for women’s 
career advancement.  
To this regard, a key aspect to be underlined concerns the costs of affirmative action 
policies. It is reasonable that gender quotas are considered zero-cost policies for nations 
(Brogi, 2013) compared to the implementation of “substantive benefits”, such as 
welfare policies, childcare services or work-life balance interventions. However, the 
“negative” literature about gender quotas on boards reveals that many other costs may 
occur at firm level, in term of drop in the stock price, reduced firm value or worse 
organizational performance (e.g., Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Bøhren and Staubo, 2014; 
Matsa and Miller, 2013). They are rather heavy costs, and therefore they should be 
recognized as such when it comes to gender quotas. To date, although many studies 
have supported the positive linkage between women on boards and firm performance 
(e.g., Carter et al., 2003; Campbell and Mìnguez-Vera, 2008; Campbell and Minguez-
Vera, 2010; Dezsö and Ross, 2012; Huse and Solberg, 2006; Nguyen and Faff, 2012; 
Torchia et al., 2011), contrasting evidence has led to be sceptical about the business 
case approach. Commenting this state of art, Ferreira (2015) asserts, “[...] current 
research does not really support a business case for board gender quotas. But it does not 
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provide a case against quotas either”, and that “When discussing policies that promote 
women in business, it is better to focus on potential benefits to society that go far 
beyond narrow measures of firm profitability” (p.3). Concerning this observation, 
several scholars have challenged the business case for women on boards by questioning 
the causal mechanisms underlying the relation between female representation on boards 
and firm performance. For instance, the negative association detected by Bøhren and 
Strøm (2010) has suggested that there is “no convincing economic reason for requiring 
by law or code that a minimum fraction of the firm’s directors [...] be of a certain gender 
[...]” (p. 1305). By discussing the negative impact of gender quotas in Norway, Matsa 
and Miller (2013) conjecture that it may depend on the institutional setting of nations, in 
terms of economic, social and cultural context, and that the detected effects could be 
larger in other countries, with more traditional gender roles or less commitment to 
gender equality in public debates. Indeed, while laws and regulatory provisions can 
protect women from formal discrimination and stereotypes from the top (Brogi, 2013), 
they cannot do the same with institutionalized social practices, equally discriminatory, 
but in a non-apparent way. Therefore, they can fail to change cultural attitudes that 
continue to affect women lifecycle from the bottom, in society, in family and at work. 
For instance, Adams and Kirchmaier (2013) argue that if gender quotas contribute to 
reinforce gendered or negative attitudes towards women, as documented in several 
studies, they cannot be very effective. 
Taken together, these concerns implicitly raise two key questions: why should 
Norway be the norm? In addition, should other countries follow its example? (Huse and 
Seierstad, 2014). In order to find possible answers, it is important to better understand 
the underlying causes of female underrepresentation on board rather than or before 
claiming the necessity of gender quotas or target in the boardroom (Adams and 
Kirchmaier, 2013). At the same time, we need to explore the institutional and historical 
context where gender quotas should take place, as well as the enactment of other public 
policies aimed to increase the number of women on boards (Huse and Seierstad, 2014).  
The research about the antecedents of both adoption and diffusion of quotas law 
offers some keys of interpretation to that end. Teigen (2012) analyzes the spread of 
quota legislation for corporate boards according to the mechanisms of diffusion, path 
dependency and critical junctures. By exploring the complexities of factors that have led 
to the diffusion of quotas law, she offers several contributions. First, the “follow-the-
leader” mechanism has had an important role in such spread. Since Norway was 
characterized by fortunate critical junctures (in terms of both financial and gender 
equality success), the quotas law has get satisfying results. Therefore, Teigen (2012) 
concludes that other countries with similar junctures can well perform with a quota law. 
In doing so, the diffusion of gender quotas for boards of directors has followed a 
regional pattern, by starting from Iceland and including Western Europe countries. 
Finally, a considerable part of the diffusion of quotas legislation is connected to national 
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factors, such as the presence of gender quotas in politics that are considered “a 
necessary albeit not sufficient condition” (Teigen, 2012, p. 141). To this regard, the 
recent work of Terjesen et al. (2014) suggests that there are three institutional factors 
consistent with the enactment of gender quotas for boards of directors. They are: 1) 
female employment and gendered welfare state policies; 2) left-leaning governments; 
and 3) a legacy of path-dependent initiatives for gender equality in both politics and 
businesses. The natural consequence of such evidence is that the implementation of 
gender quotas legislation may be most successful when they are enacted in countries 
with those institutional characteristics (Terjesen et al., 2014). Beyond institutional 
factors, also actors and processes have had a role in driving affirmative action policies 
for gender diversity on boards. Seierstad et al. (2015) discuss these arguments.  Among 
the others, international and transnational actors have been key actors for supporting 
quota legislation. The most apparent case is Germany, where the EU pressure has 
dramatically influenced the (controversial) debate about quotas, until to their enactment 
on May 2015 (Seierstad et al., 2015). 
1.3 The role of institutions: emerging interdependencies and increasing complexity  
Institutions play a key role in shaping the representation of women on boards, as well 
as the adoption and diffusion of gender quotas regulation. Exploring national 
institutional contexts is very important to understand the different performance across 
countries, in terms of both the number of women on boards, and the variety of gender 
policies for boards of directors. Indeed, such divergence may depend on differences in 
cultural, economic, and regulatory environments (Kang et al., 2007). Given the lack of 
contributions to that effect, several scholars have called for further investigation in 
comparative and country-level research concerning gender diversity on boards (Adams 
et al., 2015; Terjesen et al., 2009). To date, just a small number of studies have 
answered this inquiry of investigation (e.g., Adams and Kirchmaier, 2013; De Anca, 
2008; Grosvold, 2011; Grosvold and Brammer, 2011; Terjesen and Singh, 2008), 
making this stream of research still infant. 
To summarize, three main institutional domains appear to have a noticeable 
influence on female representation on boards. They are welfare, labour and cultural 
institutions (see § 1.1.3). In detail, countries with generous welfare states, such as 
countries with French and Germanic legal heritage, present a small number of women 
on boards (Grosvold and Brammer, 2011). Moreover, systematic evidence supports the 
influence of labour institutions in shaping female representation on boards. To this 
regard, extant comparative research presents two main contributions. On the one hand, 
the presence of more women in senior management positions and less gender pay gap 
leads countries to perform better in terms of women on boards (Terjesen and Singh, 
2008). On the other hand, full-time female labour force participation is positively 
related to the number of women in the boardroom (Adams and Kirchmaier, 2013). This 
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means that in order to reach board positions, women need to stay at work. However, 
“full-time employment may be not sufficient” (Adams et al., 2015:80), because the 
presence of cultural barriers may affect women’s career advancement and other public 
policies program may be necessary to promote work-life balance (Adams and 
Kirchmaier, 2013). Clearly, the underlying rationale is that a full presence of women in 
the labour market allows them to acquire the appropriate competences and experiences 
to gain board positions. Looking at national culture, empirical evidence shows that 
cultural institutions are significantly related to female representation on boards (Adams 
and Kirchmaier, 2013) and that countries with lower levels of gender differentiation 
(i.e., Nordic European and Eastern European culture-oriented countries) have a higher 
number of women on boards (Grosvold and Brammer, 2011).  
Interestingly, a long tradition of studies in law, management, sociology, and 
psychology research have offered systematic support for the close interconnection 
between welfare, labour and cultural institutions. Such interdependence is supported by 
a number of sociological theories addressing the effects of institutions on the life 
courses of the individuals. Looking at cross-national differences, sociologists argue that 
individual lives outcomes and institutional configurations co-vary, because life courses 
are shaped by institutions (Mayer, 2009). The sociological perspective attributes the 
greatest share of the variance in individual life courses to three institutional factors: 1) 
the division of labour, which shapes external social structures; 2) the division of labour 
within households; and 3) the state intervention through welfare policies (Mayer, 2009). 
In detail, Mayer (2009) describes the consequences of four institutional configurations 
(i.e., the liberal market societies, the Scandinavian social democratic welfare states, the 
continental conservative welfare societies, and the familistic residual welfare states of 
the southern Europe) on nine aspects of the predominant life course regimes, including 
the degree of career involvement of women. Overall, this study reveals that the different 
characteristics in welfare, family and labour institutions have a relevant influence on 
female life courses, especially with regard to their career.  
In general, welfare states, intended as “the set of social assistance and social 
insurance programs, universal citizenship entitlements, and public services”, are 
acknowledged to shape gender relations (Orloff, 1996, p. 52), for example through the 
sexual division of caretaking and domestic labour (Orloff, 1993). In turn, gender 
relations themselves contribute to shape the nature of welfare states. In this way, gender 
relations and welfare states mutually influence each other (Orloff, 1996). 
Interconnections also occur between welfare institutions and labour environments. 
Welfare states affect the promotion of equal opportunities (e.g., Esping-Andersen, 1990, 
1999; Grosvold and Brammer, 2011; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Misra and Moller, 
2005), especially the participation of women in the labour market (e.g. Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006). However, despite higher level of social 
and family policies are linked with higher level of female employment (e.g., Esping-
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Andersen, 1999), the effects of institutional welfare provisions seem to be rather 
ambiguous with regard to female managerial positions. For instance, Mandel and 
Semyonov (2006) find that welfare provisions promote female employment, but not into 
powerful and desirable positions. As a consequence, the presence of women in 
managerial occupations may be very low. The aforementioned authors insert this issue 
into the “welfare state paradox”, since “the same welfare state activities that promote 
one dimension of gender equality appear to inhibit another dimension” (Mandel and 
Semyonov, 2006, p. 1942). In a similar vein, “welfare state affects gender inequality 
within higher classes (managers) mainly through the potential for defamilialization to 
block women’s attainments” (Mandel and Shalev, 2009:1901). In line with Esping-
Andersen’s definition, the defamilialization role of states refers to the public support 
offered for working mothers, such as paid maternity leave or reduced working hours. 
Unfortunately, this support unbinds mothers from employment, but it fails to liberate 
women from family’s responsibilities (Misra and Moller, 2005), affirming their 
dominant role in childcare, eldercare and housework.  
Finally, a number of scholars emphasize the relevant influence of social prescriptive 
norms,  gender stereotypes and gender schemas on female career advancements, as well 
as on female representation on boards (e.g., Adams and Kirchmaier, 2013; Nelson and 
Levesque, 2007; Terjesen et al., 2009; Terjesen et al., 2014; Swiss and Walker, 1993; 
Williams, 2000)27. Common examples are the asymmetry in marital roles (Pearson and 
Bales, 1955), the “breadwinner” and “caregiver” stereotypes, the dichotomy between 
the prescriptive norms of “ideal worker” and “ideal mother” (Williams, 2003).  
Clearly, a direct influence on female representation on boards stems from gender 
quotas policies. The comparative research about the adoption of gender quotas for 
boards of directors has reported similar institutional interdependencies. Teigen (2012) 
mentions the existence of distinctive critical junctures that were important for the 
success of quotas law in Norway, suggesting that countries with similar characteristics 
could achieve better results with gender quotas, just as Norway did. In a similar vein, 
Terjesen et al. (2014) propose the adoption of gender quotas in terms of national 
coherence between three particular institutional factors
27
, concluding that the more the 
countries present those institutional characteristics, the better the performance of gender 
quotas. This claim is well suited with the assumption that gender quotas are not 
sufficient on their own to achieve a higher number of women on boards, but they 
require be integrated or complemented by other interventions, such as work-life balance 
policies (Adams and Kirchmaier, 2013; Bergstø, 2013). On the contrary, other research 
supports the supplementary function of gender quotas. For instance, Grosvold and 
                                                          
27
 See § 1.1.3 (§ Career advancement) for detailed description. 
CHAPTER 1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
41 
 
Brammer (2011) assert that affirmative action policies for gender diversity on boards of 
directors should be taken when the cultural heritages of nations are very slow to change. 
In this way, gender quotas should make up for the deficiencies of other institutions (in 
line with the definition of supplementary institutions provided by Crouch, 2005). 
1.3.1 Research agenda 
The arguments reviewed suggest that welfare states, labour institutions, national 
cultures, and regulatory policies for boards of directors are not independent from each 
other, but they appear to be closely intertwined. This means that gender diversity on 
boards of directors may result from multiple interconnections between complementary 
institutions. Although corporate governance research contributed to uncover that female 
representation in the boardrooms goes through the role of women in welfare states, 
national culture and in occupational environments, it almost neglected a further step in 
exploring the influence of national configurations on gender diversity on boards. It 
concerns the existence of institutional interdependencies, emerged in parallel streams of 
research, but until now not explicitly called into question in studies of board 
composition.  
This state of art reveals that extant literature on women on boards is limited in 
several ways. On the one hand, prior research has highlighted the influence of welfare 
institutions, occupational segregation, and cultural dispositions, on female 
representation on board (e.g.., Adams and Kirchmaier, 2013; Grosvold and Brammer, 
2011;  Nelson and Levesque, 2007), but it has lacked to investigate the joint influence 
that such institutions can have on gender diversity on boards of directors. In doing so, 
these studies have left unexplored the causal mechanisms underlying the relationships 
between the mentioned institutional sets. In the lack of holistic approaches, it remains 
rather unclear why, whether, how and which institutional condition are in conjunctural 
causality with female representation on boards. Moreover, the institutional research on 
women on boards has been dominated by descriptive studies (Seierstad et al., 2015), 
with very few theoretical developments (Terjesen et al., 2009). Clearly, investigating 
the existence of institutional complementarities requires acknowledging the 
interrelationships among several theories, just as suggested by Terjesen et al. (2009). 
Unfortunately, to date no research has delved into this complexity.  
On the other hand, the inconsistency of the results related to the effects of gender 
diversity and gender quotas on performance (see § 1.1.2 and § 1.2.2), has led scholars to 
question the business case for women on boards. The recent shift towards social justice 
arguments has moved the attention to explore “why are there relatively few women on 
boards?” (Adams et al., 2015, p. 80). The opinion is that understanding causes and 
antecedents of female underrepresentation on boards allows for designing measures of 
intervention that are more appropriate and may include not necessarily mandatory 
quotas. Surprisingly, very few studies have deepened the relations between national 
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institutional factors and the use of public policies (Seierstad et al., 2015), usually 
resulting in two separated streams of research. On the contrary, existing national 
configurations really matter for the introduction of new affirmative action policies. 
When a new regulatory policy or institution is enacted into a given national system, it 
may fail to gain the expected objectives, because the synergic effect of 
complementarities between the other institutions might lock or delay the aimed change 
(in line with Deeg, 2007). Therefore, it is still vague whether gender quotas regulation 
may be sufficient on its own to pursue a higher level of female representation on boards 
(as questioned by Adams and Kirchmaier, 2013), and what role it plays in the existing 
national institutional systems (are gender quotas complements or substitutes?).  
The aim of this thesis is, therefore, to answer the following research questions: 
 
RQ1: Why and how are certain institutional domains causally and jointly related to 
women on boards? 
RQ2: Are there complementarities between these institutional domains?  
RQ3: What type of complementarity is it? Are they synergic or substitutes? 
RQ4: Which conditions in each institutional domain are in conjunctural causality 
with the representation of women on boards? 
RQ5: Which combinations of country-level conditions lead to a higher number of 
women on boards? 
RQ6: What is the role of gender quotas for boards of directors in the existing 
national configurations? Are they necessary and/or sufficient conditions to 
achieve a higher number of women on boards? 
 
By filling these gaps in the literature, this work address the importance of 
institutional interdependencies for designing national policies aimed to promote female 
representation on boards. It acknowledges the existence of complementarities between 
certain institutional domains, theoretically informing their “gendered” structure.  
Delving into the complexity of the subject under investigation, this analysis elects, for 
each institutional domain, the main causal conditions that are likely to affect the number 
of women on boards of directors. Furthermore, it empirically explores their 
conjunctural causality and synergic effects in order to investigate if a “superior” 
national model for female representation on boards exists across EU countries.  
The next chapter adopts a multiple theoretical lens, by integrating institutional 
complementarities theory, configurational theory and set theory. The aim is to provide a 
comprehensive conceptual framework that takes into account the interrelated forces 
between regulatory policies, and welfare, labour and cultural institutions that influence 
women success. Acknowledging these interrelationships is important to:  
1) assess the necessity and sufficiency of certain country-level conditions to achieve 
a higher number of women on boards of directors;  
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2) explain the differences across countries in terms of female representation on 
boards and their different approaches to the adoption of gender regulatory policies; and 
3) investigate the necessity and sufficiency of gender quotas according to the 
characteristics of the existing national configurations.  
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CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has addressed several objectives. First, it aimed to offer a detailed 
analysis of extant research about gender diversity on boards, by articulating the 
review of the literature according to two mainstreams: 1) characteristics, impact, 
rationales, and antecedents of women on boards; and 2) forms, impact, rationales 
and antecedents of gender regulatory policies for boards of directors. Second, it has 
presented the results of a deepened documentary analysis aimed to classify the 
variety of forms of regulation for gender diversity on boards across countries. In this 
way, a systematic review of the main legal texts, corporate governance codes, 
national legislations, and EU official documents has been provided. Third, it has 
identified specific research areas that need to be further theoretically and empirically 
investigated, by developing a research agenda to that end.  
By focusing on the institutional research on women on boards, it has revealed that, 
although previous studies supported the (individual) influence of regulatory policies, 
welfare, labour and cultural institutions on women on boards, they neglected the 
existence of interdependencies and latent complementarities between them. This 
means that gender diversity on boards of directors may result from multiple 
interconnections between complementary institutions. Unfortunately, in the lack of 
holistic approaches, it remains rather unclear why, whether, how and which 
institutional condition are in conjunctural causality with female representation on 
boards. Moreover, despite the importance of understanding institutional antecedents 
of female underrepresentation on boards for designing public policies that are more 
appropriate to promote gender diversity in boardrooms, these two streams of 
research appear rather separated in corporate governance literature. This state of the 
art suggests the need for integrating such aspects in a comprehensive and unique 
theoretical framework, as well as the need for assessing the actual necessity and/or 
sufficiency of gender quotas policies according to the existing national 
configurations. Since the enactment of gender quotas for corporate boards may have 
ambiguous effects on firm performances (as shown by several studies), these aspects 
need a deeper investigation. Indeed, existing national configurations really matter 
for the introduction of new affirmative action policies. When a new regulatory 
policy or institution is enacted into a given national system, it may fail to gain the 
expected objectives, because of the synergic effect of complementarities. Therefore, 
it is still vague whether gender quotas regulation may be sufficient on its own to 
pursue a higher level of female representation on boards and what role it plays in the 
existing national institutional systems (are gender quotas complements or 
substitutes?). Filling these gaps may contribute to advance theory in studies of 
corporate governance and to better inform policy aimed at the promotion of gender 
diversity on boards. 
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CHAPTER 2 THEORIES AND PROPOSITIONS 
OVERVIEW: The existence of complementarities and joint causal effects between 
different institutional domains needs to be theoretically informed and empirically 
verified. In order to accomplish this twofold aim, this chapter adopts a multiple 
theoretical lens, by integrating institutional complementarities theory, 
configurational theory and set theory. It theoretically argues the existence of 
complementarities between welfare, labour and cultural institutions according to 
their “gendered” structure. The logic of set-theory and the assumption of causal 
complexity inform the development of propositions, which assume, in line with 
the configurational theory, the existence of two equifinal and mutually non-
exclusive bundles of causal conditions that can lead to a higher number of women 
on boards. 
2.1 Research rationale 
The representation of women on boards appears to be the height of deeper social 
issues. It evokes a problem of gender equality in terms of access to opportunities and 
distribution of power in societies. If this subject is understood as such, women on 
boards cannot be separated from the role of women in family, labour, welfare and 
cultural institutions. The underlying rationale is that gender relations shape certain 
institutional domains because gender itself is an institution embedded in other 
institutions (Martin, 2004; Terjesen et al., 2009). According to Martin (2004), if gender 
is conceptualized as social institution, we can: 1) make it more visible and more 
susceptible to change by human agency; 2) assume its interdependence with others 
institutions, such as family, labour market, laws and welfare; 3) recognize that States 
have power over others institutions as well as gender institution. Such an approach 
increases the complexity of the matter under investigation, since it places women on 
boards at a crossroads of theories. At the same time, it paves the way for responding to 
several calls within corporate governance research, suggesting the need for  
acknowledging the interrelations between theories (Terjesen et al., 2009), as well as the 
importance of adopting multiple theoretical lenses, such as institutional theories (Adams 
et al., 2015). The present study embraces this inquiry of research.  
The interdependence of institutions requires adopting a holistic approach to the 
understanding of female representation on boards. In doing so, this study  assumes that 
women on boards are the outcome of multiple relations between different institutional 
sets, whose conditions influence the “gendered” nature and structure of institutions 
themselves. The presence of similar gendered structures within each institutional 
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domain may generate strong complementarities, which in turn may determine synergic 
effects on a given national outcome (women on boards). This research draws on 
institutional complementarities theory to support these arguments.  
Implicitly, referring to the existence of complementarities underlies a causal 
mechanism between institutions, because complementarities imply that the effect of one 
institution depends on the presence or absence of another (complementary) institution. 
It also requires understanding which country-level conditions, within each institutional 
domain, are responsible for these joined causal relationships. This means that country-
level conditions can combine in different ways, by generating several national 
configurations. Analyzing such configurations may result in different conjunctions or 
combinations of causal conditions (conjunctural causality) that can equally lead to the 
outcome, i.e. a higher number of women on boards of directors (equifinality). The 
corresponding insights may be relevant to assess whether or not there is a superior 
national model for female representation on boards, as well as to evaluate the role of 
gender quotas policies within the existing national configurations. For this reason, 
assumptions of configurational theory also inform this study. 
Finally, beyond theoretical justifications, both complementarities and conjunctural 
causality need empirical verifications. However, exploring conjunctural causality and 
joint effect poses a methodological challenge (Jackson and Ni, 2013). To this regard, 
set-theoretic methods are particularly useful to study women on boards in terms of 
relations between institutional sets. They allow for assessing the effects of country-level 
causal conditions on women on boards, through the analysis of (individual and 
combined) sufficiency and necessity of such conditions. The notions of set theory are 
included in this research in order to empirically explore theoretical propositions, and to 
articulate them according to set-theoretic notations, such as the logical operators AND 
(*) and OR (+).  
2.2 Conceptual foundations for research 
The following sections detail the assumptions of three theories involved in this work. 
They emphasize the configurational nature of complementarities (Jackson and Ni, 
2013) and the use of set-theoretic approaches to explore combinatory effects and 
equifinality in national configurations. The aim is to develop explicit theoretical 
arguments that link women on boards to a bundle of multiple interconnected institutions 
and to argue the consequences in terms of necessity and sufficiency of gender quotas for 
boards of directors. This is followed by the development of theoretical propositions.  
2.2.1 Institutional Complementarities Theory 
According to Institutional Theory, a number of formal and informal constraints 
influences economic activities, organizational structure and human behaviours  (North, 
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1990). For instance, laws and constitutions limit individual action in a formal way, 
while institutionalized taboos, traditions and socio-cultural norms do it informally. As 
stated by North (1990), institutions have been created to give order and stability. In 
doing so, they “shape the interactions of human beings, in part by helping them to form 
expectations of what other people will do” (Nugent e Lin, 1995:2037). Therefore, in 
their regulatory function of society, institutions provide opportunities and limitations. 
By defining institutions as “systems of social beliefs and socially organized practices 
associated with varying functional arenas within social systems” (Scott, 1987:499), 
Scott presents an interesting theoretical framework, according to which institutional 
theory is based on three pillars. They are regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive 
structures (Scott, 1995). On the one hand, the regulative pillar underlies the economic 
perspective on institutional theory and it reflects the attention to laws and formal rules 
in shaping individual and organizational behaviours. On the other hand, based on the 
sociological perspective, the normative and cultural cognitive pillars help to explain the 
influence of culture, values and social norms on behaviours (Scott, 1995). Grosvold 
(2011) has applied this framework in studies of gender diversity on boards, contending 
that regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive pillars strongly affect the prevalence 
of women on the board.  
Looking at cross-national differences, a vigorous tradition in economic research 
underlines the “bundled” nature of institutions within national systems, to the extent that 
any institution “fits into a system of institutions” (Neale, 1988, p. 245). The diversity of 
institutional systems and the overall coherence of a “national model” can be explained 
by the co-existence of interdependent and interacting institutions that reinforce each 
other and create a coherent and stable structure (Amable, 2000). The effects of this 
interdependence play a role in determining differences in national outcomes and imply 
the presence of multiple equilibria concerning the economic outcomes of nations (Aoki, 
2001; Ahlering and Deakin, 2007). Moreover, institutions co-evolve by developing 
mutually reinforcing characters. In this way, they make national institutional systems 
particularly resistant to change (e.g., Aoki, 2001, Amable, 2003; Jackson and Deeg, 
2008; North, 1991). Taken together, these arguments have spread in comparative 
capitalism literature under the theory of institutional complementarities.  
 
Defining institutional complementarities. The concept of complementarities roots on 
organizational research (Jackson and Ni, 2013). When investigating the configurations 
of both old and modern manufacturing firms, Milgrom and Roberts (1995) find that 
they are characterized by patterns of mutually complementary features. In their word, 
“high levels of flexibility ought to be associated with broad product lines, and inflexible 
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production technologies with limited product variety. Both constitute coherent patterns, 
and either can be successful and, indeed, optimal in the appropriate environment” 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1995, p. 193). Through the formal notion of complementarities28, 
they substantiate the concepts of “fit” and “synergies” between strategies and structures 
of organizations. They argue that adopting bundle of complementary practices lead to 
better results, compared with the adoption of a single practice.  
In line with these tenets, institutional complementarity can be defined as “the 
interactions between the influences that different institutions have on agents’ behaviour” 
(Amable et al., 2005: 313). In functional terms, institutional complementarity stems 
from the circumstance that the functional performance of an institution depends on the 
presence of another institution (Höpner, 2005a). Since complementary institutions exert 
a joint influence, the conjunction of two or more institutions may enhance the 
performance of a social and economic actor, such as organizations or national 
economies (Deeg, 2007). With regard to the definition of institutional complementarity, 
three aspects need to be underlined.  
The first is that institutional complementarities represent one type of the possible 
linkages between institutions (Boyer, 2005; Höpner, 2005b) and they quite diverge from 
the notions of institutional coherence29, institutional compatibility30 and institutional 
clustering31 (Deeg, 2007). Thus, the presence of the latter does not imply necessarily a 
case of institutional complementarities, because “complementarity is a causal effect or 
outcome” that need to be measured and empirically verified (Deeg, 2007, p. 614).  
The second aspect to be noted refers to the specification of two main different 
definitions of institutional complementarity. Amable et al. (2005) assert that, on the one 
hand, institutional complementarities can be defined according to measures of 
performance, since complementary institutions are likely to push national economies 
towards a local optimum. Amable et al. (2005, p. 317), formally articulate this notion of 
institutional complementarities as follows:  
                                                          
28
 Milgrom and Roberts (1995) adopt a formal mathematical approach based on the definition of 
“Edgeworth complements”, activities are complementary “if doing (more of) any one of them increases 
the returns to doing (more of) the others” (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995, page 191). 
29
 According to Deeg (2007, p. 613), “institutional coherence refers to a situation in which institution 
share common or identical principles, which may facilitate interaction among actors operating under them 
(i.e. institutional isomorphism)”. Consequently, the presence of coherence does not imply 
complementarity and enhances effects on performance, just as the presence of incoherence between 
institutions does not mean that institutions are linked by supplementarity.  
30
 Institutional compatibility refers to a situation of stability between institution, without the existence of 
coherence or complementarity, hence having no valuable effects on performance (Deeg, 2007). 
31
 Institutional clustering refers to the presence of two or more institutions frequently observed together 
across nations (Deeg, 2007). According to Höpner (2005b, p. 334), “clusters is an indication for 
compatibility, but no proof of complementarity”, because they stem not always from functional reasons, 
but for instance from the existence of similar cultural arrangements across nations. 
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Formula 2.2.1 - First notion of institutional complementarity 
                                             
where   refers to a measure of performance related to the interaction of two different 
institutional domains, while A and A’ represent two institution forms available for the 
first domain, as well as B and B’ two institution forms available for the second domain32 
(Amable et al., 2005). On the other hand, institutional complementarities may imply a 
form of dynamic stability, since the presence of an institution simply reinforces the 
existence of another, without reference to performance effects. This means that the 
presence of an institution A implies the presence of the institution B (Amable et al., 
2005). More formally, Amable et al. (2005, p. 318) have expressed this dynamic notion 
of complementarities as follows:  
Formula 2.2.2 - Second notion of institutional complementarity 
 
       
                       
       
         
Finally, a third aspect regards the existence of two essential logics embedded in the 
notion of institutional complementarities.  
A first logic is synergy: two or more institutions, which are aligned and organized 
around common principles, show mutually reinforcing effects on a given outcome 
(Campbell, 2011). These synergic effects stem from a sort of similarity between 
institutions (Crouch, 2005), which reinforce similar and compatible incentive structures 
in different institutional subsystems (Deeg, 2007). In general, the varieties of capitalism 
(VOC) literature relies on the logic of similarity to establish institutional 
complementarities (e.g., Molina and Rodhes, 2007; Jackson and Deeg, 2008). The 
underlying principle is that complementarity stems from similar properties or incentive 
structures that make co-existent institutions more aligned and mutually reinforced 
(Campbell, 2011). Thus, national systems are usually classified in categories or 
typologies of complementary institutions, such as liberal market economies (LMEs) or 
coordinated market economies (CMEs), common or civil law countries, welfare or 
market states. For instance, the presence of several aligned institutions enhances market 
competition in LMs, while institutions in CMs typically encourage cooperation 
(Campbell, 2011).  
A second logic is supplementarity: two or more institutions with contrasting 
properties complement each other, because one compensates for the deficiencies of the 
                                                          
32
 See Amable et al. (2005) for detailed explanation. 
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other (Crouch, 2005). Therefore, the logic of contrast implies a form of compensation 
between institutions. To this regard, emblematic is the example of Denmark, where 
flexicurity institutions in the labour market are compensated by the presence of 
contrasting institutions, such as generous welfare states, and vigorous training and job 
relocation programmes (Campbell, 2011).  
 
Assessing institutional complementarities. Beyond definitions, assessing the 
existence and the strength of institutional complementarities is important to unravel the 
causal mechanisms that link interrelated institutions to an outcome (Deeg, 2007). To 
this regard, several levels of analysis need to be taken into account. According to 
Höpner (2005b), to study complementarities requires specifying performance criteria 
and perspectives. Indeed, the existence of institutional complementarities can be 
assessed with regard to overall macroeconomic performance or by referring to the 
welfare of particular groups in society (Höpner, 2005b). Moreover, institutional 
complementarities that enhance a given outcome (e.g., firm profitability) might have 
opposite effects with regard to the others (e.g., employees’ satisfaction). For these 
reasons, “complementarities must be understood locally in relation to a particular model 
or outcome of interest, whereby it is difficult to extrapolate a global view of whether 
two elements are in a positive equilibrium” (Jackson and Ni, 2013, p. 136).  
Deeg (2007) suggests two further step of analysis. The first level consists in 
evaluating the relative importance of complementarities created between different sets 
of institutional domains. This means that it is necessary to assess which institutional 
complementarities, among all the other conceivable, are more important for a given 
national outcome. In other words, this implies to elect those institutional domains, 
whose complementarities contribute more to the outcome than complementarities 
between other institutional domains. The second level of analysis concerns the relative 
significance, within each institutional domain, of specific institutions that are likely to 
generate complementarities with other institutional domains. Assessing such 
significance essentially consists in identifying, for a certain institutional domain (e.g. 
welfare states), those institutions (e.g., parental leave, childcare services) that generate 
complementarities with institutional attributes (e.g., female employment) of other 
domains (e.g. labour institutions). Clearly, these institutions can combine in different 
way, providing a wide range of combinations of complementary institutions (Deeg, 
2007). In other words, they can be complements or substitutes within a given national 
configuration, hence showing multiple equilibria with regard to the same national 
outcome (Aoki, 2001; Deeg, 2007). The assumption that different combinations of 
institutional characteristics can equally lead to the same outcome is related to the 
concept of equifinality, thus unravelling “the configurational nature of 
complementarities” (Jackson and Ni, 2013, p. 131), and posing several methodological 
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challenges “in understanding complementarities as specific types of configurations 
associated with positive effects” (Jackson and Ni, 2013, p. 136).  
2.2.2 Configurational Theory 
The concept of configuration refers to “any multidimensional constellation of 
conceptually distinct characteristics that commonly occur together. Numerous 
dimensions of environments, industries, technologies, strategies, structures, cultures, 
ideologies, groups, members, processes, practices, beliefs and outcomes have been said 
to cluster into configurations, archetypes or gestalts” (Meyer et al., 1993, p. 1175). 
Configurations are conceived as a whole, instead of a collection of elements (Fiss et al., 
2013). Accordingly, the essential assumption of configurational theory is that each 
element of an organization can be better understood by referring to the whole 
configuration (Miller and Friesen, 1984). This implies the adoption of a holistic 
principle of inquiry “aiming to identify configurations, or unique patterns of factors, 
that are posited to be maximally effective” (Delery and Doty, 1996, p. 808). To that 
effect, configurations represent theoretically-construed ideal types, intended as unique 
combinations of factors that are relevant for an outcome (Doty and Glick, 1994). The 
bureaucratic ideal-type designed by Weber can be considered as the forerunner of 
“ideal-type or typological configurationism” (Grandori and Furnari, 2013, p. 80). 
Interestingly, configurational theorizing is intimately characterized by “logic of 
consistency” to the extent that all elements of a configuration are viewed as equally 
important for its existence and/or its effectiveness (Fiss et al., 2013). In this way, ideal 
types show some traits that are predicted to be effective for the outcome and when 
configurations deviate from ideal types, their performance is expected to be lower (Doty 
et al., 1993). Indeed, configurations or typologies are based on the notion of fit among 
the different factors that constitute the whole (Fiss, 2011). While contingency theories 
assert the importance of the external fit (see for example, to enhance business 
performance, a configurational fit requires a high consistency among multiple set of 
elements, both internal and external to organizations (Soda and Furnari, 2012).  
The most important application of configurational approach in organizational 
research has been made in exploring the linkages between bundles of organizational 
factors (context, structure, strategy and practices) with a given outcome of interest. 
Indeed, configurational arguments “acknowledge the complex and interrelated nature of 
organizations, in which fit and competitive advantage frequently rest not on a single 
attribute but instead on the relationships and complementarities between multiple 
characteristics” (Fiss, 2011, p. 393). Configurations generally exhibit synergies and 
their relationships tend to produce synergistic effects on the outcome under 
investigation (Delery and Doty, 1996). From this perspective, it emerges that the notion 
of complementarities is closely related to the configurational thinking. Indeed, 
complementary relationships imply causally complex configurations of multiple 
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elements (Jackson and Ni, 2013). Configurations and complementarities-based 
approaches are very attractive for research both at the organizational level, as well as at 
industry and national level (Fiss, 2007), because they allow scholars to explore the 
synergic effects that bundles of elements have in determining superior firm performance 
or national outcomes33. However, the configurational nature of complementarities 
increases the complexity of the subject under investigation because it give rise to some 
issues related to the understanding of the causal mechanisms underlying complementary 
relationships; to the evaluation of the joint influence of several variables on the 
outcome; and, to the presence of several possible combinations of elements that can 
equally lead to the same outcome. In other words, adopting a configurational approach 
assumes the presence of complex causality and nonlinear relationships that, taken 
together, pose some methodological challenges, since they lead to break with the linear 
paradigm that predominate in extant literature (Fiss, 2007).  
First of all, a configurational approach implies a conjunctural causation (Ragin, 
2000) rather than singular causation. With reference to a given outcome, conjunctural 
causation implies that the effect of a single variable within a configuration depend on 
the presence or absent of other variables. Therefore, configurations may display the 
combination or conjunction of a number of conditions, which are causally related the 
outcome. They can be intended in terms of causal configurations, whereas 
configurations represent the intersection of factors whose conjunction causes on 
outcome (Kogut et al., 2004). Another important property of configurations is the 
nonlinearity or asymmetry of relationships between variables (Black and Boal, 1994). 
This statement suggests that the circumstance that variables are causally related in one 
configuration does not exclude that they may be unrelated or inversely related in other 
configurations (Meyer et al., 1993). If a specific configuration is sufficient to achieve 
higher performance, the opposite configuration not necessary lead to low performance 
(Jackson and Ni, 2013). By deepening these aspects, Fiss (2011) asserts that 
configurations frequently show core conditions, that are essential elements in strong 
causal relationship with the outcome proffered, and peripheral conditions, that are 
exchangeable elements in a weaker relationship with the outcome of interest (e.g. high 
business performance). With the core-periphery view of configurations, Fiss (2011) 
contributes to apply the concept of causal asymmetry to configurational thinking. 
Causal asymmetry (Ragin, 2008a) represents one of the main characteristics related to 
the notion of causal complexity, and it implies that causal conditions that lead to the 
                                                          
33
 As noted by Jackson and Ni (2013) and Fiss (2007), a number of studies have analyzed the effects of 
complementarities on outcomes at several levels. For instance, complementarities have been investigated 
between organizational strategies and structures (e.g. Miles and Snow, 1978), among human resource 
management practices (e.g., Delery and Doty, 1996), and among the attributes and features of national 
economic systems (e.g., Aoki). 
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presence of a given outcome can partially differ from those that are present in the 
absence of the outcome (Fiss, 2011). Moreover, a configurational approach assumes the 
concept of equifinality34 (Fiss, 2007; Payne, 2006), by considering the presence of 
multiple possible combinations of elements that can equally lead to the same outcome. 
Ragin (2000) refers to this concept as multiple conjunctural causation. In this way, 
multiple configurations can result in superior performance (Meyer et al., 1993). To that 
regard, Fiss (2011) has developed the concept of neutral permutations, by asserting that 
within an organizational configuration “more than one constellation of different 
peripheral causes may surround the core causal condition, with these permutations of 
peripheral elements being equally effective regarding performance” (Fiss, 2011, p. 394). 
At the same time configurations have the property of structural multifinality, to the 
extent that each single configuration may achieve multiple purposes and it can have 
multiple effects (Grandori and Furnari, 2013). For instance, a set of aligned and 
consistent human resource management practices may positively affect firm 
performance, but this does not implies that it makes up the best place to work for 
employees (Guest, 1997), as these practices may result in increased workload and stress 
for workers.  
Although the assumptions of configurational theory and the properties of 
configurations look promising for theoretical advancements in several streams of 
research, a great mismatch between theory and method has limited the development of 
configurational approaches in extant literature (Fiss, 2007). Configurational thinking 
increases the complexity that theories and methods have to take into account, and this 
complexity “grows exponentially as more elements are added to the system” (Fiss et al., 
2013, p. 2). This constitutes the main reason that why configurational approaches 
challenge the linear paradigm that is prominent in conventional statistical and 
correlations-based research methods (Fiss, 2007; Rihoux, 2006).  
Fiss (2007, 2011) provides a deepened description of this mismatch, by comparing 
the most frequent research methods that are used for analyzing complexity, namely 
regression models, deviation scores and cluster analysis. According to the author, the 
configurational assumptions of nonlinearity, synergistic effects and equifinality come to 
diverge from the properties of linearity, additive effects and unifinality that are typical 
of econometric methods (Fiss, 2007). For instance, Delery and Doty (1996) use 
deviation scores for studying theoretically and a priori defined configurations, but 
without finding any strong support for the configurational approach. Deviation scores 
                                                          
34
 As noted by Grandori and Furnari (2013), the notion of equifinality has a long tradition, as it originally 
roots on general system theory developed by the biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy. Kats and Kahn (1978, 
p. 30) refers to the notion of equifinality by asserting that “a system can reach the same final state from 
different initial conditions and by a variety of different paths”.  However, configurational perspective has 
allowed for empirical investigations about this concept (Grandori and Furnari, 2013). 
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calculate the difference between ideal types and real types in the sample, hence helping 
researchers to establish the effect of deviation from ideal type on performance (in 
general, lower performance), but not allowing them for understanding which factors of 
this divergence actually affect the outcome. Fiss (2007) suggests that this is probably 
due to the fact that configurations or ideal profiles are preliminarily defined according 
to empirically derived means scores or deviation from the mean. In doing so, they are 
extremely sample-dependent, rather than theory-guided (Fiss, 2007). Other studies 
adopt cluster analysis (e.g., Arthur, 1992; Pardo and Perlines, 2008; Bissola et al., 2014) 
for studying configurations, and then they usually employ ANOVA for verifying 
differences in performance among selected clusters. Although cluster analysis is useful 
to determine similar characteristics among the cases under investigation, it presents 
some limitations.  First of all, it greatly depends on the researcher’s judgment about the 
number of clusters to be included in the analysis. Secondly, clustering mainly depends 
also on selected sample and variables. Finally, empirical clusters could not include 
those cases that have the same configuration because they differ in some characteristics. 
As a result, cluster analysis produces empirical groupings that often “do not reflect 
causal relations” (Fiss, 2007, p.1182). Moreover, Fiss (2007) shows some concerns 
about the use of linear regression models to investigate configurations. For instance, 
regression analysis does not allow the identification of several combinations of 
variables that can lead to an outcome. Essentially, linear regression models treat 
variables as competing and they estimate the contribution of a variable while holding 
constant all other variables in the model, rather than reveal how variables combine for 
determining the outcome. This leads to underestimate synergistic effects, as well as to 
underrate the construct of equifinality (Fiss, 2007), while a configurational approach 
aims to unravel interaction effects and complementarities that do not imply simple 
correlation (Fiss et al., 2013; Jackson and Ni, 2013). Clearly, through interaction effects 
it is possible to overcome this obstacle, but to interpret more than two- or three-way 
interactions may be very difficult, at the expense of equifinality (Fiss, 2007).  Finally, 
correlational approaches adopt a symmetric logic that is in contrast with the assumption 
of causal asymmetry of the configurational perspective, i.e. the circumstance that 
configurations that lead to the presence of the outcome can differ from those that lead to 
the absence of the outcome (Fiss, 2011). For instance, correlational methods, such as 
probit and logit regression, estimate simultaneously the presence and the absence of a 
given outcome, without allowing for acknowledging which combinations of factors 
occur in the presence and in the absence of the outcome separately (Fiss et al., 2013). 
In order to overcome this mismatch, the importance of new methodological 
approaches to manage causal complexity is now being recognized. In detail, many 
scholars have stressed the potential benefits of applying set-theoretic methods to 
develop or verify configurational theories (e.g., Fiss, 2007, 2011; Soda and Furnari, 
2012; Ragin, 2009). Indeed, equifinality, conjunctural causation and causal asymmetry 
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are the main characteristics of the type of causal complexity that set-theoretic methods 
are able to unravel35 (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). Set-theoretic approaches are 
particularly useful to determine which combinations of variables (e.g., organizational or 
national attributes) can lead to an outcome of interest (e.g., firm performance or national 
outcomes) in a set of cases (e.g., a number of firms or countries) (Ragin, 1987). These 
methods are more suitable to empirically explore the assumption of causal complexity 
and configurational theory, rather than statistical investigation (Fiss, 2007, 2011). They 
study cases as configurations, by assuming the relationship among several variables in 
terms of  set-subset relations, with notable consequences for the analysis of causally 
complex configurations (Fiss et al., 2013). Among the others, the most widespread set-
theoretic method that has been applied in political economy, management and 
organizational research is Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). Some notable 
applications have been provided by Fiss (2011), Garcìa-Castro et al. (2013), Kogut and 
Ragin (2006), Grandori and Furnari (2008). 
Unlike to linear algebra and calculus that characterize the mathematics of standard 
statistical approaches, set-theoretic methods apply several mathematical principles that 
make reference to the logic of propositions, the theory of sets and Boolean and fuzzy 
algebra (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). The following section provides a detailed 
description of the basic notions and notations of set-theory and related logics.  
2.2.3 Set-theory and related logics 
Schneider and Wagemann (2012, p. 6) define set-theoretic methods as “approaches 
to analyzing social reality in which (a) the data consists of set membership scores; (b) 
relations between social phenomena are modelled in terms of set relations; and (c) the 
results point to sufficient and necessary conditions and emphasize causal complexity in 
terms of INUS and SUIN causes” (emphasis in the original). Accordingly, set-theoretic 
methods are based on the assumptions of the logic of propositions and set theory and 
they make use of Boolean algebra (Fiss, 2007; Fiss et al., 2013, Scheider and 
Wagemann, 2012).  
Set theory is the mathematical theory of sets. A set is defined as a collection of 
objects that are called members, or elements of the set. Two sets A and B are said to be 
equal if they are constituted of the same elements. In this case, they represent the same 
set, and it is denoted as A = B. 
                                                          
35
 However, Schneider and Wagemann (2012) underline that this definition of causal complexity is only 
one possible definition, because other perspectives on causal complexity exist. For further details, see 
Schneider and Wagemann (2012, p. 80). 
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 Let a be the element of the set A, then a is a member of A, and it is denoted as 
below:  
Formula 2.2.3 - Set membership     
    
The basic operations on sets are intersection and union. In set theory, a combination 
of elements is defined intersection (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). Let A and B be 
two different sets, the intersection of A and B indicates the set of all objects that are 
members of both A and B. Union refers to the set of elements that are members of at 
least one set. Therefore, union of the sets A and B is the set of all elements of A, or B, or 
both.  
Moreover, the notion of complement of a set A refers to the elements that are NOT 
member of A. In set theory, logical negation is generally denoted with A or  A. As 
underlined by Schneider and Wagemann (2012, p. 47), “it is important to understand 
that the complement of set does not automatically denote the conceptual counterpart”. 
Bearing in mind that, in social science, sets usually imply areas of inclusion and 
exclusion with reference to a given concept (Mahoney, 2012), set membership defines 
whether a case belongs to and can be described by that concept or not (Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2012). To that effect, let A be the set of tall persons, its negation (~A, or set 
of not tall persons) does not correspond to the set of short persons, but to the set of all 
other persons that are not tall. This is a particular kind of asymmetry related to concepts 
that are represented by sets: qualitative differences concerning a given concept are 
captured by different sets (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). 
Intersection, union and negation are all operators that produce a new set starting from 
existing sets (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). In addition, there is an important 
relation between sets that is called inclusion or subset relation: a set A is a subset of a 
set B when all elements of the set A are also members of the set B. Therefore, A is 
contained in B, and B is a superset of A. There are two types of subset relation. When 
every element of A is also an element of B, the subset relation is denoted by A  B, 
meaning, “A is a subset of B”. In this case, B is a superset of A; this relation is denoted 
by B  A. Conversely, if at least one element of B is not an element of A, A is a proper 
or strict subset of B (denoted by A  B), as well as B is a proper superset of A (denoted 
by B  A). However, if A is a subset of B, then B cannot be a subset of A (i.e., A  B  
B  A). In set-theoretic methods, it is important to understand that this relation is 
unidirectional and it cannot be inverted, since the commutativity rule is not applied to 
set relations (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). Indeed, when set relations are 
interpreted as causal relations, this property substantiates the existence of “asymmetric 
causal relationships” (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, p. 53). 
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Formulas from (2.2.4) to (2.2.9) synthesize all the aforementioned notations. Figures 
2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 show their graphical representation through Venn diagrams.  
Formula 2.2.4 – Intersection      
     
Formula 2.2.5 – Union 
    
Formula 2.2.6 – Inclusion (Subset relation)    
A  B 
Formula 2.2.7 – Inclusion (Superset relation)    
     
Formula 2.2.8 – Inclusion (Proper subset)    
     
Formula 2.2.9 – Inclusion (Proper superset)    
    
 
Figure 2.1 - Intersection of sets (A B) 
  
Figure 2.2 - Union of sets (A B) 
 
 
Figure 2.3 - Subset relation (A  B) 
 
Figure 2.4 - Equal sets (A = B) 
 
A B 
A B 
A 
B 
A=B 
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The notions involved in set theory find a correspondence with the formal logic of 
propositions, as well as with the notions involved in Boolean and fuzzy logics.  
Propositions are defined as declarative sentences that are either true (T) or false (F). 
To that effect, they are defined “decidable propositions”, since it is always possible to 
know whether they are true or false. True (T) and false (F) represent the truth-values of 
a statement. They are values that indicate the relation of a proposition to truth, and they 
classify a statement as true or false. Let p and q be two propositions, the logical operator 
AND stands for their conjunction (logical product), while the logical operator OR stands 
for their disjunction (logical sum). In detail, the notation p ∧ q (p AND q) means that the 
logical statement is true when both p and q are true; while, it is false when at least one 
proposition is false. Conversely, the notation p ∨ q (p OR q) means that the logical 
statement is true when p is true, or q is true, or both propositions are true, because the 
presence of one of these propositions is sufficient to verify the disjunction36. At the 
same time, it is false only when both propositions are false.  
Moreover, a proposition can be transformed into its opposite truth-value with the 
logical NOT, or negation. Therefore, the negation of a logical statement corresponds to 
the proposition that is true when p is false and false when p is true. The notation of 
negation is generally ⌐p or ~p. When both p and ⌐p are considered true simultaneously, 
there is a logical contradiction.  
In the logic of proposition, subset relations (or inclusion) correspond to the logic of 
implication. A logical implication is the mechanism through which the truth of a 
proposition is transferred to other propositions (Blasi, 2006). Generally, implication is 
denoted by p  q or p  q37, meaning, “if proposition p is true, then proposition q is 
true”. However, if p is false, this does not mean that then q is false, because q might be 
either true or false. Since q is true if p is true, then p is defined a sufficient condition for 
q. However, if q is false, then p cannot be true, because the logical statement p q 
implies that p is true, only if q is true. This means that q is a necessary condition for p, 
                                                          
36
 This notion of “or” corresponds to the Latin word “vel” (from which the notation ∨ is derived) and it 
indicates an inclusive “or”. Conversely, an exclusive “or” corresponds to the Latin word “aut” and in 
formal logic it is denoted as XOR or EXOR, and by a ⊕ sign). In this case, the logical statement p ⊕ q is 
true when only one of the propositions is true, but not both (for details, see Blasi, 2006; Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2012).   
37
 Generally, in this case, the relation between p and q is defined material implication or material 
conditional, where p is called the antecedent and q is called the consequent. When p q is true, the truth 
of the antecedent p is sufficient for the truth of the consequent q, and the truth of the consequent q is 
necessary for the truth of the antecedent p (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, last updated October 
2011, web source: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/necessary-sufficient/). 
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because q is true whenever p is true. This is denoted by p  q. Therefore, the logical 
statement p q is false only when p is true, but q is false. 
The logical statement of implication “if...then...” cannot be inverted, i.e. p q  q 
p. When both these logical statements are true simultaneously, then p and q are always 
both true or both false. This is denoted by p ↔ q38, meaning, “p is true if and only if q is 
true”, and it corresponds to the logical statement: (p → q) ∧ (q → p). Substantially, this 
means that p and q are logically equivalent and that p is true “if and only if” q is true. In 
other words, p is a necessary and sufficient condition for q. Conceptually, in set-
theoretic terms this means that a set A, whose elements hold the property p, and a set B, 
whose elements show the property q, are equal, that is, they are the same set (A = B).  
 
Overall, the main notations of the logic of propositions are summarized below. 
Formula 2.2.10 – Conjunction (AND)     
p ∧ q 
Formula 2.2.11 – Disjunction (OR)      
 ∨   
Formula 2.2.12 – Negation (NOT)      
    
Formula 2.2.13 – Implication (sufficiency)     
    
Formula 2.2.14 – Implication (necessity)     
    
Formula 2.2.15 – Implication (necessity and sufficiency)   
    
 
In general, formal logic makes use of a “truth table” to compute the truth or falsity of 
complex logical statements or propositions based on the truth-values of their attributes. 
                                                          
38
 In this case, the relation between p and q, is referred as a biconditional statement.  
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A truth table contains all possible combinations of simple statements (n) with two truth-
values (true and false) and it is useful for determining the truth values of a compound 
statement. Therefore, it consists of 2
n 
rows.  Table 2.1 shows an example of truth table 
in which, starting from the truth-values of p and q, the main logical operations are 
computed (conjunction, disjunction, negation, and implication).  
Table 2.1 - Truth Table (logic of positions) 
p ⌐p q  ∧    ∨   p→ q p ↔ q 
T F T T T T T 
T F F F T F F 
F T T F T T F 
F T F F F T T 
 
In Boolean algebra39, variables can hold only two logic values, true and false, 
denoted by 1 (true) and 0 (false)40. They represent binary variables, defined as Boolean 
variables. Boolean algebra consists of a mathematical system of elements, operations 
and axioms that are useful to model logical statements and set relations. In set-theory, 
conventional sets are based on this logic, whereas an element is either a member of 
the set or not, with clear and strict membership criteria. They are called “crisp sets”. 
Therefore, an element holds a membership value of 1 if it is a member of the set, and 0 
if it is not an element of the set. Clearly, crisp sets require a dichotomisation of the 
concepts they represent, and they apply the “Rule of the Excluded Middle”, according 
to which an element can be either a member of a set or a member of its complementary 
set, but not a member of both (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). Later, the development 
of the fuzzy set theory has allowed for assigning membership values that are more 
gradual and that range from 0 to 1. This type of set is called “fuzzy set”41 (Zadeh, 1965). 
                                                          
39
 This branch of mathematics roots in the seminal work of George Boole (1854)
39
, whose basic 
assumption was that propositions could be expressed in mathematical terms, through the use of specified 
logical operators, that are AND (logical product), OR (logical sum) and NOT (logical negation or 
complement). G. Boole is considered the father of symbolic logic and binary operators. He developed an 
“algebra of logic” in order to compute expressions of propositional logic in mathematical terms through 
the combination of several terms (or propositions) through the logical operators AND, OR and NOT lead 
to the definition of Boolean functions.   
40
 In elementary or linear algebra, the values of variables are numbers, while in Boolean algebra the 
values of variables are the truth-values true and false.  
41
 The term “fuzzy sets” was pioneered by the seminal work “Fuzzy Sets” of Lofti Asker Zadeh (1965). In 
his words: “Let X be a space of points (objects), with a generic element of X denoted by x. Thus, X = x. 
A fuzzy set (class) A in X is characterized by a membership (characteristic) function A (x) which 
associates with each point in X a real number in the interval [0, 1], with the value of A (x) at x 
representing the “grade of membership” of x in A. Thus, the nearer the value of A (x) to unity, the higher 
the grade of membership of x in A. When A is a set in the ordinary sense of the term, its membership 
function can take on only two value 0 and 1, with A (x) = 1 or 0 according as x does or does not belong to 
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Indeed, fuzzy set theory “was initially intended to be an extension of dual logic and/or 
classical set theory” (Zimmermann, 2010, p. 317). Reasonably, the “Rule of the 
Excluded Middle” does not hold for fuzzy sets, whereby an element can have a partial 
membership in both the original sets, as well as in its complementary set (Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2012). A membership score of 0.5 represents the cross over point, intended 
as point of maximum ambiguity (fuzziness) with regard to the membership of an 
element (or case) to the concept (Ragin, 2000, 2009; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). 
It corresponds to the point of indifference of whether a case is more in or more out of a 
set: it is neither fully “in” nor fully “out” of the set (Ragin, 2009). Therefore, these 
three-value based fuzzy sets consider three values for set membership: “1” for full 
membership; “0” for full non membership; and, “0.5” for elements that have neither a 
full membership, nor a full non membership to the set (Ragin, 2009). More fine-grained 
fuzzy sets can use four42 or six43 values for membership scores to a fuzzy set, up to 
continuous values, where elements can hold every value in the interval from 0 to 1 
(Ragin, 2009).  
Both Boolean and fuzzy logics are applied in set-theoretic methods. In set theory, the 
combination of elements corresponds to the intersection of sets (AB), while in 
Boolean and fuzzy logics, it corresponds to the Boolean and fuzzy multiplication, 
usually denoted by the symbol (*). According to the Boolean logic, a conjunction p ∧ q 
(logical AND) is equal to 1 if both p and q are equal to 1; otherwise it is equal to zero. 
In order to find the membership score of an element (or case) in a conjunction of two 
sets A and B (i.e., A * B), the minimum value, i.e. the lowest value score between the 
membership score that the element holds in A and the membership score that it holds in 
B, is taken.  
With regard to the notation of logical alternatives (logical OR), set theory makes us 
of the union of sets (A  B), while Boolean and fuzzy logics adopt the symbol (+) to 
identify Boolean and fuzzy addition. Accordingly, p ∨ q is equal to zero if p=q=0; 
otherwise it is equal to 1. To compute the membership score of an element in the union 
of two sets A and B (i.e., A + B), the maximum value, between the membership score 
that the element holds in A and the membership score that it holds in B, is taken.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
A. Thus, in this case A (x) reduces to the familiar characteristic function of a set A. (When there is a need 
to differentiate between such sets and fuzzy sets, the sets with two-valued characteristic functions will be 
referred as ordinary sets or simply sets.)” (Zadeh, 1965, p. 339, emphasis in the original). 
42
For instance: 0= full non-membership; 0.33= more out than in; 0.67= more in than out; and, 1= full 
membership (Ragin, 2009). 
43
 For instance, 0= full non membership; 0.1= mostly but not fully out; 0.4= more or less out; 0.6= more 
or less in; 0.9= mostly but not fully in; and, 1= full membership (Ragin, 2009). 
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 Finally, in Boolean algebra, the logical NOT (~A) is denoted as (1 – A), thus the 
negation ~A is equal to zero if A = 144, and it is equal to 1, if A = 045. Therefore, in crisp 
sets, the logical operator NOT transforms membership scores from 1 to 0, and 
viceversa. Concerning fuzzy sets, the membership score of an element in the fuzzy set 
~A can be calculated as (1 - fuzzy membership in the set A) (Ragin, 2009).  
The main Boolean operations are summarized below, while Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show 
the corresponding truth tables: 
Formula 2.2.16 – Boolean multiplication     
      
Formula 2.2.17 – Boolean addition    
      
Formula 2.2.18 – Boolean negation     
      
 
Table 2.2 - Truth Table (Boolean logic) 
A ~A B         
1 0 1 1 1 
1 0 0 0 1 
0 1 1 0 1 
0 1 0 0 0 
 
Table 2.3 - Truth Table (Fuzzy logic) 
A ~A B         
0.8 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.8 
0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 
0.4 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.7 
0.2 0.8 0.9 0.2 0.9 
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 1 – A = (1 – 1) = 0 
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 1 – A = (1 – 0) = 1 
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In set theory, the logical operators AND, OR and NOT are governed by a number of 
mathematical rules that are useful for understanding complex sets and for computing the 
membership of elements in compound logical expressions (Schneider and Wagemann, 
2012). The first rule is commutativity, meaning that changing the order of the elements, 
which are connected through the logical operators AND and OR, does not change the 
result46. The second rule is associativity: when two or more elements are connected 
through the same logical operators, they can be combined in different sequences without 
changing the result47. The third rule is distributivity, meaning that multiplying a sum by 
a factor is equal to sum the products of each element by the factor48. Another important 
rule to calculate the negation of a complex set-theoretic expression is the so called 
“DeMorgan’s law” (Schneider and Wagemann). This law governs the negation of 
complex logical statements, by stating that: a) the negation of a conjunction is the 
disjunction of the negations; and b) the negation of a disjunction is the conjunction of 
the negations49. Therefore, the following applies: ~ (A + B) = ~A * ~B; and, ~ (A * B) = 
~A + ~B.  
 
Set-theoretic approaches. In line with Schneider and Wagemann (2012), set-theoretic 
approaches employ the notions of sets and their relations to analyze social reality. Many 
social phenomena can be re-framed in terms of relation between sets; in turn, set 
relations can be interpreted as complex causal relations and expressed in terms of 
equifinality, conjunctural causation and asymmetry (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). 
Given that set relations are interpreted in a causal manner, set-theoretic approaches 
make use of a specific terminology, which diverges from that adopted in the most 
common correlational methods. What are usually intended as independent variables, in 
set-theoretic approaches are defined causal conditions; in a similar vein, the term 
outcome is applied to denote the dependent variable, i.e. the phenomenon under 
investigation (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). Moreover, what is in set theory 
generally denoted as element, in set-theoretic approaches is intended as a case50. 
Through a process of calibration, cases are assigned to the sets, according whether 
those cases can be described by the concept underlying the set or not (Ragin, 2008b; 
Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). After calibration, conventional variables are 
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 For instance, A * B = B * A, as well as A + B = B + A. In set theory, the commutative property is 
denoted by A  B = B  A for the intersection of sets; and by A  B = B  A for the union of sets. 
47
 For instance, A * (B * C) = (A * B) * C, as well as A + (B + C) = (A + B) + C. In set theory, the 
associative property is denoted by A  (B   C) = (A  B)  C = A   B  C , for the intersection; and 
by A  (B  C) = (A  B)  C = A  B  C, for the union of sets. 
48
 This means that A * (B + C) = A * B + A * C. In set theory, the distributive property is denoted by A  
(B   C) = (A  B)  (A  C); and by A  (B   C) = (A  B)  (A  C).   
49
 In set theory, this denoted by (A  B)= A  B; and (A  B) = A  B. 
50
 In this research, cases are the 27 EU countries. 
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transformed into sets, i.e. the sets of causal conditions and the outcome set (Ragin, 
2008b). The essential scope of set-theoretic methods is to investigate how (the sets of) 
causal conditions are related to (the set of) the outcome in terms of subset/superset 
relations, i.e. in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, and combinations of these 
two types of causes for the outcome of interest (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). 
Indeed, sets are not variables, as well as set-theoretic methods do not analyze 
correlations, but the intersection between sets (Fiss et al., 2013). Moreover, since set 
relations are asymmetric in nature, set-theoretic approaches avoid the use of the term 
“equation”, by referring instead to necessity (denoted by “”) and sufficiency (denoted 
by “→”) of a condition for the outcome of interest (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). 
Bearing in mind the aforementioned notions, a condition A is necessary if, whenever 
the outcome B occurs, it is present. This means that cases with the outcome B always 
show the condition A. To that effect, the outcome B is a subset51 of the causal condition 
A (Ragin, 2008b). Necessity can be denoted as A  B. Therefore, in fuzzy sets logic, B 
is a subset of A if the membership scores of cases in the outcome set (B) are less than or 
equal to their respective membership scores in the set of the causal condition (A) 
(Ragin, 2008b), i.e. A  B. Conversely, a condition A is sufficient if, whenever it occurs 
across cases, the outcome B is present. This means that all cases showing the condition 
also show the outcome; sufficiency can be denoted as A → B (Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2012). If A implies B, then A is a subset of B51. When it comes to fuzzy sets, 
a causal condition A is sufficient for the outcome B, if the fuzzy membership scores in 
the set of the causal condition (A) is less than or equal to the fuzzy membership in the 
outcome in the outcome set (B) (Ragin, 2008b),i.e. A ≤ B. 
Clearly, a condition can consists of a conjunction or a path of several causal 
conditions that are connected by the logical operator AND (*) (Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2012). In this case, the outcome comes to depend on the presence of two or 
more combined conditions. Denoting this conjunctural relationship with A * C → B, 
this means that a single condition (for example, A) can play a causal role on the 
outcome only in combination with other causal conditions (in this case C). If set 
relations are interpreted in causal terms, a conjunction of condition implies a 
conjunctural causation (Ragin, 2000), i.e. a combination of multiple conditions where 
no single cause may be either necessary or sufficient (Kogut and Ragin, 2006; Ragin 
2000). At the same time, causal conditions can be connected by the logical operator OR 
(+). In set-theoretic approaches, the logical OR describes an inclusive perspective of 
logical alternatives52 (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). For instance, the notation A + C 
→ B means that A and C represent two alternative conditions that can equally explain 
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 See p. 44 for details on the logic of implication.  
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 See note 36, p. 44, for detailed explanation. 
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the outcome. However, through the logical operator OR (+), it is possible to connect 
several combinations of causal conditions. This is generally referred as solution term 
(Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). For instance, the notation (A * C) + (D * E) → B 
represents a solution term and it reflects both the concepts of equifinality and 
conjunctural causation. In detail, (A*C) and (D*E) stand for two alternative and 
mutually non-exclusive combinations of conditions that can equally explain the 
outcome B.  
These notions correspond to the concept of INUS conditions introduced by Mackie 
(1965, 1974), which stands for “Insufficient but Necessary part of a condition which is 
itself Unnecessary but Sufficient for the result” (Mackie, 1974, p. 62). According to 
Mackie (1965), an outcome can have a plurality of causes. For this reason, a causal 
condition (A) can be not sufficient on its own, but it needs to be combined with other 
causal conditions (C) in order to form a sufficient conjunction for the outcome. 
Moreover, the conjunction (A * C) is itself unnecessary condition for the result, because 
there is another alternative pathway (i.e., D * E) that can lead to the outcome. Therefore, 
“INUS conditions which are neither sufficient nor necessary, but still part of the causal 
explanation, represent a very complex and advanced way of dealing with causality” 
(Wagemann, 2014, p. 52). Another causally complex statement refers to the concept of 
SUIN condition (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). SUIN is the acronym for 
“Sufficient, but Unnecessary part of a factor that is Insufficient, but Necessary for the 
result (Mahoney et al., 2009, p. 126). For instance, in the solution term (A + C) * (D + 
E) → B, (A+C) and (D+E) represent a conjunction of two necessary conditions for the 
outcome B. However, each single union (for example, A+C) is not a sufficient 
condition, because it needs to be combined with the other union (D+E) to explain the 
outcome. While the former relation represents an equifinal causal relation, the latter 
implies a conjunctural causal relation.  
Finally, set-theoretic approaches allow for taking into account the claims of causal 
asymmetry underlying complex configurations. Indeed, set-relations are asymmetric in 
their nature, and the circumstance that certain causal conditions explain the presence of 
the outcome of interest does not imply that the absence of the outcome is explained by 
the same causal conditions (Fiss, 2011). In other words, the occurrence and non-
occurrence of the outcome may depend on the presence of two different configurations 
of elements.   
 
By drawing on to the assumptions of institutional complementarities theory, 
configurational theory and set theory, the following sections develop the theoretical 
propositions that drive this work. The central tenet refers to the existence of 
complementarities between welfare states, labour markets and national cultures, which 
taken together are likely to show mutually reinforcing effects on gender diversity on 
boards. A set-theoretic approach is applied to conceptually explore:  
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1) The relations between the conjunction of national institutional arrangements 
(causal conditions) on female representation on boards (outcome) (conjunctural 
causation);  
2) The existence of alternative and mutually non exclusive pathways that may lead to 
a higher number of women on boards (equifinality); and  
3) The role of gender affirmative action in terms of necessity and sufficiency for 
gender diversity on boards.    
2.3 Theoretical development 
In line with the rationale of this research, the phenomenon of women on boards is 
proposed as the result of multiple causal relations between several interdependent 
institutional sets. Extant research has suggested that, among the others, three main 
institutional domains are more important for female representation on boards, compared 
to other institutional domains. In detail, welfare states, national cultures and labour 
markets have been found to play the most relevant role in shaping gender diversity on 
corporate boards (e.g., Adams and Kirchmaier, 2013; Grosvold and Brammer, 2011). 
Moreover, these institutional domains appear to be intimately connected each other, 
with the consequence that they are likely to result in complementary institutional sets. 
Accordingly, they may show a conjunctural causal effect on the number of women on 
boards of directors.  
Section § 2.3.1 theoretically argues the existence of complementarities between these 
three institutional domains according to their similar gendered structures. However, in 
order to assess the strength of complementarities and their effects on the outcome under 
investigation, it is important to elect, within each institutional domain, the main causal 
conditions that are likely to create complementarities with causal conditions in other 
institutional domains. In this way, it is possible to unravel the causal mechanisms that 
link institutional complementarities to gender diversity on boards (in line with Deeg, 
2007). By adopting a set-theoretic approach, § 2.3.2 proposes the existence of a 
combination of country-level conditions that is sufficient to achieve a higher number of 
women on boards, without the need for enacting gender quotas legislations. This means 
that the existence of complementarities between specific national conditions may create 
mutually reinforcing effects on the representation of women on boards, by making 
unnecessary the enactment of gender affirmative action. Recognizing the effects of 
institutional complementarities between welfare, labour and cultural institutions has 
relevance for assessing the necessity and sufficiency of public policies that are more 
appropriate to enhance female representation on boards.  To that end, §2.3.3 proposes a 
set-theoretic explanation of the necessity and sufficiency of gender quotas for boards of 
directors, by exploring their role within national configurations. The adoption of a set-
theoretic approach allows for developing a comprehensive conceptual framework that 
takes into account the intertwined forces that exist between regulatory policies that can 
CHAPTER 2. THEORIES AND PROPOSITIONS 
67 
 
foster female representation on boards, and welfare, labour and cultural institutions that 
influence women’s rise on boards.  
Overall, this section proposes the existence of two equifinal and mutually non-
exclusive bundles of causal conditions that can lead to a higher number of women on 
boards.  
2.3.1 Institutional complementarities and women on boards 
Conceptualizing the problem of female underrepresentation on corporate boards as a 
broader social phenomenon is useful to acknowledge that the arguments about women 
on boards cannot be separated from those issues related to the presence of women in 
other institutions, such as state, family, workforce and culture. Indeed, extant research 
has shown that welfare states, national cultures, and the structure of labour markets play 
an important role in shaping the presence of women on boards (see for example, Adams 
and Kirchmaier, 2013; Grosvold and Brammer, 2011).  In turn, a parallel literature has 
documented that these institutional domains appear to be closely interconnected (e.g., 
Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1999; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; 
Misra and Moller, 2005), by paving the way for possible claims of institutional 
complementarities.  
Complementarities can be established according to specified performance criteria 
and perspectives (Höpner, 2005b). In this study, complementarities between welfare, 
labour and cultural institutions are theoretically argued by referring to two aspects. 
Firstly, they are assessed by taking a greater presence of women on boards as the 
performance criterion; secondly, they are established according to the similarity of 
institutions with reference to their similar gendered structure, i.e. their similar 
approaches to the gender perspective. Indeed, it is widely recognized that gender 
relations shape certain institutional domains, because gender itself is an institution 
rooted in other institutions (Martin, 2004; Terjesen et al., 2009). According to Terjesen 
et al. (2009, p. 324), the perspective of gender is “an institution embedded in the 
workplace, occupations, and occupational environments through formally defined rules, 
roles, and responsibilities and the “habitus” of mental structures through which 
individuals think about their social world”. Consequently, it is rational to argue that 
welfare, labour and cultural institutions show a profound gendered nature. They are 
discussed each in turn.  
 
Gender in welfare states. States have “codified many aspects of gender into laws or 
regulations” (Martin, 2004, p. 1259). This is particularly apparent in the case of welfare 
state, “which it is closely connected to gendered dimensions of maternity leave, 
childcare, and female labour force participation” (Terjesen et al., 2014). On the one 
hand, the majority of welfare states across EU countries show a great inequality in terms 
of legislation for parenthood rights. In other words, the protection of motherhood rights, 
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through the provision of extended-length maternity leaves, clearly has prevailed on 
fatherhood rights53. In addition, despite decades of equal opportunity initiatives, welfare 
policies have continued to favour mothers over fathers, giving a proof of the strong 
path-dependency of institutions. As noted by Terjesen et al. (2014), “at an early stage, 
different policy paths are equally possible, and there is a wide choice of potential social 
outcome”. However, the choice of a certain path of policies influences future decisions, 
by making rather difficult to change direction (Greener, 2005; Pierson, 2000). This 
evidence suggests that during the past decades states have progressively mobilized 
gender into welfare institutions, by fostering a sort of legal maternal wall and by 
institutionalizing the prevalent role of women in childcare and housework. Considering 
that men’s power over women has been supported from legal institutions for many years 
(Connell, 1987), institutions have reflected the interest of those who had power to make 
rules, giving evidence that institutions are not necessarily socially efficient (North, 
1990). Orloff (1993, 1996) contends that gender relations within social systems and 
welfare states mutually influence each other (Orloff, 1996). At the same time, several 
scholars support the role of welfare states in promoting equal opportunities, especially 
with regard to female participation in the labour market (see for example, Esping-
Andersen, 1990, 1999; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Misra and Moller, 2005). In this 
way, the presence of gender in welfare institutions contributes to shape gender roles also 
in family, labour and cultural institutions.  
 
Gender in labour markets. Labour markets show a similar gendered logic. As argued 
by Williams (2005), much of gender inequality in labour environments depends on the 
division of gender roles between work and family. Essentially, there is a conflict 
between two gendered norms: 1) the prescriptive norm of the ideal worker, i.e. full-time 
and full-force for working; and 2) the prescriptive norm of the ideal mother, i.e. full-
time and full-force for childbearing and childrearing (Williams, 2005). This perspective 
is also supported by Børve (2007, p. 322), who asserts that the boundless working time 
culture (full-time and overtime) produces “workers without gender and body”. In a 
similar vein, Guillaume and Pochic (2007, p.22) note that “the typical organizational 
career pattern, linear and progressive, ignores individual life cycles and implicitly 
assumes that managers are male”. Mandel and Shalev (2009) document that the typical 
skill regimes of CMEs are more appropriate to the male model of full time and 
continuous employment. For this reason, women are confined just to certain areas of 
employment. Therefore, the presence of gender in labour markets depends on the 
presence of stereotypes, biases and social prejudices linked to the maternal role of 
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women. In turn, such social norms may be perpetuated by the presence of gender 
unbalance in welfare policies. Since the gender perspective that is embedded in welfare 
institutions enhances the presence of gender imbalance in labour markets and in cultural 
beliefs of what is expected by women and men in society, then welfare, labour and 
cultural institutions can be considered closely complementary in their gendered 
structures. 
 
Gender in national culture. The perceived affinity and inter-correlations among 
institutions reveals an underlying cultural logic that claims a particular body of causal 
beliefs (Kogut and Ragin, 2006, p. 45). Individuals with common cultural backgrounds 
are likely to share convergent mental models, ideologies, and institutions; for this 
reasons, institutions underlie common beliefs and cultural norms on what is expected 
from individuals (Denzau and North, 1994)54. In his theoretical framework, Scott (1995) 
asserts that the normative and cultural cognitive pillars of institutions help to explain the 
influence of culture, values and social norms on behaviours (Scott, 1995). In a similar 
vein, many sociologists recognize that the “human agency” has a role in creating, 
shaping and changing social institutions (Nisbet, 1953), through recursive practices 
(Giddens, 1984), routine and repetition (Connell, 1987), and habitualization (Berger 
and Luckmann, 1966). Gendered practices and processes have moved gender in 
multiple settings and contexts (Acker, 1992). In this frame, “gender is a property of 
collectivities, institutions and historical processes” (Connell, 1987, p. 139), giving a 
proof of the fundamental sociality of gender (Lorber, 1994). Since the concept of 
culture refers to human behaviours, recursive practices, norms and beliefs of a given 
society, it is rational to assume that when individuals take gendered behaviours, 
gendered processes and gendered practices, gender ends up flowing into national 
culture. In doing so, gender becomes a property embedded in cultural institutions and it 
may enhance the presence of gender in other institutions through individual behaviours. 
To that regard, the role of culture in shaping gender relations at several levels of social 
life is widely acknowledged in academic literature (e.g., Hofstede, 1983; Gupta et al., 
2002; Grosvold and Brammer, 2011; Williams, 2003). For instance, Williams (2003) 
asserts that workplaces persist to be largely male-oriented, owing to long lasting cultural 
attitudes. In a similar vein, a number of scholars emphasize the relevant influence of 
cultural attitudes on female career advancements and female representation on boards 
(e.g., Adams and Kirchmaier, 2013; Nelson and Levesque, 2007; Terjesen et al., 2009; 
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 To that regard, Denzau and North (1994, p.15) affirm: “The cultural heritage provides a means of 
reducing the divergence in the mental models that people in a society have and also constitutes a means 
for intergenerational transfer of unifying perceptions. We may think of culture as encapsulating the 
experiences of past generations of any particular cultural group. With the diversity of human experiences 
in different environments, there exists a wide variety of patterns of behaviour and thought”. 
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Terjesen et al., 2014; Swiss and Walker, 1993; Williams, 2000). Looking at national 
differences, cultural institutions have been found to influence the level of gender 
differentiation55 and the distribution of power in a given society (e.g., Bakacsi et al., 
2002; Gupta et al., 2002). Taken together, these observations lead to assume that gender 
schemas in national cultures may contribute to shape labour institution with a profound 
gendered perspective. Moreover, if national culture affects the level of gender 
differentiation and the distribution of power in the overall society, it is rational to 
assume that the presence of gender in cultural institutions may also reinforce the 
presence of gender in welfare institutions. This linkage is substantiated by the evidence 
that: 1) institutions reflect the long lasting men’s power over women (Connell, 1987); 2) 
rules are made from those who have power (North, 1990); and 3) States (i.e., the 
maximum expression of power in a given society) have transposed many aspects of 
gender into laws or regulations (Martin, 2004, p. 1259). In sum, gendered culture shapes 
gender-based welfare and labour institutions. In turn, the presence of gender in welfare 
institutions reinforces the presence of gender in labour markets, as well as the existence 
of gender roles in society.  
According to the concept of synergy in institutional complementarities (e.g., 
Campbell, 2011; Crounch, 2005), the presence of similar gendered structures within 
each institutional domain may generate strong complementarities, which in turn are 
likely to determine synergic effects on a given national outcome (women on boards). In 
other words, welfare, labour and cultural institutions are aligned and organized around 
similar and compatible gendered structures. This sort of similarity leads these 
institutions to complement each other and to mutually reinforce their similar gendered 
nature, by creating synergic effects on the on the distribution of power and opportunity 
between men and women. As a result, if the presence of women on boards of directors 
reflects the overall power structure of a social system, then it is reasonable to expect that 
the presence of institutional complementarities in countries with more gender-neutral 
welfare, labour and cultural institutions creates positive synergic effects on the number 
of women that hold corporate board positions. For this reason, the different performance 
in terms of female representation on boards across EU countries can be explained by the 
existence of complementarities between the three main institutional domains that have 
been found to have the most relevant role in shaping the number of women on boards, 
namely welfare states, labour markets and national cultures. Definitively, the more 
‘non-gendered’ cultural, welfare and labour institutions are, the higher the number of 
women on boards of directors.  
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2.3.2 A set-theoretic analysis of institutional complementarities and women on boards 
Recognizing the existence of institutional complementarities and their synergic 
effects on female representation on boards has a twofold implication.  
On the one hand, since complementarities can be conceived as specific types of 
complex configurations associated with positive effects (Jackson and Ni, 2013, p. 136), 
this allows for exploring the existence of conjunctural causal relations between 
institutions. Indeed, assuming a case of institutional complementarities underlies a 
causal effect and it posits that the effects of one institution depend on the 
presence/absence of another institution (Deeg, 2007; Jackson, 2005). Therefore, the 
presence of complementarities between welfare, labour and cultural institutions imply 
that the effect of one of them depends on the presence or absence of the other 
complementary institutions. Moreover, the assumption that complementary and 
consistent institutions have mutually reinforcing effects on female representation on 
boards underlies a claim of conjunctural causation, which can be intended in terms of 
conjunction or combination of multiple causal conditions for the outcome. As noted 
above, the interdependence of institutions, their perceived affinity and the underlying 
cultural logic (e.g., Acker, 1992; Neale, 1988; Kogut and Ragin, 2006) invokes a 
problem of causal complexity, defined as “patterns of multiple conjunctural causation 
where no single cause may be either necessary or sufficient” (Kogut and Ragin, 
2006:47).  In a similar vein, the configurational nature of complementarities (Jackson 
and Ni, 2013) enables to inquire whether a “superior” national model, or an “ideal” 
national configuration, for female representation on boards exists across EU countries.  
On the other hand, acknowledging the effects of interacting institutions is very 
important for both theoretical research and policy recommendations (Amable, 2000). 
When the causal mechanisms between complementary institutions and women on 
boards are verified, it is possible to investigate which mix of public policies is more 
appropriate to promote female representation on boards. In detail, considering that the 
debate about the adoption and diffusion of gender quotas for corporate boards is 
controversial and still open, this study pays a particular attention on the role of gender 
quotas policies, in terms of their necessity and sufficiency for the presence of a major 
number of women on boards. To that regard, it is important to understand whether 
institutions are “neutral” or not, since whether a practice may be transferred in other 
countries depends on existing configurations of institutions and their efficacy may 
depend on some affiliated belief structures (Kogut and Ragin, 2006). National 
institutions can combine in different ways and generate different national 
configurations. As a result, such configurations may show different conjunctions of 
country-level causal conditions (conjunctural causation) that can equally lead to a 
higher number of women on boards of directors (equifinality). 
In order to deepen these issues, the present section adopts a set-theoretic approach, 
particularly suitable when the inquiry concerns the study of causally complex relations. 
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Moreover, the logic underlying set-theoretic approaches allows for developing a 
comprehensive conceptual model that takes into account the relationships between 
“bundles” of causes that influence women’s rise on boards and the enactment of 
regulatory policies that can facilitate this rise. In order to evaluate the existence of 
institutional complementarities it is necessary to assess, for each institutional domain, 
the relative significance of specific institutional attributes, or their combination, for 
generating complementarities with other domains (Deeg, 2007). In a set-theoretic 
perspective, such an investigation requires the election of the main country-level 
conditions, within each institutional domain, that are responsible for combined causal 
relationships between welfare, labour and cultural institutions. In particular, the 
selection of causal conditions “should occur via an iterative dialogue between prior 
theoretical knowledge and empirical insights gained during the research process” 
(Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, p. 277). For the purpose of this research, country-
level causal conditions were elected according to two characteristics: 1) their significant 
impact on gender diversity on corporate boards; and 2) their relative significance in 
unravelling the gendered nature of institutions. They are described below. 
 
Selection of country-level causal conditions. Considering the plurality of inputs 
underlying cultural and labour institutions (e.g., labour regulation, earnings gap, 
stereotypes, mental models, recursive practices, behaviours), their gendered structures 
were assessed in terms of macro-variables, i.e. in terms of aggregate measures related to 
the final outcome that the presence of gender in such institutions can determine. By 
making reference to the broader concept of gender equality in society, it is possible to 
measure the presence of gender in national culture. Therefore, countries with more non-
gendered cultural institutions are expected to present higher levels of gender equality in 
society. With regard to labour markets, both female employment and part-time female 
employment are taken as a valid proxy of how gender perspective is embedded within 
labour institutions. As noted by Adams and Kirchmaier (2013), part time jobs for taking 
on family responsibilities might undermine women’s career opportunities. For this 
reason, policies for full-time female employment and childcare services are important to 
foster work-life balance. Consequently, countries with more gender-neutral labour 
institutions are expected to present high level of female employment and not high level 
of female part-time job.  
When it comes to welfare institutions, it is important to understand that welfare states 
operate at multiple levels, through several public policies and with different outcomes 
for the wellbeing of a number of social groups. As a result, only those policies that are 
more directly related to the phenomenon of female representation on boards were 
chosen. In order to assess the presence of a gendered structure in welfare institutions, 
schemas of parental leave (more exhaustively, maternity leave, paternity leave, and 
parental leave schemas) and public childcare policies were taken. This choice was 
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motivated by several reasons. On the one hand, parental leave provisions for mother, 
father and both parents taken together represent an appropriate proxy of the gendered 
nature of welfare states, as well as they are plausibly a relevant foregoer of the actual 
division of family and childcare responsibilities between men and women. On the other 
hand, as argued by Terjesen et al. (2014), the nature of the welfare state is closely 
related to gendered dimensions of maternity leave, childcare services and female labour 
participation. Actually, in many other research context, mother’s entitlements and 
maternity leaves were often chosen to show the perverse effects of work/family 
reconciliation policies on female employment and careers (e.g., Aschcraft, 1999; 
Grosvold and Brammer, 2011; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; 
Misra and Moller, 2005; Nelson and Levesque, 2007). For instance, in line with Esping-
Andersen’s definition of the defamilialization role of states, the public support offered 
for working mothers, such as paid maternity leave or reduced working hours fails to 
liberate women from family’s responsibilities (Misra and Moller, 2005) and it 
strengthens their dominant role in childcare, eldercare and housework. In addition, 
maternity leaves are considered as a cost for organizations (Imperatori and Paolino, 
2013); this negative view creates negative stereotypes about maternity (e.g., Guetal et 
al., 1995) in workplaces and lead employers to invest in and hire male work-force 
(Grosvold and Brammer, 2011). By examining the labour force participation gap, 
Ganguli et al. (2011) find that a gap between mothers and non-mother women (defined 
by the authors as “motherhood gap”) still exists and it is heterogeneous among 
countries. In sum these causal conditions are suitable to reflect the gendered nature of 
welfare institutions and they are likely to generate complementarities with labour and 
cultural institutions. When the more extended length of maternity leaves is compared to 
the less extended length of paternity leaves, this circumstance reflects a strong presence 
of gender in welfare institutions. In a similar vein, an extended length of parental leaves 
(generally available for both mothers and fathers) may reflect a more egalitarian role of 
men and women in childcare56. By introducing equal opportunity for both fathers and 
                                                          
56
Despite recent calls from some international bodies (e.g., International Labor Organizational, Council of 
Europe) to make the share of family responsibilities between women and men more egalitarian, Sweden 
is considered the only society formally committed to promote fatherhood and the equal involvement of 
fathers in child care (Haas, 1992). This approach emphasizes that Swedish welfare institutions protect 
parenthood more than motherhood, giving evidence that gender equality is embedded in institutions. 
Sweden guarantees 480 calendar days of paid leave to the family, by providing both mother and father’s 
quota of leave through a unique parental leave benefit system. Bearing in mind that “every society 
represents a peculiar configuration of historical, economic, political, and social force” (Haas, 1992:18), it 
is widely recognized that Sweden has a radical gender equality culture (Teigen, 2012), which is the main 
reason to assume that Swedish government did not need to introduce board gender quotas (Teigen and 
Wangnerud, 2009). Evidence shows that in Sweden there is one of the highest rates of women on boards 
worldwide (Terjesen et al., 2014). 
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mothers to take time off for childcare, parental leave schemes can be an effective tool 
for promoting gender equality (Eydal and Gislason, 2008). Moreover, more “women-
friendly” welfare states generally provide high levels of childcare services, since these 
services release women from their prevalent role in domestic responsibilities. Overall, it 
is reasonable to expect that countries with more “non-gendered” welfare institutions 
show a shorter distance in the length of paternity and maternity leave (comparatively 
speaking, this means that these countries should show higher length of paternity leave 
and not higher length of maternity leave compared to other countries), higher level of 
parental leaves, and higher level of childcare services.  
If the existence of complementarities is likely to be true in a theoretical perspective, 
it determines synergic effects on female representation on boards (see § 2.3.1). Since the 
presence of similar, aligned and consistent gendered structures within each institutional 
domain generates strong complementarities and synergic effects, then the more gender-
neutral the cultural, welfare and labour institutions are, the higher the number of women 
on boards of directors will be. In view of that, gender relations in these three 
institutional domains are related causally and jointly to gender balance on boards of 
directors; thus, women on boards can be intended as the outcome of multiple relations 
between different institutional sets, whose attributes shape the “gendered” nature of 
institutions themselves. To that effect, they are the outcome of the conjunctural causal 
relationship between several sets of gender-neutral institutional conditions. In set-
theoretic terms, this means that the conjunction or combination of these causal 
conditions is sufficient to achieve a comparatively higher number of women on boards 
across countries. In other words, high paternity leave, not high maternity leave, high 
parental leave, high level of childcare services, high female employment, not high 
female part-time job AND high gender equality in society are sufficient conditions for a 
higher number of women on boards. Since it has been driven by theory-based 
expectations, this combination of gender-neutral causal conditions can be intended as an 
“ideal” configuration of institutional attributes that lead to a greater gender balance on 
boards.  Accordingly, the following is proposed: 
 
Proposition 1: The conjunction of high paternity leave, not high maternity leave, 
high parental leave, high level of childcare services, high female employment, not 
high female part-time job AND high gender equality in society is sufficient to 
achieve a higher number of women on boards. 
 
In set-theoretic notation, this joint causation can be denoted as follows: 
 
High Paternity Leave * ~ High Maternity Leave * High Parental Leave * High 
Level of Childcare Services * High Female Employment * ~ High Female Part-
Time Job * High Gender Equality → High Number of Women on Boards. 
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2.3.3 The necessity and sufficiency of gender quotas for boards of directors 
Considering the notion of sufficiency, a condition is sufficient if, whenever it occurs 
across cases, the outcome is present. This means that the presence of the condition 
implies the presence of the outcome. Gender quotas for boards of directors should be a 
sufficient condition if, whenever they occur across countries, those countries show a 
higher number of women on boards. To that regard, the enactment of mandatory gender 
quotas at board level, by definition, leads to increase the number women in board 
positions. Therefore, it is logically true that the presence of mandatory gender quotas at 
board level implies the presence of more women in board positions. This corresponds to 
say that whenever gender quotas regulation occurs across countries, these countries are 
expected to have a high number of women on boards, or rather, that gender quotas are 
sufficient by themselves to achieve this outcome. More formally, the following 
proposition is proposed: 
 
Proposition 2: Gender quotas for boards of directors are a sufficient condition to 
achieve a higher number of women on boards. 
 
In set-theoretic notation, this relation can be denoted as follows: 
 
Gender Quotas for Board of Directors → High Number of Women on Boards. 
 
In a configurational perspective, this means that gender quotas represent an 
alternative pathway to the outcome of interest. Consistent with this standpoint, some 
scholars have recognized that, when countries lack of particular women-friendly 
conditions, affirmative action such as gender quotas may be a valuable alternative to 
have more women on boards (e.g., Grosvold and Brammer, 2011). In addition to the 
ideal configuration proposed in Proposition 1, Proposition 2 shows another sufficient 
condition for the outcome, i.e. gender quotas for boards of directors. Essentially, 
Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 represent two equally effective and mutually non-
exclusive pathways for a greater number of women on boards. Bearing in mind that 
conjunctural causal relationship is denoted by logical AND operators (*), while 
equifinality of different combinations of causal conditions is denoted by logical OR 
operators (+), in set-theoretic terms, the presence of two equifinal pathways for the 
outcome can be denoted as follow: 
 
High Paternity Leave * ~High Maternity Leave * High Parental Leave * High 
Level of Childcare Services * High Female Employment * ~High Female Part-
Time Job * High Gender Equality  +  Gender Quotas for Board of Directors → 
High Number of Women on Boards. 
 
CHAPTER 2. THEORIES AND PROPOSITIONS 
76 
 
On the other hand, gender quotas for boards of directors should be a necessary 
condition if, whenever a higher number of women on boards occurs across countries, 
those countries have enacted gender quotas legislations. Indeed, the notion of necessity 
states that a condition is necessary if, whenever the outcome is present, the condition is 
always present.  However, the theory-driven Proposition 1 shows a configuration of 
causal condition that is sufficient to achieve a higher number of women on boards, 
without the enactment of gender quotas for boards of directors. According to the 
theoretical expectations, the conjunction of very gender-neutral institutional attributes is 
sufficient to achieve a higher presence of women on boards, without requiring any kind 
of regulation or self-regulation at board level. This is owing to the great internal 
consistency and gender neutrality of aligned institutions that entail superior effects on 
female representation on boards, through the existence of institutional 
complementarities. In set-theoretic terms, this means that the outcome (a higher number 
of women on boards) is present, while the condition (gender quotas) is absent. 
Definitively, gender quotas for boards of directors are a sufficient, but not necessary 
condition to achieve a higher number of women on boards. More formally: 
 
Proposition 3: Gender quotas for boards of directors are not a necessary condition 
to achieve a higher number of women on boards. 
 
An important contribution of adopting set-theoretic approaches is that they allow for 
the empirical verification of theory-informed propositions that concern configurations 
of causal conditions for an outcome of interest. To that end, this study applies a 
particular set-theoretic method, called fuzzy set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(fs/QCA), which enables to map countries as different national configurations of causal 
conditions in order to verify empirically the alleged assumptions. In line with Schneider 
and Wagemann (2012), when the phenomenon under investigation is likely to be better 
understood in terms of set relations (i.e., in terms of conjunctural causation, equifinality 
and causal asymmetry), QCA is an adequate methodological choice. The next chapters 
presents a comparative analysis of national configurations in the 27 European Union 
countries. Through fs/QCA, each country is taken as a configuration of specific national 
conditions, including regulatory policies, welfare policies, characteristics of labour 
markets, and levels of gender equality in the overall society. In doing so, the analysis 
explores the existence of particular combinations of country-level causal condition that 
can lead to a higher number of women on boards, as well as it verifies the necessary 
and/or sufficient function of gender quotas for corporate boards in the existing national 
configurations.  
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CHAPTER SUMMARY 
By drawing on to the assumptions of institutional complementarities theory, 
configurational theory and set theory, this chapter has developed the theoretical 
propositions that drive this work. The presence of similar and consistent “gendered” 
structures theoretically supports the existence of complementarities between welfare, 
labour and cultural institutions, as well as their causal synergic effects on female 
representation on boards. The central tenet of this work is that the more gender-neutral, 
cultural, welfare and labour institutions are, the higher will be the number of women 
on boards of directors. By addressing the importance of institutional interdependencies 
for policy recommendations, a set-theoretic approach has been adopted to study 
women on boards in terms of causally complex relations. In order to assess the strength 
of complementarities and their effects on the outcome under investigation, it has been 
necessary to elect the main country-level causal conditions, within each institutional 
sphere, that were likely to generate complementarities with other domains. This step is 
relevant to better understand the causal mechanisms that link institutional 
complementarities to gender diversity on boards. These causal conditions have been 
elected according to two characteristics: 1) their significant impact on gender diversity 
on corporate boards; and 2) their relative significance in unravelling the gendered 
nature of institutions. They are paternity leaves, maternity leaves, parental leaves, and 
childcare services (for assessing the gendered nature of welfare institutions); female 
employment and female part-time employment (for assessing the gendered nature of 
labour markets); level of gender equality in the overall society (for assessing the 
gendered nature of national cultures). Therefore, women on boards can be intended as 
the outcome of multiple relations between different institutional sets, whose conditions 
shape the “gendered” nature of institutions themselves. In set-theoretic terms, this 
means that the conjunction or combination of these causal conditions is sufficient to 
achieve a comparatively higher number of women on boards across countries. 
Accordingly, three main theoretical propositions have been formulated according to 
set-theoretic logic and notation. Proposition 1 suggests a sufficient combination of 
country-level causal conditions that can lead to a higher number of women on boards, 
without the need for enacting gender quotas for boards of directors.  This means that 
the existence of complementarities between specific national conditions may create 
mutually reinforcing effects on the representation of women on boards, by making 
unnecessary the enactment of gender affirmative action. Addressing the effects of 
institutional complementarities between welfare, labour and cultural institutions has 
relevance for assessing the necessity and sufficiency of gender quotas policies for 
female representation on boards. Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 suggest that gender 
quotas for boards of directors are a sufficient, but not necessary condition to achieve a 
higher number of women on boards. Overall, this chapter proposed the existence of 
two equifinal and mutually non-exclusive bundles of causal conditions that can lead to 
a higher number of women on boards. By using fs/QCA, the next chapters presents an 
empirical investigation of these theoretical propositions. 
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CHAPTER 3 METHOD 
OVERVIEW: This chapter presents a comparative analysis between the 27 EU 
countries (cases). Through fuzzy sets/Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(fs/QCA), countries are mapped in terms of configurations of institutional 
attributes (causal conditions). The aim is to explore the existence of particular 
combinations of country-level attributes that can lead to a comparatively higher 
number of women on boards across countries. Fs/QCA allows for the causal 
interpretation of the phenomenon of gender diversity on boards. In this way, the 
alleged claims of conjunctural causation and equifinality are empirically 
investigated.  
3.1 Fuzzy sets / Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
In order to answer the alleged research questions, this work presents an empirical 
investigation, aiming to corroborate the theoretical propositions that have been 
formulated in the previous chapter. In detail, it performs a qualitative comparative 
analysis between the 27 European Union countries. Taken together, the great 
heterogeneity in terms of female representation on boards across EU countries and the 
contextual commitment of EU institution in promoting initiative that bring more women 
in top management positions, create a suitable scenario for the objectives of this 
research. The comparative analysis of their differences and similarities contributes to 
shed light on the existence of institutional complementarities in shaping female 
representation on boards. At the same time, the results of this comparison can help to 
assess whether gender quotas that were enacted in some EU countries might be 
transferred in other EU countries. Clearly, statistical investigation can be difficult for 
this purpose. Beyond the well known conflict between the predominant linear paradigm 
and the assumptions of configurational theory (Fiss, 2007), the number of countries and 
their possible interactions is rather limited to perform statistical analyses (Kogut and 
Ragin, 2006).  
Accordingly, this work proposes a fuzzy sets/ qualitative comparative analysis 
(fs/QCA) in order to explore countries in terms of national configurations. To that end, 
fs/QCA is applied as both a research approach and an analytical technique. The 
adoption of this methodological tool leads to map countries as configurations of several 
institutional attributes and to unravel all possible combinations that these attributes can 
generate. By comparing configurations of causal conditions, fs/QCA allows for 
investigating the alleged claims of complementarities and causal complex relations 
CHAPTER 3. METHOD 
 
79 
 
between sets of complementary institutions and gender diversity on boards. Essentially, 
this method tends to maximize the number of comparison between configurations, and 
then to logically reduce them in simpler causal statements. Therefore, through fs/QCA it 
is possible to detect the existence of a superior national model (or “ideal type”) that is 
connected with a greater number of women on boards of directors, as well as the 
existence of multiple pathways of causal conditions that can equally lead to the outcome 
under investigation. At the same time, fs/QCA applies the assumptions of set theory and 
the rules of Boolean algebra. According to Kogut and Ragin (2006), this is a very 
important property, because to take a configurational perspective often means facing 
unspecified and unknown relationships among a number of elements in reference to a 
given outcome. To that regard, by involving both the logic of sets and Boolean logic, 
QCA contributes to reduce this complexity and to find the minimal number of logical 
statements (Kogut and Ragin, 2006). This mixture is valuable to investigate 
relationships in terms of necessity and sufficiency of causal conditions for the outcome 
at hand. Overall, these characteristics are well suited with the aim of verifying the 
necessary and/or sufficient function of gender quotas in the existing national 
configurations.  
Overall, when the purpose of research is to analyze a phenomenon in terms of 
(causal) relations between sets and to assess the presence of equifinality and multiple 
conjunctural causation, QCA represents a fruitful methodological choice (Schneider 
and Wagemann, 2012). Interestingly, Fiss et al. (2013, p.12) suggest that QCA is a very 
promising methodological tool “to resolve a number of long-standing puzzles in 
organization theory including board composition (...)”. This study can represent a first 
effort to that effect. 
However, for the purpose of this study, it is important to understand that sets are not 
variables; consequently, QCA does not analyze correlations, but it provides a causal 
interpretation of the phenomenon under investigation (Fiss et al., 2013; Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2012). The configurational assumptions of nonlinearity, synergistic effects 
and equifinality come to diverge from the linear paradigm that is typical of correlations-
bade methods, whose properties are linearity, additive effects and unifinality57 (Fiss, 
2007, p. 1181). More exhaustively, QCA produces results that reveal several aspects of 
causal complexity, since it allows for investigating how certain causal conditions are 
jointly related to the outcome in terms of subset/superset relations, i.e. in terms of 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the outcome (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). 
These characteristics have made QCA particularly widespread in the literature. Indeed, 
although this method has been especially used in political and social research, it is now 
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 See § 2.2.2 for further details. 
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spreading in a plurality of fields and disciplines, such as political economy, 
management and organization studies (Ragin and Rihoux, 2004; Rihoux, 2006; e.g., 
Kogut and Ragin, 2006; Grandori and Furnari, 2008; Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein, 
2009; Fiss, 2011; Garcìa-Castro et al., 2013).  
QCA has its roots in a “synthetic strategy” between complexity and generality, thus 
representing a middle, and distinct, path between case-oriented research approaches and 
variable-oriented research approaches (Ragin, 1987, p. 84). By integrating these 
approaches, QCA has resulted in a method that is both qualitative and quantitative in its 
nature. To that regard, QCA can be understood both as a research approach and as a 
data analysis technique (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009). While the latter refers to the 
quantitative roots of QCA, i.e. to the “analytical moment” of finding empirical patterns 
of conditions through specified algorithms and appropriate software, the former refers to 
the qualitative roots of QCA (Schneider and Wagemann, 2010). Conceiving QCA as a 
research approach refers to the overall iterative research process underlying QCA, i.e. to 
the specification and re-specification of selection criteria, the selection and re-selection 
of cases and causal conditions, the specification and re-specification of concepts and 
criteria during the research process. Indeed, the adoption of a QCA research approach 
require a continue dialogue between ideas and evidence, before and after the analytical 
moment (Ragin 1987, 2000). Since “this middle path emphasizes the use of a 
configurational approach to cases and thus retains some of the holism of the case-study 
approach in the analysis of cross-case pattern”, it has been considered the foundation of 
a “diversity-oriented research” (Kogut and Ragin, 2006, p. 47). Although neither the use 
of set theory nor the adoption of a configurational approach represent novel 
methodological tools, the distinctiveness of this method stems from their combination to 
analyze how configurations of causal conditions contribute to explain an outcome (Fiss 
et al., 2013). To that effect, QCA represents a specification of a broader class of 
Configurational Comparative Methods (CCMs) that are based on set theory and that 
allow for “systematic cross-case comparisons, while at the same time giving justice to 
within-case complexity” (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009, p. xviii).  
Under the heading of Configurational Comparative Methods, three main analytic 
techniques are included: 1) crisp-set QCA (csQCA); 2) multi-value QCA (mvQCA); 
and 3) fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009). In his original applications, 
QCA was based on the binary logic of Boolean algebra (Ragin, 1987) with only two 
values for each variable (“0” for full non-membership or “1” for full membership). For 
this reason it was referred as crisp set – QCA (cs/QCA). However, the limits of 
dichotomizing phenomena just into two values are well known in social research. In 
later versions, QCA has been developed to allow multiple-category conditions (this is 
the case of mvQCA), as well as to involve the application of fuzzy logic, according to 
which conditions can have continuous values between 0 and 1 (Ragin, 2000). The latter 
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case is referred as fs/QCA. With the application of fuzzy logic, it is possible to have 
more fine-grained measures of the attributes involved in the analysis (Fiss, 2007).  
The next section provides a brief description of the main steps and procedure that the 
application of a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis requires. 
3.1.1 Main steps and procedures in fs/QCA  
In order to analyze complex configurations, QCA follows a meticulous procedure.  
 
Selection of cases, causal condition and outcome. The first step concerns the 
selection of cases, causal condition and outcome. This choice requires a systematic 
dialogue of ideas and evidence and it needs to be theoretically informed (De Meur and 
Rihoux, 2002; Kogut and Ragin, 2006; Rhioux, 2006). Overall, theory is very pervasive 
in a QCA research approach, since it implicitly leads researchers to provide a theoretical 
justification of their choices, by explaining why, how and which particular conditions 
are causally related to the outcome of interest. As noted by Schneider and Wagemann 
(2012, p. 277), the selection of causal conditions should made trough “an iterative 
dialogue between prior theoretical knowledge and empirical insights gained during the 
research process”. In line with this logic, during the research process, cases, causal 
condition and outcomes can also be added, dropped or reconceptualised (Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2012). This iterative process allows researchers to develop robust 
explanations about the underlying causal mechanism that link several causal condition 
to an outcome.  Moreover, in line with Schneider and Wagemann (2010), it is important 
to be as much familiar as possible with the cases at hand. The aforementioned authors 
suggest that a profound knowledge of cases is fruitful before the analysis, since it helps 
to identify relevant causal conditions, as well as after the analysis, as it contributes to 
the interpretation of the results. Taken together, the selection of cases and causal 
conditions is strictly related to the use of QCA as research approach. Section 3.2 defines 
the research setting of this study, by theoretically justifying the choice of both cases and 
causal conditions to be included in the empirical analysis.  
 
Set Calibration. The second steps refers to the calibration of set-membership scores, 
i.e. the definition of the membership degree of cases to the sets, with a score ranging 
between 0 (full exclusion from a set) and 1 (full inclusion in a set). The process of 
calibration essentially consists in the transformation of conventional variables in fuzzy 
sets, and it is one of the most important steps in fs/QCA, because cases will be assessed 
with regard to their membership in previously specified sets of conditions (Schneider 
and Wagemann, 2012). Concerning the criteria to be used, calibration should be made 
“using theoretical and substantive criteria external to the data and taking into account 
the researcher’s conceptualization, definition, and labeling of the set in question” 
(Ragin, 2008b:16). While the use of criteria that are external to the data is 
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recommended, the use of just quantitative parameters, such as the mean, is highly 
discouraged, since the set-membership of a case to a set comes to depend from other 
cases (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). Although there are two methods of calibration, 
namely the “direct” and the “indirect” method (Ragin, 2008a), this section particularly 
focuses on the direct method, since it is applied in this study.  
The “direct method” of calibration uses a logistic function and it works in the metric 
of log odds, through which interval-scale variables are transformed into a log odds 
metric, and then into the degree of membership in the target set (Ragin, 2008a, 2008c). 
Generally, a logistic function is used in logistic regression to model how the 
probability of an event may be affected by one or more explanatory variables.  Logistics 
functions are useful because the value of the output always ranges between 0 and 1. The 
inverse of a logistic function is denoted as logit (i.e. log odds or natural logarithm of the 
odds). In line with Ragin (2008c), the odds of full membership and the corresponding 
log odds are obtained with the following formulas: 
Formula 3.1.1 - Odds of membership 
                   
                      
                         
 
Formula 3.1.2 - Log Odds 
             
                      
                         
 
 
Once a target set has been conceptualized and it has been labelled according to the 
theoretical and substantive knowledge of researchers (e.g. the set of “EU countries with 
high level of paternity leave”), three important qualitative anchors have to be selected. 
They correspond to the threshold for the full membership of countries in the target set 
(1); the threshold for the full non-membership of countries in the target set (0); and, the 
cross-over point, where cases have both a membership and non-membership score of 
0.5 in a given set (Ragin, 2000; 2008a). However, since this method is based on a 
logistic function, the actual anchors correspond to the fuzzy score of 0.95 for the full 
membership; the fuzzy score of 0.05 for the full non-membership, and a fuzzy score of 
0.5 for the point of maximum ambiguity (Scheider and Wagemann, 2012). After 
defining the three threshold values for each condition and outcome, calibration can be 
automatically calculated through the use of the fs/QCA software package 2.5 (Ragin et 
al., 2006). However, in order to better understand the logic underlying the direct method 
of calibration, some mathematical aspects require a further explanation. This procedure 
is well explained in Ragin (2008c), to whom the following elucidation makes reference.  
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Let the 27 EU countries be the cases that need to be assigned into the set of “EU 
countries with high level of paternity leaves”, the values of variables correspond to the 
number of days for statutory paternity leaves that are enacted in each EU country. The 
three qualitative anchors are established at: 15 days for the threshold for full 
membership; 9 days for the cross-over point; and, 3 days for the threshold of full non-
membership. The first value, i.e. the threshold for full membership, corresponds to a set 
membership score of 0.95; the corresponding odds of membership is equal to 19, as 
calculated by applying the formula (3.1.1); the natural log of the odds is exactly 2,94. 
The third value, i.e. the threshold for full non-membership, corresponds to a set 
membership score of 0.05; the corresponding odds of membership is equal to 0.1, as 
calculated by applying the formula (3.1.1); the natural log of the odds is exactly - 2,94.  
These results are summarized in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1 - Calibration 
 Threshold Set membership 
score 
Odds of 
membership 
Natural log of 
the odds 
Full membership 15 0,95 19 2,944 
Full non-membership 3 0,05 0,053 -2,944 
Cross-over point 9 0,5 1 0,000 
 
In order to compute the calibrated value of the membership degree of a case in a 
target set, it is important to calculate the deviations of raw scores from the (previously 
specified) cross over point. For instance, with regard to Italy, the statutory amount of 
paternity leave corresponds to one day; therefore, the deviation score from the cross-
over point corresponds to -8 (i.e., 1 - 9 = -8). Afterwards, the “cross-over centred” data 
need to be translated into the metric of log odds. To that end, the procedure differs 
according to whether the values are above or below the cross-over point. If cases are 
above the cross-over point, the values corresponding to the metric of log odds result 
from the multiplication of deviation scores (i.e., -8) by the ratio of the log odds 
(associated with the threshold of full membership) to the deviation score of full 
membership from the cross-over point (i.e., 2.94 / (15-9) = 2.94 / 6 = 0.49). If cases are 
below the cross-over point, the values corresponding to the metric of log odds result 
from the multiplication of deviation scores (i.e., -8) by the ratio of the log odds 
(associated with the threshold of full non-membership) to the deviation score of full 
non-membership from the cross-over point (i.e., -2.94 / (3-9) = -2.94 / -6 = 0.49). Since 
Italy is below the cross-over point, the second procedure is applied; thus, the rescaled 
value that reflects the log odds of membership in the set of “EU countries with high 
level of paternity leaves” corresponds to -3.92 (i.e., (-8 * 0.49) = -3.92). These 
procedures are summarized in formulas (3.1.3) and (3.1.4).  
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Formula 3.1.3 - Rescaling values (above the cross-over point) into the metric of log 
odds 
           
                                                       
                                  
 
Formula 3.1.4 - Rescaling values (below the cross-over point) into the metric of log 
odds 
           
                                                           
                                      
 
The last step requires the transformation of the log odds into values that reflect the 
degree of membership in the target set. To that end, Ragin (2008c) suggests the formula 
(3.1.5). In the case of Italy, the degree of membership in the set of “EU countries with 
high level of paternity leaves” corresponds to 0.01 (i.e.,                 ) = 0.01). 
Table 3.2 shows the results for all countries.  
Formula 3.1.5 - Converting log odds to scores 
                     
        
            
 
 
Table 3.2 – Calibration of conventional variables in fuzzy sets 
Countries 
Statutory 
Paternity 
Leaves 
Deviation scores 
from the cross 
over point 
Values 
rescaled into 
the metric of 
log odds 
Degree of membership in 
the set of "EU Countries 
with high level of paternity 
leave" 
Austria 0 -9 -4,41 0,01 
Belgium 3 -6 -2,94 0,05 
Bulgaria 15 6 2,94 0,95 
Cyprus 0 -9 -4,41 0,01 
Czech Republic  0 -9 -4,41 0,01 
Germany 0 -9 -4,41 0,01 
Denmark 14 5 2,45 0,92 
Estonia 10 1 0,49 0,62 
Greece 2 -7 -3,43 0,03 
Spain 15 6 2,94 0,95 
Finland 18 9 4,41 0,99 
France 14 5 2,45 0,92 
Hungary 5 -4 -1,96 0,12 
Ireland 0 -9 -4,41 0,01 
Italy 1 -8 -3,92 0,02 
Lithuania 28 19 9,31 1,00 
Luxembourg 2 -7 -3,43 0,03 
CHAPTER 3. METHOD 
 
85 
 
Latvia 10 1 0,49 0,62 
Malta 1 -8 -3,92 0,02 
The Netherlands  2 -7 -3,43 0,03 
Poland  14 5 2,45 0,92 
Portugal  10 1 0,49 0,62 
Romania  5 -4 -1,96 0,12 
Sweden  10 1 0,49 0,62 
Slovenia  90 81 39,69 1,00 
Slovakia  0 -9 -4,41 0,01 
United Kingdom 14 5 2,45 0,92 
 
Truth Table. As previously noted (see chapter 2), in formal logic a truth table 
contains all possible combinations of simple statements (n) with two truth-values (true 
and false) and it is particularly useful for determining the truth values of a compound 
statement. Denoting with k the number of causal conditions, and considering that each 
single condition can take two values (0 if it is absent, and 1 if it is present), in QCA, 
truth tables represent all the logically possible AND combinations of these conditions, 
i.e. all logically possible causal arguments (Ragin, 2009; Schneider and Wagemann, 
2012). Therefore, the number of all possible combinations corresponds to the value 2
k
. 
Since each combination constitutes one row of the truth table, the total amount of rows 
is 2
k
. Each row of the table is called “a configuration and represents a unique 
combination of k values” (Thiem and Duşa, 2013, p. 506, emphasis in the original).  
Cases are assigned to each row of the truth table when they have the highest 
membership in that row. With crisp sets, cases can belong to only one row of the truth 
table, because if a case has a full membership (1) in one row, then it has a full non-
membership (0) in the remaining rows; conversely, with fuzzy sets, cases have a partial 
membership in every combination of causal conditions (Ragin, 2009; Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2012). Ragin (2009) refers to fuzzy sets representing conditions as a 
multidimensional vector space with 2
k 
corners. Consequently, the rows of the truth table 
reflect the corners of the multidimensional vector space defined by the causal conditions 
(Ragin, 2000), and each corner corresponds to a combination of causal conditions, 
where the value of conditions are either 0 (full non-membership), or 1 (full 
membership), i.e. the two extreme values of a fuzzy set (Schneider and Wagemann, 
2012). For instance, let 4 be the number (k) of causal conditions, then the corners of the 
vector space are 16 (i.e., 2
4
). Every corner corresponds to a combination of these four 
causal conditions with the two extreme values, i.e., 0001, 0100, 0011, 1111, and so on.  
However, since fuzzy sets lead cases to have a partial membership in every 
combination of causal conditions, this means that cases can have varying degree of 
membership in every corner of the multidimensional vector space (Ragin, 2009). For 
this reason, it is important to establish to which corner of this space a case most belongs 
and to assess the distance of cases from the corners of the vector space (Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2012). On the one hand, the membership of each case in a corner can be 
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calculated by applying the rules of fuzzy algebra. In detail, the rule of the minimum 
score is applied (see § 2.2.3): the membership score of a case in a conjunction of two 
causal conditions A and B (i.e., A * B) stems from the minimum value between the 
membership score that the case holds in A and the membership score that it holds in B. 
An important property of fuzzy sets is that any case can have a membership score 
greater than 0.5 in one and only one of the 2
k 
possible combinations of causal 
conditions. Schneider and Wagemann (2012, p. 100) refer to this property as the 
“golden rule for fuzzy sets”. A membership score of a case that is higher than 0.5 in a 
specific combination of conditions suggests that the case is “more in than out” the 
conjunction. In this way, it identifies the corner of the vector space, i.e. the row of the 
truth table, to which the case mostly belongs (Ragin, 2009; Schneider and Wagemann, 
2012). In sum, cases are assigned to truth table rows calculating the number of cases 
with greater than 0.5 membership score.   
A further step for constructing a truth table is to define the value of the outcome for 
each row. This process essentially consists in evaluating the presence of subset 
relations. Indeed, each row represents a combination of conditions that can be 
considered sufficient for the outcome if the membership score of cases in the 
combination (i.e. in the row of the truth table) is smaller than or equal to the 
membership that cases hold in the outcome set. In other words, this means that the 
combination of conditions is a subset of the outcome and it is sufficient for the outcome. 
If this criterion is satisfied the value of the outcome is set to 1; conversely, it is set to 0 
(Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). This particular outcome set has been defined 
“inclusion” and it represent “a summary measure of the degree to which the hypothesis 
that the configuration is a subset of the outcome set can be preliminary considered as 
true” (Thiem and Duşa, 2013, p. 507). Definitively, a truth table containing all logically 
possible combinations of causal conditions with two truth-values (1 and 0) is obtained.  
Finally, the designation of the number of causal combinations that are relevant for 
the outcome should be made according to a reasonable frequency threshold: when 
enough cases have a membership score greater than 0.5 in a combination, it is 
reasonable to consider that combination as relevant for the outcome (Ragin, 2009). 
When the total amount of cases is relatively small, the frequency threshold could be 1 or 
2 (Ragin, 2008b). As a consequence, when the combinations of conditions present a 
lack of cases with a membership score greater than to 0.5, they are treated and labelled 
as “reminders” in the following steps of the analysis (Ragin, 2009). Essentially, 
reminders correspond to configurations for which any statement about subset relation 
cannot be formulated for the lack of empirical evidence (Thiem and Duşa, 2013). In 
practical terms, they represent the logically possible combinations that are not 
empirically observed (Ragin, 2009). 
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Analysis of truth tables. The analysis of the truth table corresponds to the analysis of 
sufficiency. In line with Schneider and Wagemann (2012), each row of the truth table in 
which the outcome shows the value 1 can be considered a sufficient pathway for the 
outcome. However, when the number of causal condition is very large, the total amount 
of their logically possible combinations may be particularly copious and it may present 
redundant conditions. For this reason, the number of combinations of causal conditions 
needs to be logically reduced. Since these combination represent forms of Boolean 
functions, they can be reduced by applying the laws of Boolean algebra (see § 2.2.3). A 
valuable method for minimizing Boolean functions is the use of the Quine – McCluskey 
algorithm, or “method of prime implicants” (Quine, 1955; McCluskey, 1956). This 
algorithm is particularly appreciated for its reliability (Ragin, 2008b) and it is 
considered the most well known procedure for the minimization of Boolean function 
(Thiem and Duşa, 2013). The “primitive expressions” of the truth table correspond to 
the conjunctions of causal conditions that are sufficient for the outcome, exactly those 
conjunctions that correspond to the rows of the truth table where the outcome is set 
equal to 1 (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, p. 105). The overall information that is 
contained in the truth table corresponds to a Boolean function, which stands for the 
union of the sufficient conjunctions. More exhaustively, Boolean functions consist of 
“canonical union of fundamental intersections” and their minimization aims to eliminate 
irrelevant and redundant conditions, which can be omitted as they do not affect the 
outcome (Thiem and Duşa, 2013, p. 507). Through the use of the Quine – McCluskey 
algorithm similar conjunctions are compared and reduced in the so-called “prime 
implicants”, a term that refers to conditions that cannot be simplified further. The 
resulting solution term correspond to the conjunction of prime implicants that are linked 
by the logical operator OR (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). Therefore, the solution 
formula with prime implicants is further reduced in a “minimal union” of combinations 
of causal conditions that are sufficient for the outcome under investigation (Schneider 
and Wagemann, 2012; Thiem and Duşa, 2013). This process of logical minimization 
can be automatically computed through the fs/QCA software, which makes use of the 
so-called “truth table algorithm” that is in turn based on the Quine – McCluskey 
algorithm. 
While the test of sufficiency stems from the analysis of the truth table, the analysis of 
necessity follows a separate procedure. Considering that a condition is defined as 
necessary if it is always present whenever the outcome occurs, the test of necessity 
makes reference to those cases that show the outcome (Schneider and Wagemann, 
2012). Once these cases are found, it is possible to verify if one or more conditions are 
always present across cases; if this requirement is satisfied, then conditions can be 
considered as necessary for the outcome. Clearly, the analysis of necessary conditions 
requires to investigate single conditions, rather than their conjunction through the 
logical operator AND. The reason stems from the fact that necessity implies that the 
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outcome is a subset of the causal condition (Ragin, 2008b). In fuzzy sets logic, the 
outcome is a subset of a causal condition if the membership scores of cases in the 
outcome set are less than or equal to their respective membership scores in the set of the 
causal condition (Ragin, 2008b). However, the membership score of a case in a 
conjunction of two causal conditions corresponds to the minimum value across the 
conditions. This means that it is unlikely that the conjunction can pass the test of 
necessity, since necessary conditions should hold a value higher than or equal to the 
value in the outcome set (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). Therefore, non-necessary 
conditions cannot become necessary through their conjunction: a conjunction of 
conditions is necessary only if it is constituted by conditions that individually pass the 
test of necessity (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). 
 
Assessing consistency. Since a condition is sufficient if, whenever it occurs across 
cases, the outcome is also present, this means that all cases showing the condition 
should show the outcome, i.e. the condition is a subset of the outcome. A perfect subset 
relation requires that all cases in which the condition is present (1), the outcome is also 
present (1). Clearly, empirical evidence may deviate from this kind of subset relations. 
For this reason, it is important to evaluate the degree to which the empirical evidence is 
consistent with set theoretic relation (Ragin, 2006, 2009). From this perspective, 
“consistency provides a numerical expression for the degree to which the empirical 
information deviates from a perfect subset relation” (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, 
p. 129). It can be assessed with regard to single sufficient conditions, as well as for 
more complex configurations (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). According to Ragin 
(2006), fuzzy set-theoretic consistency can be calculated with the following formula: 
Formula 3.1.6 – Consistency of sufficient conditions 
                    
           
   
 
where    corresponds to the membership scores of cases in the set of a causal 
condition, while    corresponds to the membership score in the outcome set. In fuzzy 
logic, a causal condition is sufficient for the outcome, if fuzzy membership scores of 
cases in the set of the causal condition are less than or equal to the fuzzy membership in 
the outcome in the outcome set (Ragin, 2008b). Looking at the formula, when all cases 
have a fuzzy score in the set of causal condition that is smaller than or equal to their 
fuzzy score in the set of the outcome, the numerator corresponds to the sum of all values 
  , which constitutes the same term of denominator. In this case, the formula returns a 
value of 1, and it refers to a perfect consistent sufficiency (Schneider and Wagemann, 
2012, p. 124-126). A value of consistency of 0.5 means that about half of cases 
contradict the statement of sufficiency (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012); thus the 
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minimum recommended threshold to accept a solution as consistent is 0.75 (Ragin, 
2006; 2008a). Overall, the assessment of consistency of sufficient conditions is of great 
importance to establish which rows of the truth table can be analyzed, and then logically 
reduced, as sufficient conditions (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). 
Following a similar logic, consistency can be assessed also with regard to necessary 
conditions and it indicates the extent to which empirical evidence is consistent with the 
statement of necessity. Since a condition is necessary if it is always present whenever 
the outcome occurs across cases, this means that all cases showing the outcome should 
always show the condition, i.e. the outcome is a subset of the condition. According to 
Ragin (2006), the consistency of necessary conditions can be calculated with the 
following formula: 
Formula 3.1.7- Consistency of necessary conditions 
                    
           
   
 
In fuzzy logic, a causal condition is necessary for the outcome, if fuzzy membership 
scores of cases in the outcome set are less than or equal to the fuzzy membership in the 
set of the causal condition. When all cases have a fuzzy score in the set of the outcome 
that is smaller than or equal to their fuzzy score in the set of the causal condition, the 
formula (3.1.7) returns a value of 1, because numerator and denominator come to 
converge. Generally, a threshold of consistency of at least 0.9 is recommended for 
statement of necessity (Ragin, 2006).  
 
Assessing coverage. In addition to consistency, another important parameter of fit in 
fs/QCA is coverage. Indeed, the actual relevance of a sufficient condition or a causal 
combination depends on how many cases it covers. When conditions cover very few 
cases, it is reasonable to interpret them as not empirically important conditions (Ragin, 
2006). For this reason, defining a measure of coverage essentially consists of comparing 
the set of causal condition and the set of outcome in terms of their size. From this 
perspective, coverage provides a numerical expression of the empirical importance of a 
condition for explaining a given outcome (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). In other 
words, coverage suggests how many cases with the outcome are the results of a 
particular causal condition. According to Ragin (2006), it can be calculated with the 
following: 
Formula 3.1.8 – Coverage of sufficient conditions 
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Moreover, this parameter of fit involves three different notions of coverage, to which 
the same formula (3.1.8) can be applied (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). 
Specifications of coverage are closely related to the occurrence of equifinality, which 
refers to the presence of different conditions or combinations of causal condition that 
equally lead to the outcome. In detail, the so-called “raw coverage” indicates how much 
of the outcome is covered by single paths. The “solution coverage” instead expresses 
how much of the outcome is covered by the overall equifinal and conjunctural solution 
term. Finally, the “unique coverage” points out how much of the outcome is uniquely 
covered by a specific path. In practical terms, the unique coverage of a condition or 
combination of conditions corresponds to the value of the solution coverage minus the 
value of coverage related to all pathways that lead to the outcome except the path whose 
unique coverage have to be assessed (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). In view of that, 
the essential scope of partitioning coverage in the analysis of fuzzy sets “is to assess the 
relative importance of different combinations of causally relevant conditions” (Ragin, 
2006, p. 305). Last aspects to be underlined refer to the choice of threshold of coverage. 
Actually, thresholds have not great importance in the case of coverage. Although a low 
coverage suggests that the outcome is little covered by consistent conditions, this 
circumstance can have theoretical and substantive importance for researchers 
(Schenider and Wagemann, 2012). The choice between values of consistency and 
coverage often represents a trade off for researchers. As underlined by the formula 
(3.1.8), coverage may increase due to the inclusion of cases that are inconsistent with 
the statement of sufficiency. For this reason, coverage should be assessed after the 
definition of a consistency threshold, i.e. after it has been established that conditions are 
consistent subsets of the outcome in question (Ragin, 2006). Definitively, coverage 
must be calculated only for those conditions that pass the test of sufficiency (Ragin, 
2006). 
With regard to necessary conditions, coverage can be interpreted as a measure of 
their relevance. Given that in the case of necessary conditions, the outcome is a subset 
of the cause, measuring the degree of coverage is useful to establish whether the 
outcome set is much smaller than the condition set (Ragin, 2006; Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2012). According to Ragin (2006), the formula of coverage of necessary 
conditions is the following: 
 
Formula 3.1.9 - Coverage of necessary conditions 
                 
           
   
 
However, this formula captures only the form of trivialness, owing to the size of sets.  
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Another form of trivialness that should be avoided refers to the case of constancy of the 
necessary condition, i.e. when a conditions is assessed as a necessary condition only 
because it occurs in most of the cases (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). In order to 
avoid this form of trivialness Schneider and Wagemann (2012) propose the use of the 
formula (3.1.10). If a necessary condition is a constant across cases, this formula returns 
a value that is close to 0, meaning trivialness; conversely, it returns a value that is close 
to 1, meaning relevance. 
Formula 3.1.10 - Relevance of Necessity (Schneider and Wagemann) 
                       
      
            
 
The use of fs/QCA software packages allows for the calculation of both consistency 
and coverage automatically. 
 
Solutions. The truth table analysis produces three solutions with different levels of 
complexity according to the way they deal logical remainders. As noted above, logical 
reminders represent “missing configurations”, i.e. logically possible combinations 
without empirical cases, and they are quite the rule in comparative social science 
research since social phenomena are limited in their diversity (Ragin and Sonnett, 
2004). Unlike statistical methodology, in which a missing value refers to empirically 
observed cases but without information on one or more variables, logical reminders 
refer to logically possible but empirically non-existing cases (Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2012). Hence, the way in which logical remainders are handled leads to 
different solutions, namely the complex, parsimonious and intermediate solution. In a 
set-theoretic perspective, assumptions about logical reminders are permissible, as long 
as they are made in a conscious and transparent manner for justifying counterfactual 
claims (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). 
The most complex solution term is obtained by excluding the logical remainders, i.e. 
without making assumptions about them (Ragin, 2008). Since complex solution is 
exclusively derived from empirical observation (without counterfactuals), it represents a 
conservative solution (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). The intermediate solution 
requires a counterfactual analysis based on theoretical assumptions about the outcomes 
and their plausibility. In this way, “only the logical remainders that ‘make sense’ given 
the researcher’s substantive and theoretical knowledge are incorporated into the 
solution” (Ragin, 2009, p. 111). For this reason, it is claimed that intermediate solutions 
arise only from easy counterfactuals, which refer to those counterfactuals that are 
substantiated by both empirical evidence and theoretical knowledge (Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2012). Conversely, difficult counterfactuals are based only on the empirical 
evidence at hand (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). Finally, the most parsimonious 
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solution term is computed by including logical remainders that help to generate a 
logically simpler solution through simplifying assumptions that include both easy and 
difficult counterfactuals (Ragin, 2008c; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012).  
 
For the purpose of this study, the following sections apply these main procedures to 
the comparative analysis of the 27 EU countries. In detail, § 3.2 describes the criteria 
that were used in the selection of cases and causal conditions in order to define the 
research setting, while § 3.4 provide a detailed description of the criteria that were used 
for calibrating the sets of causal conditions and the outcome set. The remaining steps, 
which are more closely related to the analytical moment of fs/QCA, are developed in 
the next chapter.  
3.2 Selection of cases and causal condition 
In line with the aforementioned requirements, the selection of cases and conditions to 
be included in the empirical investigation was particularly consistent with both 
substantive and theoretical interests of this research and it was performed through a 
systematic dialogue between ideas and evidence. This section describes the theoretical 
information that has driven these choices.  
With regard to the selection of causal conditions, it has been widely discussed in § 
2.3.2. Overall, the causal conditions were elected according to their inherence with the 
theoretical arguments of this study. To that regard, the review of the literature (chapter 
1) has deeply argued the extent to which the characteristics of welfare provisions, 
regulatory policies, female labour force and country-level gender equality can fit 
together to bring more women on board. In detail, single country-level causal conditions 
were established by considering their significant impact on gender diversity on 
corporate boards, as well as their relative significance in unravelling the gendered 
nature of institutions. They are paternity leaves, maternity leaves, parental leaves, and 
childcare services (for welfare institutions); female employment and female part-time 
employment (for labour markets); level of gender equality in the overall society (for 
national cultures). Moreover, regulatory policies about board gender quotas are included 
in the comparative analysis of national configurations in order to investigate their 
necessity and/or sufficiency in the existing national configurations 
Looking at the selection of cases, the choice of European Union countries as units of 
analysis stems from two main motivations. Firstly, the performance in terms of female 
representation on boards differs greatly across EU countries. These differences are 
primarily related to different economic, cultural and regulatory environments (Kang et 
al., 2007). Therefore, exploring this heterogeneity is very meaningful as it allows for 
assessing whether a relative predominance of a particular national model for women on 
boards exists. Secondly, despite this heterogeneity, European Union institutions have 
created a common commitment and a pervasive debate across EU countries about the 
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initiatives that are more appropriate to have more women on boards. On this wake, the 
European Union has asked publicly listed companies to increase the female 
representation on boards to 40% within 2020. To that end, a number of countries have 
introduced some forms of mandatory gender quotas, while other countries have opted 
for voluntary or recommendatory initiatives (Huse and Seierstad, 2014). At the same 
time, the efforts of the European Union have addressed the overall deconstruction of 
gender stereotypes that limit female participation in the labour market as well as female 
career advancement. This is quite consistent with the theoretical arguments argued in 
this research. In detail, EU institutions have recognized the disproportional involvement 
of women in part-time jobs and the persistency of traditional caregiver beliefs in 
national cultures. For this reason, the European Parliament has enacted a resolution to 
deconstruct gender stereotypes
58
, by establishing a major number of inexpensive and 
high-quality childcare and eldercare facilities; suitable forms of parental leave for both 
fathers and mothers; and binding quotas for increasing the presence of women in 
positions of responsibility in politics and businesses. Taken together, these 
circumstances make EU countries a suitable scenario to be explored in order to 
investigate the existence of institutional complementarities in shaping female 
representation on boards and evaluate whether regulatory policies that were enacted in 
some countries might be transferred in other countries.  
EU countries were compared from January 2013 to June 2013. For this reason, 
although currently the number of members of the European Union  is of 28, Croatia was 
excluded because it has become an EU member on July 2013. Therefore, the number of 
cases that were included in the analysis is 2759. In this way, they represent de facto a 
population rather than a sample. As noted above, EU countries are compared as 
configurations of specific national conditions that may have a conjunctural causal 
relation with the outcome (i.e. a higher number of women on boards of directors).  The 
next section details data and measures that were chosen to quantitatively express both 
causal conditions and outcome, while § 3.4 discusses the criteria that were used for their 
calibration in fuzzy sets. 
                                                          
58
 European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2013 on eliminating gender stereotypes in the EU. 
Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2013-
0074 +0+DOC +XML+V0//EN  
59
 Definitively, EU 27 includes: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Cyprus (CY), Czech 
Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (EL), 
Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Malta (MT), 
Netherlands (NL), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), 
Sweden (SE) and United Kingdom (UK).  
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3.3 Measures and data description 
The quantitative expression of both causal conditions and outcome has required a 
deepened documentary analysis (Bailey, 1994; Payne and Payne, 2004; Scott, 1990). 
Similarly to the investigation on the variety of forms of gender regulation for boards of 
directors (see § 1.2.1), the choice of documentary sources was made by following the 
control criteria proposed by Scott (1990). In detail, texts, statistics and documents were 
chosen according to their authenticity, credibility, representativeness, and meaning. 
These documental sources primarily refer to legal texts, national laws, and official 
documents that contained information at both national and European level. Their official 
and public nature has contributed to the reliability of this documentary analysis.  
Below is a more detail description of the resulting review and data collection for 
each main set. While sections 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3, and 3.3.4 present the description of 
measures and data concerning the elected causal conditions, section 3.3.5 refers to the 
outcome. Data matrix is shown in Table 3.3.  
3.3.1 Welfare states 
The national characteristics of welfare states are expressed in terms of maternity 
leave, paternity leave, parental leave and childcare services. 
With regard to parental leave policies, it is important to note that they are designed 
very differently across EU countries. For this reason, this analysis has adopted very 
careful criteria in order to ensure the comparability of welfare institutions between EU 
countries. In detail, both for maternity and paternity policies, it was considered only the 
mandatory amount of maternity and paternity leave that was enacted in each country. 
Clearly, the laws written into the books can differ greatly from the actual usage of 
maternity and paternity leave policies. However, they can be interpreted as a condition 
that precedes the possibility of actually taking leave.  This perspective is consistent with 
the rationale underlying the present research. Indeed, legal provisions are able to mirror 
the gendered nature of welfare policies, which can shape the prevailing role of women 
in family responsibilities and, more generally, the division of gender roles in other 
institutions. Moreover, an important contribution of adopting a fuzzy logic in this 
comparative analysis is that it allows for taking into account the level of generosity of 
welfare policies. By using a more fine-grained measure of these attributes, this analysis 
goes beyond than their mere presence (1) or absence (0).  
According to the definition provided by OECD Employment Outlook (1995, p. 174), 
maternity leave “leave granted only to mothers for a limited period of time around the 
time of childbirth (although it is possible for the father to take the post-natal part of the 
leave in extreme circumstances, such as the mother’s death or illness)”. Since the aim of 
maternity leave is to protect the health of mothers and newborn children, it is generally 
established prior to and immediately after childbirth (also known as pre-birth leave and 
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post-birth leave). Most of the EU countries have compulsory pre-birth leave and they 
provide public income support payments during this period. In some countries, 
maternity leave is included in general parental leave schemes (e.g. Sweden, Germany). 
Paternity leave instead is an employment-protected absence for employed fathers. It has 
been defined as “leave granted only to fathers for a limited period around the time of 
childbirth (not necessarily immediately after birth, but within a short period thereafter)” 
(OECD Employment Outlook, 1995, p. 174). Generally, it is much shorter than 
maternity leave. Because of the very short period, fathers on paternity leave often 
continue to receive full wage payments. In some countries, paternity leave is part of the 
parental leave schemes (father’s quotas), rather than established as a separate right 
(OECD Family database, 2012). The present analysis considered paternity leave that is 
available only to fathers. Finally, OECD Employment Outlook (1995, p. 174) defines 
parental leave as “long-term leave available to parents to allow them to take care of an 
infant or young child a period of time. This is usually granted in addition to 
maternity/paternity leave”. Parental leave essentially consists of paid or unpaid leave to 
parents for childcare. It is often a supplementary provision of leave respect to specific 
maternity and paternity leave periods, and it usually follows the period of maternity 
leave. The present analysis considered only the amount of paid parental leave, intended 
as the sum of both mother and father quotas. As noted above, data concerning parental 
leave policies were collected through a deepened analysis of legal texts, laws, and 
official documents, containing information at both national and European level. A 
comprehensive list of these information sources includes: Burri and Prechal (2013); 
CEPR Center for Economic and Policy Research (Ray, 2008: Ray et al., 2009); Council 
of Europe Family Policy Database (2009); European Commission (2012b); European 
Parliament studies (Thomsen and Urth; 2010a, 2010b; Juhlin and Marsh, 2010; Davaki, 
2010; Thevenon, 2010); OECD (2012a; 2012b); Eurostat Statistical Books (Margherita 
et al., 2009); International Labor Organization (2010, 2012); Moss (2012); World 
Economic Forum (2013). 
With regard to the provision of childcare services, data were taken from the EU-
SILC (2012), which is a database containing information about EU statistics on income 
and living conditions. This database was implemented by Eurostat, the statistical office 
of the European Union that represents the main source of reference for comparative 
statistics in the European Union. EU-SILC (2012) provides information about the 
availability of childcare services across the EU countries. In general, formal childcare 
services were referred to four variables: 1) pre-school or equivalent education; 2) 
compulsory education; 3) centre of childcare services outside school hours; and 4) day-
care centre of childcare that are organized or controlled by public or private structure. 
The research methodology applied in the EU-SILC database has led to classify formal 
childcare services according to two aspects: 1) the age of children for which they are 
provided; and 2) their duration and they are expressed in term of percentage over the 
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population of each age group. The present analysis makes reference to formal services 
that have a duration higher or equal to 30 hours and that are provided for children aged 
fewer than 3 (0-2 years). In line with the research rationale, the more extended the 
childcare services are, the more “women-friendly” is the welfare state of a country. 
Clearly, the choice of an age ranging from 0 to 2 years for children reflects the 
importance of having childcare services in a period that requires women to spend more 
time for childcare. 
3.3.2 Labour Markets 
The characteristics of labour markets are expressed in terms of the total amount of 
female labour force and the percentage of women involved in part-time jobs. The term 
“part time workers” refers to employees whose normal hours of work are less than the 
normal amount of hours of work of a comparable fulltime worker. Generally, hours of 
work are calculated on a weekly basis or on average over a period of employment of up 
to one year (Eszter, 2011).  
Data regarding female participation in labour markets were taken from the Global 
Gender Gap Report of the World Economic Forum (2013). On the one hand, measures 
of female employment refer to the proportion of a country’s working-age (15-64) 
population that engages in the labour market. On the other hand, female part-time 
employment rates refer to the percentage of women that is involved in part time jobs of 
the total female employment in a country (World Economic Forum, 2013). 
3.3.3 National cultures 
For the purpose of this study, national cultures correspond to the overall level of 
gender equality in society. Data concerning the degree of gender equality that features a 
given social system were taken from the Global Gender Gap Report of the World 
Economic Forum (2013) and they correspond to the value of the Global Gender Gap 
Index for each country. This index is particularly meaningful for capturing the presence 
and the magnitude of gender-based disparities. Indeed, it takes into account the presence 
of gender inequality across four crucial spheres, namely health, education, economic 
and politics. Moreover, it is completely independent from the levels of development of 
countries, because it is rather obvious that rich countries provide better opportunities in 
terms of education and health to individual, for example. Finally, it is based on 
measures of outcome rather than on measures of inputs. This property leads the Global 
Gender Gap Index to focus on the results that have been achieved in outcome indicators 
(such as, number of legislators, managers or senior officials), rather than in policy 
indicator (such as, the length of maternity leave). 
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Overall, this index ranks countries according to the presence of gender equality in 
their main institutions, hence taking values that range from 0 (absence of gender 
equality) and 1 (presence of gender equality).  
3.3.4 Regulatory policies for female representation on boards 
As shown in Chapter 1 (§ 1.2.1), gender regulatory policies for female representation 
on boards differ greatly across EU countries. Data concerning this variety of forms for 
gender balance on boards of directors were collected by making reference to several 
sources, such as the national factsheets provided by the European Commission (2013), 
the progress report on women and men in decision-making provided by the European 
Commission (2012a), and to previous academic contributions, such as Terjesen et al. 
(2014). The main differences across countries are shown in Table 1.1. However, since 
countries are compared from January 2013 to June 2013, the analysis did not take into 
accounts regulatory policies that were introduced after this time, such as the case of the 
enactment of gender quotas in Germany, with effect from 1 January 2016). Moreover, it 
did not take into account temporary rules (such as the case of The Netherlands, where 
gender quotas were enacted on January 2013, but they will expire on January 2016). 
The qualitative differences across countries were quantitatively expressed by classifying 
three main types of gender regulations for corporate boards. More exhaustively, the 
main distinction refers to the presence of hard forms of gender regulation (typically 
countries with gender quotas) and more soft forms of regulations (such as countries with 
self-regulatory policies or codes of good governance). Therefore, regulatory policies 
aimed to foster female representation on boards of directors were numerically expressed 
through three values. Exactly, the value of 1 was assigned to the EU countries that have 
enacted gender quotas; the value of 0.5 was assigned to EU countries with some forms 
of self-regulation; and, the value of 0 was assigned to EU countries that did not adopt 
any of the foregoing forms of regulation.  
3.3.5 Outcome  
This study takes a higher number of women on boards of directors as the outcome of 
interest, by conceiving it as the result of a multiple conjunctural causal relation between 
several causal conditions. Data concerning the outcome were taken from the database 
on women and men in decision-making provided by the European Commission (2012c). 
The aforementioned database was last updated on October 2012 and it contains 
information on 582 companies, corresponding to about 5.910 board members. 
According to the research methodology followed in constructing the database, 
companies correspond to the largest publicly listed companies in each of the 27 
European member states (maximum 50 per country) and they are members of the 
primary blue-chip index, which covers the largest companies by market capitalization 
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and/or market trades (European Commission, 2012c). As described in the 
methodological section of the database, non-national companies are excluded, as the 
data for each country cover only companies registered in that country. Moreover, in 
countries where the blue chip index covers a large number of companies, only the 50 
largest are taken into account. Conversely, in countries where the blue chip index does 
not cover enough companies, companies with the next largest market capitalization are 
taken into account when possible (European Commission, 2014). Generally, board 
members refer to president and members of the highest decision-making body. In case 
of two-tier governance system, the two highest decision-making bodies are usually 
referred to as the supervisory board and the management board, while in case one-tier 
systems they refer to the board of directors and executive/management committee 
(European commission, 2014). However, individuals sitting on more than one decision-
making body are counted only once, while employee representatives are excluded 
(European Commission, 2014). 
This analysis adopts the percentage of women on boards of directors across countries 
(rather than absolute values) with the aim to express quantitatively how large the 
number of women on boards is with respect to the total number of board members. 
Furthermore, since this research aims to assess the attainment of board positions by 
women through their career paths, rather than their performance in the boards of 
directors, the present analysis takes into account data from both executive and non-
executive board members. 
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Table 3.3 – Data Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration from “Iannotta et al. (2015) Institutional Complementarities and Gender Diversity on Boards: A Configurational Approach. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, doi: 10.1111/corg.12140”.  
EU 
Countries 
Women 
on 
Boards 
(%) 
Introduction/ 
Improvement 
of Maternity 
Leave 
Statutory 
Maternity 
Leave 
(days) 
Introduction/ 
improvement 
of Paternity 
Leave 
Statutory 
Paternity 
Leave (days) 
Paid 
Parental 
Leave (days) 
Formal 
Childcare 
Services (%) 
Female Part 
Time 
Employment 
(%) 
Female 
Labour 
Force 
(%) 
Global 
Gender 
Gap 
Index 
Forms of 
Regulation 
 
WOB 
 
ML 
 
PL PARL FCHs FPTE FE GGGI REG 
AT 11,9 1979 112 1989 0 540 7 33 69 0,7266 0,5 
BE 12,9 1971 105 2002 3 180 27 32 62 0,7809 1 
BG 11,6 1987 227 2009 15 547 8 3 63 0,7444 0 
CY 7,7 1988 126 N/A 0 0 19 13 67 0,6741 0 
CZ 16,4 1968 196 N/A 0 1095 1 7 61 0,6737 0 
DE 17,9 1878/1968 98 N/A 0 1092 15 38 71 0,778 0,5 
DK 20,8 1892/1960 126 1984 14 224 59 25 76 0,8025 0,5 
EE 7,8 1999 140 2004 10 435 14 12 71 0,7017 0 
EL 7,9 1921/1969 119 2000 2 0 15 14 58 0,6784 0 
ES 12,3 1900/1969 112 1931/1980/2007 15 0 15 22 66 0,7325 1 
FI 28,6 1978 105 1971 18 158 22 16 73 0,8453 1 
FR 25,1 1909/1969 112 2002 14 1092 23 22 66 0,7588 1 
HU 7,4 1969 168 2002 5 924 6 6 57 0,6759 0 
IE 8,7 1969 182 N/A 0 0 11 39 62 0,785 0 
IT 11 1950/1972 140 2012 1 330 11 31 51 0,6973 1 
LT 17,8 1995 126 1995 28 238 5 10 69 0,7208 0 
LU 9,7 1969 112 1962 2 364 27 30 60 0,7333 0,5 
LV 28,2 1996 112 2002 10 1080 19 11 71 0,7601 0 
MT 3,5 1996 98 1996 1 0 1 26 43 0,6707 0 
NL 21,5 1889/1966 112 2001 2 0 7 61 73 0,773 0,5 
PL 11,8 1924/1972 112 2010/2012 14 1092 5 12 59 0,7051 0,5 
PT 7,4 1963 120 1999 10 0 34 14 70 0,7243 0,5 
RO 11,9 2002 126 2004 5 594 4 12 56 0,6936 0 
SE 25,5 1963/1974 98 1980 10 420 35 18 77 0,8165 0,5 
SI 18,7 1993 105 1993 90 260 36 11 67 0,7443 0 
SK 13,8 1968/1993 98 N/A 0 1092 4 6 61 0,6806 0 
UK 18,8 1948/1976 182 2003 14 0 3 39 69 0,7383 0,5 
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3.4 Criteria of calibration 
Criteria for calibrating the target sets were elected according to theoretical and 
substantive knowledge at hand, thus representing criteria external to the data. Generally, 
the selection of qualitative anchors for designating the membership of cases in a target 
set were chosen according to a number of recommendations provided by institutional 
international bodies. After establishing a significant anchor (for example, for full 
membership or full non-membership), the remaining qualitative anchors were defined 
according to the criterion of equal distance intervals. Below is a more detailed 
discussion of the criteria that were used for calibrating fuzzy sets. While § 3.4.1 
describes the criteria for calibration of causal conditions in fuzzy sets, § 3.4.2 refers to 
the criteria that were used for calibrating the outcome.  
3.4.1 Causal conditions 
Maternity leave. Qualitative anchors for the calibration of maternity leave in fuzzy 
sets were set according to the recommendations of two important institutional bodies. 
On the one hand, the Recommendation 191
60
 and the Maternity Leave Convention 183
61
 
adopted by the International Labor Organization suggest a minimum duration of 
maternity leave ranging from 14 to 18 weeks (Schulze and Gergoric, 2015). On the 
other hand, through the Directive 92/85/EEC, the European Parliament states that the 
duration of maternity leave should be at least of 20 weeks (Schulze and Gergoric, 2015). 
Therefore, the cross-over point was established according to a duration of maternity 
leave of 150 days, which approximately correspond to the minimum value of days 
recommended by the International Labor Organization and the European Parliament. 
Consequently, the threshold for full membership and full non-membership were defined 
according to equal distance intervals. In detail, 250 days correspond to the threshold for 
full membership in the target set, while 50 days correspond to the threshold of full non-
membership in the target set. This target set was defined the set of “EU countries with 
high level of maternity leave”.  
                                                          
60
 International Labour Organization, Maternity Protection Recommendation, 2000 (no. 191), 
Recommendation concerning the revision of the maternity protection recommendation, 1952, adoption: 
Geneva, 88th ILC session (June 15, 2000). Web source: 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312
529. 
61 International Labour Organization, Maternity Protection Convention, 2000 (No. 183), Convention 
concerning the revision of the Maternity Protection Convention (Revised), 1952 (Entry into force: 07 Feb 
2002), Adoption: Geneva, 88th ILC session (June 15, 2000). Web 
source:http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C183. 
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Paternity Leave. Paternity leave shows a very short duration across EU countries. 
Consequently, the qualitative anchors for calibrating parental leave in fuzzy set appear 
to be rather low. Indeed, the European Parliament have proposed that the minimum 
duration of paternity leave should be of two weeks, or 10 working days (Schulze and 
Gergoric, 2015; Thomsen and Urth, 2010). Accordingly, the criteria of calibration for 
paternity leave were established as follow: 15 days were assigned to the threshold for 
full membership in the target set. Considering the very short duration of paternity leave 
across countries, the enactment of more than 15 days of paternity leave is a virtuous 
example of welfare institutions that are more gender-neutral (although not fully gender-
neutral). Following the criterion of equal distance intervals from the full membership 
value, the cross-over point was established at 9 days, while the threshold of full non-
membership was set to a value of 3 days. This target set corresponds to the set of “EU 
countries with high level of paternity leave”. 
Parental Leave. Through the Directive 2010/18
62
, the Council of Europe suggests 
that “the leave shall be granted for at least a period of four months and, to promote 
equal opportunities and equal treatment between men and women, should, in principle, 
be provided on a non-transferable basis. To encourage a more equal take-up of leave by 
both parents, at least one of the four months shall be provided on a non-transferable 
basis.” (Clause 2, point 2). Since at least four months of parental leave for each parent 
are recommended, the threshold of full membership in the set of countries with a 
significant provision of parental leave was established to 240 days (corresponding to 
about eight months if we consider both parents). Consequently, the threshold for full 
non-membership and the cross-over point were defined according to equal distance 
intervals. They are 140 days and 40 days respectively. The resulting target set was 
called the set of “EU countries with high parental leave”. 
 
Childcare Services. Bearing in mind that the analysis makes reference to formal 
services that are provided for children aged fewer than 3 (0-2 years), qualitative anchors 
for calibrating childcare services were based on recommendation referring to this age 
group. The Barcelona Summit has required important objectives to EU member states in 
order to remove the major impediments that affect female participation in the labour 
force. In detail, EU member state are demanded to provide childcare services for at least 
                                                          
62
 Official Journal of the European Union. 2010. Council Directive 2010/18/EU of 8 march 2010 
implementing the revised framework agreement on parental leave concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, 
UEAPME, CEEP and ETUC and repealing directive 96/34/EC.  
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33% of children less than 3 years of age63. Consequently, this target was taken as the 
threshold of full membership in the set of countries that provide high level of childcare 
services, thus mirroring welfare policies that are more “women-friendly”. The cross-
over point and the threshold for full non-membership were defined according to equal 
distance intervals: 20% and 10% respectively. More exhaustively, a level of childcare 
services of 20% represents a point of ambiguity, since it is neither too far nor too close 
to the Barcelona objectives, while a level of childcare services of 10% does not meet in 
any way these objectives. Overall, the resulting target set corresponds to the set of “EU 
countries with high level of formal childcare services”. 
 
Female Employment. Qualitative anchors for the calibration of female participation 
in the labour force were set according to the several institutional recommendations 
provided by international bodies. For instance, since 75% was estimated to be full 
employment where everybody who wants to get a job should be able to do so, the 
agenda of Europe 2020 have required achieving an employment rate for women and 
men of 75% for the 20-64 years age group64. In a similar vein, according to the Lisbon 
Strategy, a female employment of 60% was required by 201065. Taken together, these 
target objectives can represent the threshold for full membership of cases in the set of 
countries with high level of female employment. In detail, this threshold was 
established at 65% of female employment as it represents a middle path between what 
had to be done and what would be done in the coming years. Following the principle of 
equal distance intervals, the cross over point of maximum ambiguity was set at 45%, 
while the threshold for full non membership was established at 25%. Definitively, this 
target set corresponds to the set of “European countries with high level of female 
employment”. 
 
Female part-time employment. Through the Directive 81/1997, the European Union 
have asked member states to remove all types of discrimination against part-time 
workers (Burri and Aune, 2013; Eszter, 2013). As noted by Burri and Aune (2013), 
32.1% of women work in part-time, while only 9% of men do so. Since this percentage 
negatively affects female career progression, training opportunities and gender pay gap 
(Burri and Aune, 2013), the value of 35% of female part time employment over the 
                                                          
63
 In detail the European Council set the targets of providing childcare by 2010 to: 1) at least 90% of 
children between 3 years old and the mandatory school age; and 2) at least 33% of children under 3 years 
of age.  MEMO/08/592, Childcare services in the EU, Brussels, 3 October 2008. Available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08-592_en.htm . 
64
 Further details on Europe 2020 can be accessed to: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm.  
65
 European Commission, Commission staff working document, Lisbon strategy evaluation document, 
Brussels, 2.2.2010. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/lisbon_strategy_evaluation_en.pdf. 
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overall female labour force was considered as representing a strong gender imbalance in 
the labour market. Consequently, 35% was set as the threshold of full membership in 
the set of countries with high level of female employment in part time jobs. According 
to equal distance intervals, the cross-over point was set at 20%, while the threshold of 
full non-membership was established at 5%. The resulting target set corresponds to the 
set of “EU countries with high level of female part-time job”.  
 
Gender equality in society. Since gender equality in society is measured by the 
Global Gender Gap Index, it can takes values that range from 0 (absence of gender 
equality) and 1 (presence of gender equality). These extreme values represent 
respectively the threshold of full non-membership and the threshold of full membership 
in the set of countries with high level of gender equality in society. Therefore, the point 
of maximum ambiguity was set at 0.5, corresponding to the cross-over point. This set 
was called the set of “EU countries with high level of gender equality”.  
 
Forms of regulation. Considering that forms of regulation are measured by the value 
of 1 for EU countries that have enacted gender quotas, the value of 0.5 for EU countries 
with self-regulation, and, the value of 0 for EU countries that do not adopt any of the 
foregoing, the three qualitative anchors for calibrating forms of regulation were 
established as follow. The threshold for full membership of cases in the set of EU 
countries with strong forms of regulations was set at 1; conversely, the threshold for full 
non-membership in that set corresponds to 0. The point of maximum ambiguity should 
correspond to a value of 0.5. However, when the cross-over point is established at 0.5, 
the calibration becomes problematic. Looking at cases, it is important to underline that 
many countries take the value 0.5. Since their fuzzy membership score corresponds to 
0.5, they are considered neither in nor out in the target set, thus being conceptually 
ambiguous. In line with these observations, the cross-over point related to the forms of 
regulation was established at 0.55, in order to mitigate this ambiguity. According to the 
principle of equal distance intervals, the threshold for full membership was set at 0.9, 
while the threshold for full non-membership was established at 0.2. The result is the set 
of “EU countries with a high form of regulation for female representation on boards”.   
3.4.2 Outcome 
Qualitative anchors for the calibration of the outcome into fuzzy sets  were 
established according to several institutional recommendations. Firstly, the European 
Commission has presented a plan aimed to gradually increase female representation on 
boards. The target for publicly listed companies was a representation of at least 30 % for 
each gender by 2015 and 40% by 2020. Secondly, the European Women's Lobby have 
required member states to follow the example of Norway and enact gender quotas 
legislation aimed to increase the number of women on boards to  40% by 2015 and 50% 
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by 2020 (Armstrong and Wally, 2012). Generally, these recommendations are based on 
the assumption that the critical mass of women directors is reached when boards of 
directors have at least 30% women, as supported by many scholars (see Chapter 1). 
Taken together, these substantive guidelines were applied in this analysis to establish 
the following qualitative anchors. Although a perfect gender balance on boards of 
directors should require 50% of both women and men, the accomplishment of 30% of 
women on boards could represent a virtuous achievement. Therefore, 30% was 
considered the threshold of full membership for sufficient gender diversity on boards, 
while 20% and 10% were established as the cross-over point and the threshold for full 
non-membership respectively. The resulting set was called the set of “EU countries with 
a higher number of women on boards”. 
The criteria of calibration are summarized in Table 3.4. The calibration of 
conventional variables in fuzzy sets and the resulting truth table represent the next steps 
of the analysis. They are described in the next chapter.  
Table 3.4- Criteria for set calibration 
 
Full Membership Cross Over Point Full Non Membership 
Women on Boards 30 20 10 
Maternity Leave 250 150 50 
Paternity Leave 15 9 3 
Parental Leave 240 140 40 
Forms of Regulation 0.90 0.55 0.20 
Childcare Services 33 20 10 
Female Part-time 
Employment 
35 20 5 
Female Employment 65 45 25 
Gender Equality 1 0.5 0 
 
Source: Own elaboration from “Iannotta et al. (2015) Institutional Complementarities and Gender 
Diversity on Boards: A Configurational Approach. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
doi: 10.1111/corg.12140”.  
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CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In order to corroborate the theoretical propositions formulated in the previous chapter, 
this study performs a fuzzy sets/Qualitative Comparative Analysis between the 27 EU 
countries (cases). Through fs/QCA, countries are mapped in terms of configurations of 
institutional attributes (causal conditions). The aim is to explore the existence of 
particular combinations of country-level attributes that can lead to a comparatively 
higher number of women on boards across countries. In this way, the alleged claims of 
conjunctural causation and equifinality are empirically investigated. In detail, this 
chapter has stressed the importance of adopting fs/QCA as both a research approach 
and an analytical technique and it has detailed its main steps and procedures. After 
selecting cases and causal conditions to be involved in the analysis, conventional 
variables need to be transformed into fuzzy sets (calibration of fuzzy sets). To that end, 
the chapter has primarily focused on the so-called “direct method” of calibration, 
which transforms interval-scale variables into the metric of log odds, and then into the 
degree of membership in the target (fuzzy) set. Moreover, this method requires 
establishing three important qualitative anchors according to theoretical and 
substantive knowledge at hand. They are: 1) the threshold for the full membership of 
countries in the target set (1); 2) the cross-over point where cases are neither in nor out 
the set; and 3) the threshold for the full non-membership of countries in the target set 
(0). For the purpose of this study, this chapter has described the criteria that were used 
in the selection of cases and causal conditions in order to define the research setting. 
Moreover, it has presented the measures that were chosen to quantitatively express 
both causal conditions and outcome. Afterwards, it has detailed the criteria that were 
used for their calibration in fuzzy sets. Generally, the selection of qualitative anchors 
for designating the membership of cases in a target set was made according to a 
number of recommendations provided by institutional international bodies. After 
establishing a significant anchor (for example, for full membership or full non-
membership), the remaining qualitative anchors were defined according to the criterion 
of equal distance intervals. The remaining steps of fs/QCA refer to the construction 
and analysis of the truth table. A truth table contains all the logically possible AND 
combinations of causal conditions for an outcome, where each row represents a unique 
configuration. The analysis of the truth table corresponds to the analysis of sufficient 
conditions for the outcome of interest, while the analysis of necessary conditions 
requires a separated procedure. Since these steps are more closely related to the 
analytical moment of fs/QCA, they are developed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
OVERVIEW: After describing the transformation of conventional variables in fuzzy 
sets and the construction of the truth table, this chapter presents the results of the 
analysis of sufficiency and necessity. The corresponding findings reveal the 
existence of a particular configuration of national institutional conditions that is 
sufficient to achieve a higher number of women on boards. Conversely, gender 
quotas legislation for boards of directors is found to be neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for gender diversity on boards. Overall, these results support 
the alleged existence of institutional complementarities and conjunctural 
causation, but not the occurrence of other equifinal pathways for the outcome 
under investigation.     
4.1 Set calibration and Truth Table 
This analysis was performed by using the current version of the fs/QCA software 
package 2.5 (Ragin et al., 2006), which allows for automatically calculating the 
transformation of conventional variables in fuzzy sets. In detail, by taking the 
qualitative thresholds established in the previous chapter, calibration was computed 
through the direct method of calibration. Table 4.1 shows the results of calibration and it 
reports the degree of membership of EU countries in each target set, while Figures from 
4.1 to 4.9 report the distribution of the EU countries in the target sets. 
The 2
8
 possible combinations of causal conditions were represented in the truth table, 
where each row corresponds to a specific configuration of national attributes. For each 
combination, it was detected the number of EU countries with a membership score 
greater than 0.5 in each combination. The relevant combinations of causal conditions 
were selected according to the frequency of countries that showed these combinations. 
When the total number of cases is relatively small, the frequency threshold should be 1 
or 2 (Ragin, 2008b). Accordingly, an acceptable threshold of frequency higher or equal 
to 1 was set. Finally, when the membership score of EU countries in a given 
configuration was smaller than or equal to the membership score that EU countries had 
in the outcome set (i.e., the set of “EU countries with a higher number of women on 
boards”), then the value of the outcome in that configuration was set to 1. Conversely, it 
was set to 0.  
Definitively, the truth table represented in Table 4.2 contains all logically possible 
combinations of causal conditions with two truth-values (1 and 0).
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Table 4.1 - Transformation of conventional variables in fuzzy sets 
EU 
Countries 
Set of EU 
Countries with 
a higher 
number of 
women on 
boards 
Set of EU 
Countries 
with high 
level of 
maternity 
leave 
Set of EU 
Countries 
with high 
level of 
paternity 
leave 
Set of EU 
Countries 
with high 
level of 
parental 
leave 
Set of EU 
Countries with 
high level of 
formal 
childcare 
services 
Set of EU 
Countries 
with high 
level of 
gender 
equality 
Set of EU 
Countries 
with high 
level of 
gender 
regulation 
Set of EU 
Countries 
with high level 
of female part-
time 
employment 
Set of EU 
Countries 
with high 
level of 
female 
employment 
 HighWOB HighML HighPL HighPARL HighFCHs HighGE HighREG HighFPT HighFE 
AT   0,08 0,24 0,01 1 0,02 0,81 0,39 0,93 0,91 
BE   0,11 0,21 0,05 0,77 0,83 0,84 0,98 0,92 0,81 
BG   0,07 0,91 0,95 1 0,03 0,81 0,01 0,03 0,83 
CY   0,02 0,33 0,01 0,01 0,43 0,74 0,01 0,2 0,88 
CZ  0,25 0,8 0,01 1 0 0,74 0,01 0,07 0,79 
DE   0,35 0,17 0,01 1 0,18 0,84 0,39 0,97 0,93 
DK    0,56 0,33 0,92 0,93 1 0,86 0,39 0,73 0,96 
EE   0,03 0,43 0,62 1 0,14 0,77 0,01 0,17 0,93 
EL   0,03 0,28 0,03 0,01 0,18 0,74 0,01 0,23 0,72 
ES   0,09 0,24 0,95 0,01 0,18 0,8 0,98 0,6 0,87 
FI   0,93 0,21 0,99 0,63 0,61 0,89 0,98 0,31 0,94 
FR   0,82 0,24 0,92 1 0,67 0,83 0,98 0,6 0,87 
HU   0,02 0,63 0,12 1 0,01 0,74 0,01 0,06 0,7 
IE   0,03 0,72 0,01 0,01 0,06 0,85 0,01 0,98 0,81 
IT   0,06 0,43 0,02 1 0,06 0,77 0,98 0,9 0,53 
LT   0,34 0,33 1 0,95 0,01 0,79 0,01 0,12 0,91 
LU    0,04 0,24 0,03 1 0,83 0,8 0,39 0,88 0,77 
LV   0,92 0,24 0,62 1 0,43 0,83 0,01 0,14 0,93 
MT   0,01 0,17 0,02 0,01 0 0,74 0,01 0,77 0,3 
NL  0,61 0,24 0,03 0,01 0,02 0,84 0,39 1 0,94 
PL  0,08 0,24 0,92 1 0,01 0,77 0,39 0,17 0,75 
PT   0,02 0,29 0,62 0,01 0,96 0,79 0,39 0,23 0,92 
RO  0,08 0,33 0,12 1 0,01 0,76 0,01 0,17 0,67 
SE  0,84 0,17 0,62 1 0,97 0,87 0,39 0,4 0,96 
SI  0,4 0,21 1 0,97 0,98 0,81 0,01 0,14 0,88 
SK  0,13 0,17 0,01 1 0,01 0,75 0,01 0,06 0,79 
UK   0,41 0,72 0,92 0,01 0,01 0,81 0,39 0,98 0,91 
Source: Own elaboration from “Iannotta et al. (2015) Institutional Complementarities and Gender Diversity on Boards: A Configurational Approach. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, doi: 10.1111/corg.12140”.  
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Figure 4.1 - Distribution of countries in the fuzzy set of “High 
level of Maternity leave” 
 
Source: Own elaboration from “Iannotta et al. (2015) Institutional Complementarities and 
Gender Diversity on Boards: A Configurational Approach. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, doi: 10.1111/corg.12140”.  
 
Figure 4.2 - Distribution of countries in the fuzzy set of "High 
level of Paternity leave" 
 
Source: Own elaboration from “Iannotta et al. (2015) Institutional Complementarities and 
Gender Diversity on Boards: A Configurational Approach. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, doi: 10.1111/corg.12140”.  
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Figure 4.3 - Distribution of countries in the fuzzy set of "High 
level of Parental Leave” 
 
Source: Own elaboration from “Iannotta et al. (2015) Institutional Complementarities and 
Gender Diversity on Boards: A Configurational Approach. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, doi: 10.1111/corg.12140”.  
 
Figure 4.4 - Distribution of countries in the fuzzy set of "High 
level of Formal Childcare Services" 
 
Source: Own elaboration from “Iannotta et al. (2015) Institutional Complementarities and 
Gender Diversity on Boards: A Configurational Approach. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, doi: 10.1111/corg.12140”.  
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Figure 4.5 - Distribution of countries in the fuzzy set of "High 
level of Gender Equality" 
  
Source: Own elaboration from “Iannotta et al. (2015) Institutional Complementarities and 
Gender Diversity on Boards: A Configurational Approach. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, doi: 10.1111/corg.12140”.  
Figure 4.6 - Distribution of countries in the fuzzy set of "High 
level of  Regulation" 
 
Source: Own elaboration from “Iannotta et al. (2015) Institutional Complementarities and 
Gender Diversity on Boards: A Configurational Approach. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, doi: 10.1111/corg.12140”.  
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Figure 4.7 - Distribution of countries in the fuzzy set of "High 
level of Female Part Time Employment” 
  
Source: Own elaboration from “Iannotta et al. (2015) Institutional Complementarities and 
Gender Diversity on Boards: A Configurational Approach. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, doi: 10.1111/corg.12140”.  
 
Figure 4.8 - Distribution of countries in the fuzzy set for "High 
level of Female Employment" 
 
Source: Own elaboration from “Iannotta et al. (2015) Institutional Complementarities and 
Gender Diversity on Boards: A Configurational Approach. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, doi: 10.1111/corg.12140”.  
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Figure 4.9 - Distribution of countries in the fuzzy set for "High 
number of Women on Board" 
 
 
Own elaboration from “Iannotta et al. (2015) Institutional Complementarities and Gender 
Diversity on Boards: A Configurational Approach. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, doi: 10.1111/corg.12140”.  
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Table 4.2 - Truth Table 
 
Source: Own elaboration from “Iannotta et al. (2015) Institutional Complementarities and Gender Diversity on Boards: A Configurational Approach. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, doi: 10.1111/corg.12140”.  
High ML High PL High PAR High FCH High GE High REG High FE High FPTE 
Number of EU 
countries  0.5 
High WOB Raw Consistency 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1.00 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.00 
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0,91 
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 2 1 0,8 
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0,74 
0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0,61 
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0,61 
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0,52 
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0,5 
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 2 0 0,49 
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 4 0 0,48 
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0,47 
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0,44 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 0,4 
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 0,39 
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0,3 
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0,28 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0,2 
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 0,1 
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4.2 Analysis of sufficiency 
The truth table was analyzed in order to find which causal conditions, or 
combinations of causal conditions, are sufficient to achieve a higher number of women 
on boards across countries. Since each row of the truth table in which the outcome 
shows the value 1 represent a sufficient pathway for the outcome, the total amount of all 
possible combinations of conditions has to be logically reduced in order to avoid the 
presence of redundant and irrelevant conditions. This process of logical minimization of 
configurations was automatically computed through the fs/QCA software, which makes 
use of the so-called “truth table algorithm” (based on the Quine – McCluskey 
algorithm). 
The first step of the analysis of the truth table was made to test the individual 
sufficiency of each national condition. The corresponding results are reported in Table 
4.3. Overall, it emerges that, taken one at time, national conditions are not sufficient on 
their own to achieve a higher number of women on boards. Since, the minimum 
recommended threshold to accept a solution as consistent is 0.75, in this study this 
threshold has been set at 0.80. The values of consistency for each conditions show that 
empirical evidence is not considerably consistent with the circumstance of perfect 
subset relations. Interestingly, according to the criteria that were used for calibrating 
fuzzy sets (see § 3.4), the condition “high level of regulation” correspond de facto to the 
set of EU countries that have enacted gender quotas for female representation on 
corporate boards. This condition shows a value of consistency of about 0.50, meaning 
that about half of cases contradicts the statement of sufficiency. This circumstance does 
not satisfy in anyway the requirement for establishing individual sufficiency, although 
the value of coverage (0.58) indicates that they are empirically important conditions, i.e. 
they cover several EU countries. Nevertheless, gender quotas for boards of directors 
appear to be not a sufficient condition to achieve a comparatively higher number of 
women on boards. This state of affairs reflects the existence of the so-called INUS 
conditions, i.e. Insufficient but Necessary part of a condition which is itself 
Unnecessary but Sufficient for the result” (Mackie, 1974, p. 62). Essentially, this means 
that although each national attributes is not sufficient on its own, it can be combined 
with other causal conditions in order to generate a sufficient conjunction for the 
outcome of interest. 
In order to verify the claims of conjunctural causation, the logical minimization of 
the truth table was performed. Interestingly, no logical reminders were found. 
Therefore, the results (reported in Table 4.4) correspond to the complex solution, i.e. the 
solution that is obtained only through the analysis of observed cases without 
counterfactuals. This solution shows the existence of a unique configuration of national 
institutional conditions that, taken together, are sufficient to achieve a higher number of 
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women on boards. They are: high length of paternity leave, not high length of maternity 
leave, high length of parental leave, high level of childcare services, high level of 
female employment and high level of gender equality. The value of consistency related 
to this specific pathway is 0.85 and it corresponds to the overall solution consistency, 
while the level of coverage corresponds to a value of 0.49. Taken together, these 
parameters of fit suggest that the detected solution is considerably acceptable. The EU 
countries that display this unique combination of causal conditions are Slovenia, 
Denmark, Sweden, Finland and France. Indeed, they show a membership score greater 
than 0.5 in such configuration.  
The graphical representation of these findings is shown in Figure 4.10. More 
exhaustively, it reports the distribution of EU countries in the detected configuration. 
Since the notion of sufficiency implies that the conjunction of causal conditions is a 
subset of the outcome, the membership score of countries in the sufficient configuration 
need to be smaller than or equal to the membership score that countries have in the set 
of a “high number of women on boards”. In graphical terms, this means that the alleged 
claims of sufficiency are satisfied when countries are above or on the main diagonal. In 
line with Schneider and Wagemann (2012), EU countries that are far below the main 
diagonal are those that strongly contradict the statement of sufficiency. 
 
Table 4.3 - Sufficiency of individual conditions 
 
Consistency Raw Coverage 
High Maternity Leave 0,39 0,5 
~ High Maternity Leave 0,39 0,92 
High Paternity Leave 0,46 0,72 
~ High Paternity Leave 0,19 0,41 
High Formal Childcare Services 0,49 0,57 
~ High Formal Childcare Services 0,23 0,57 
High Female Labour Force 0,33 1 
~ High Female Labour Force 0,39 0,26 
High Female Part Time Employment 0,35 0,61 
~ High Female Part Time Employment 0,33 0,64 
High Gender Equality 0,33 0,98 
~ High Gender Equality 0,51 0,38 
High Regulation 0,5 0,58 
~ High Regulation 0,28 0,7 
High Parental Leave 0,32 0,8 
~ High Parental leave 0,21 0,25 
 
  
Source: Own elaboration from “Iannotta et al. (2015) Institutional Complementarities and Gender Diversity on 
Boards: A Configurational Approach. Corporate Governance: An International Review, doi: 10.1111/corg.12140”.  
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Table 4.4 – Truth Table Analysis 
 
RAW 
COVERAGE 
UNIQUE 
COVERAGE 
SOLUTION 
COVERAGE 
CONSISTENCY 
HighPARL * ~ HighML * HighPL 
* HighFCHs * HighFE * HighGE 
0.49 0.49 0,49 0.85 
Frequency cut-off: 1 
    
Consistency cut-off: 0.80 
     
Source: Own elaboration from “Iannotta et al. (2015) Institutional Complementarities and Gender Diversity on 
Boards: A Configurational Approach. Corporate Governance: An International Review, doi: 10.1111/corg.12140”.  
 
Figure 4.10- Graphical representation of the solution 
 
Source: Own elaboration from “Iannotta et al. (2015) Institutional Complementarities and Gender Diversity on 
Boards: A Configurational Approach. Corporate Governance: An International Review, doi: 10.1111/corg.12140”.  
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4.3 Analysis of necessity 
As described in §3.1.1, the analysis of necessary conditions follows a separate 
procedure and it requires the analysis of individual conditions, rather than their 
conjunction. According to the notion of necessity, this analysis has primarily focused on 
the selection of those countries that show the outcome (i.e., a higher number of women 
on boards), thus verifying whether they always show a specific condition. Indeed, a 
necessary condition represents a superset of the outcome, and then it occurs whenever 
the outcome is present. This also means that fuzzy membership scores of countries in 
the set of “high number of women on boards” should be less than or equal to their fuzzy 
membership in the set of the (necessary) causal condition. This subset relation is 
measured through the assessment of consistency. Generally, a threshold of consistency 
of at least 0.9 is recommended for statement of necessity (Ragin, 2006). After 
performing the analysis of necessary conditions, the corresponding results reveal that 
only three national attributes pass the threshold of 0.9 for consistency. They are high 
level of female employment, which shows a perfect consistency (1.00); high level of 
gender equality, with a consistency value of 0.98; and, not high level of maternity leave, 
with a consistency value of 0.92.  
However, it is important to assess the relevance of the detected necessary conditions 
in term of set dimension and constancy. In order to avoid the first form of trivialness, 
the values of coverage were taken into account to establish whether the outcome set was 
much smaller than the condition set. All necessary conditions show low values of 
coverage, with the exception of the condition “not high maternity leave” that display a 
relatively higher coverage (0.39). Since the greater is the value of coverage, the greater 
is the relevance of necessary conditions, then “not high maternity leave” is the only 
condition that might be considered as a necessary condition for a higher number of 
women on boards. With regard to the second form of trivialness, both this “survived” 
necessary condition and the remaining ones were checked for their constancy by 
applying the formula 3.1.10 (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). The results show very 
low values of relevance (from 0.20 to 0.27), due to the circumstance that these 
conditions are rather a constant across the 27 EU countries. Definitively they cannot be 
considered as necessary conditions for a higher number of women on boards. In other 
words, this means that the outcome might occur although in absence of these conditions.  
Overall, these findings are reported in Table 4.5, while Figures from 4.11 to 4.13 
display the XY plots related to the distribution of the 27 EU countries for the three 
necessary, although not relevant, conditions.  
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Table 4.5 - Analysis of necessary conditions 
CONDITIONS 
 
CONSISTENCY COVERAGE RELEVANCE 
High Maternity Leave HighML 0,50 0,39 
 
Not High Maternity Leave ~HighML 0,92 0,39 0,20 
High Paternity Leave HighPL 0,72 0,46 
 
Not High Paternity Leave ~HighPL 0,41 0,20 
 
High Formal Childcare Services HighFCHs 0,57 0,49 
 
Not High Formal Childcare 
Services 
~HighFCH 0,57 0,23 
 
High Female Employment HighFE 1,00 0,33 0,24 
Not High Female Employment ~HighFE 0,26 0,39 
 
High Female Part Time 
Employment 
HighFPTE 0,61 0,35 
 
Not High Female Part Time 
Employment 
~HighFPTE 0,64 0,33 
 
High Gender Equality HighGE 0,98 0,33 0,27 
Not High Gender Equality ~HighGE 0,38 0,51 
 
High Regulation HighREG 0,58 0,50 
 
Not High Regulation ~HighREG 0,71 0,28 
 
High Parental Leave HighPARL 0,80 0,32 
 
Not High Parental leave ~HighPARL 0,25 0,21 
 
Source: Own elaboration from “Iannotta et al. (2015) Institutional Complementarities and Gender Diversity on 
Boards: A Configurational Approach. Corporate Governance: An International Review, doi: 10.1111/corg.12140”.  
Figure 4.11 - XY Plot - Distribution of EU countries for necessary condition "High 
Gender Equality" 
 
Source: Own elaboration from “Iannotta et al. (2015) Institutional Complementarities and Gender Diversity on Boards: A 
Configurational Approach. Corporate Governance: An International Review, doi: 10.1111/corg.12140”.  
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Figure 4.12 - XY Plot - Distribution of countries for necessary condition "Not High 
Maternity Leave" 
 
Source: Own elaboration from “Iannotta et al. (2015) Institutional Complementarities and Gender Diversity on Boards: A 
Configurational Approach. Corporate Governance: An International Review, doi: 10.1111/corg.12140”.  
Figure 4.13 - XY Plot - Distribution of countries for necessary condition "High 
Female Employment" 
 
Source: Own elaboration from “Iannotta et al. (2015) Institutional Complementarities and Gender Diversity on Boards: A 
Configurational Approach. Corporate Governance: An International Review, doi: 10.1111/corg.12140”.  
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CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented the analysis of necessity and sufficiency of country-level 
institutional attributes for a higher number of women on boards. Taken together, these 
steps constitute the analytical moment of fs/QCA that aims to explore the empirical 
existence of particular configurations of causal conditions for the outcome under 
investigation. The analysis of necessary conditions has been separated from the 
analysis of sufficient conditions, also known as the “truth table analysis”. On the one 
hand, the results of the analysis of necessity have showed that three main national 
attributes correspond to the notion of necessary conditions, namely not high length of 
maternity leave, high level of gender equality, and high level of female employment. 
Unfortunately, when they were checked for relevance, they did not appear to be 
empirically significant, because they were a constant across EU countries. On the other 
hand, the analysis of (individual) sufficiency has revealed that, taken one at time, the 
elected institutional attributes are not sufficient on their own to achieve a higher 
number of women on boards. However, they might be sufficient if combined one 
another. In order to verify the existence of conjunctural causation and equifinality, the 
logical minimization of the truth table was performed. The corresponding results have 
showed the existence of a unique configuration of national institutional conditions that 
is sufficient to achieve a higher number of women on boards. In detail, it has emerged 
that the conjunction of  high length of paternity leave, not high length of maternity 
leave, high length of parental leave, high level of childcare services, high level of 
female employment AND high level of gender equality is sufficient for a 
comparatively higher number of women on boards across EU countries. However, 
these findings have showed another point of interest: gender quotas legislation for 
boards of directors has been found to be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
for gender diversity on boards. Overall, while these results support the alleged 
existence of institutional complementarities and conjunctural causation, they do not 
reveal the occurrence of other equifinal pathways for the outcome under investigation. 
By stressing the importance of the dialogue between ideas and evidence, the next 
chapter discusses these findings. 
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CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
OVERVIEW: The aim of this study was to assess the existence of institutional 
complementarities between certain national attributes and their synergistic effects 
on female representation on boards.  The core assumption was that the more un-
gendered are the welfare, labour and cultural institutions, the higher is the number 
of women on boards. Moreover, by comparing the 27 EU countries in a 
configurational perspective, it aimed to understand whether and how certain 
country-level conditions were causally and jointly related to a major presence of 
women on boards of directors and to evaluate the necessary and/or sufficient 
function of gender quotas for boards of directors. The corresponding findings 
have uncovered the existence of a unique configuration of institutional attributes 
that can lead to a higher number of women on boards, where gender quotas for 
corporate boards are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition on its own to 
achieve a higher number of women on boards. By discussing such evidence, this 
chapter presents the main contributions and implications of the research for both 
theory and practice. Finally, it recognizes the existence of some limitations, which 
nevertheless pave the way for further challenges in future research.     
5.1  The importance of national configuration for gender diversity on boards 
In line with Schneider and Wagemann (2012), set-theoretic methods, and QCA in 
particular, are inductive in their nature and they allow for the empirical evaluation of 
theory-driven assumptions. In detail, the alleged sufficient paths that were derived from 
theory can be compared with the solution terms of sufficient conditions that were 
detected by the empirical analysis, thus generating some meaningful intersections. 
According to the aforementioned authors, when theoretical paths and empirical paths 
overlap, a theory can be confirmed.  However, “hypothesis are not rejected or supported 
tout court. Rather, the evaluation of theory-guided hunches sheds light on which parts 
of existing theories are supported by empirical findings; in which direction should be 
expanded; and which part need to be dropped” (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, p. 
295). By acknowledging the importance of the dialogue between ideas and evidence, 
this section deepens and discusses several aspects that have emerged from the 
comparison between theoretical assumptions and empirical findings. As noted by 
Schneider and Wagemann (2012), after the analytic moment of QCA, dialoguing with 
cases under investigation is important to facilitate the interpretation of the results. 
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Indeed, interpreting findings is a meaningful moment to reunite theory with the 
evidence discovered by observed data. 
On the one hand, the alleged existence of a multiple conjunctural causation that 
affects female representation on boards of directors was expressed in Chapter 2 as 
follows:  
 
High Length of Paternity Leave * ~ High Length of Maternity Leave * High Length 
of Parental Leave * High Level of Childcare Services * High Level of Female 
Employment * ~ High Level of Female Part-Time Job * High Level of Gender Equality     
+     Gender Quotas for Board of Directors     →       Higher Number of Women on 
Boards. 
 
In practical terms, this is a set-theoretic representation of theoretical propositions, 
and it suggests that there are two alternative (or equifinal) pathways that can equally 
lead to achieve a higher number of women on boards: 1) a conjunction of greatly un-
gendered national conditions in three main institutional domains (welfare states, labour 
markets and national cultures); OR, 2) the enactment of gender quotas for boards of 
directors. Moreover, this notation highlights the not necessary function of gender quotas 
for female representation on boards of directors. In other words, gender quotas can be a 
sufficient condition by itself to achieve a higher number of women on boards, but they 
are not necessary to do so. This statements derives from the circumstance that the 
outcome can be reached with a great gender neutrality in welfare, labour and cultural 
institutions, without necessarily the enactment of gender quotas. 
On the other hand, the empirical results generated by the implementation of the 
qualitative comparative analysis correspond to the following solution term (presented in 
Chapter 4): 
 
High Length of Paternity Leave * ~ High Length of Maternity Leave * High Length of 
Parental Leave * High Level of Childcare Services * High Level of Female Employment 
* High Level of Gender Equality     →    Higher Number of Women on Boards 
Overall, the overlap of these two solutions provides support for a number of the 
theoretical propositions that drive this work. The empirical solution of sufficient 
conditions shows the existence of a unique configuration of country-level causal 
conditions that can lead to a comparatively higher number of women on boards across 
countries. This evidence has a threefold implication.  
Firstly, it recognizes that, taken jointly, certain country-level conditions that mirror 
the gendered nature of welfare, labour and cultural institutions are causally related to a 
higher number of women on boards. More exhaustively, the analysis of individual 
sufficiency has revealed that, taken one at time, the elected national attributes are not 
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sufficient on their own for the outcome, while they result sufficient if combined one 
another. This evidence implicitly supports the existence of complementarities between 
such institutional attributes. Indeed, in line with Höpner (2005a), institutional 
complementarities imply that the presence, and then the functional performance, of a 
particular institutional arrangement depends on the presence or absence of other 
institutional arrangements. On this wake, by exerting a joint influence, the conjunction 
of two or more complementary institutions enhances a given national outcome (Deeg, 
2007). With regard to the present analysis, complementarities are detected from the 
evidence that country-level conditions are not singly sufficient, but they combine and 
complement each other to create a sufficient conjunction of institutional attributes that 
can lead to higher national performance in terms of women on boards of directors. 
Considering that the causal conditions involved in the analysis were selected according 
to their relative significance in unravelling the gendered nature of institutions, these 
findings provide wide support to the core assumption of this work (Proposition 1). In 
other words, they confirm that the more un-gendered are the welfare, labour and cultural 
institutions of a country, the greater will be the number of women that can reach board 
positions in that country. The EU countries that display this unique combination of 
institutional conditions that appear more “gender neutral” are Slovenia, Denmark, 
Sweden, Finland and France. Not surprisingly, these countries show a national culture 
where gender equality is embedded within institutions and they primarily correspond to 
Nordic European and Eastern culture-oriented countries. This evidence comes to 
converge with the results of Grosvold and Brammer (2011), who find that, typically, 
countries with a Nordic-oriented and Eastern-oriented cultural system are significantly 
related to a higher number of women on boards. Moreover, most of these countries 
show a Scandinavian-originated institutional pattern (Sweden, Finland, Denmark), with 
the only exception of France and Slovenia. At the same time, Denmark represents an 
interesting “deviant case” among the other Nordic countries. In graphical terms (see 
Figure 4.10), this circumstance reflects the different position taken by countries in 
relation to the main diagonal. Finland, Sweden, France, and Denmark show a 
membership score greater than 0.5 in both the set of a “higher number of women on 
boards” and the sufficient conjunction. In line with Schneider and Wagemann (2012, p. 
308), their position in the upper right area of the graph leads to define them as “typical 
cases”. Nevertheless, Finland, Sweden and France are situated above the main diagonal, 
while Denmark stays below the main diagonal. This means that Finland, Sweden and 
France satisfy high value of consistency and coverage in both the sufficient 
configuration and the outcome, while Denmark seems to contradict the statement of 
sufficiency with lower level of consistency and coverage. With regard to the case of 
Slovenia, this country represents a “deviant cases for consistency” as it displays the 
sufficient configuration but rather low value of membership in the outcome set. In other 
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words, despite the presence of gender neutral institutions, Slovenia does not achieve a 
good performance in terms of female representation on boards. With regard to the 
welfare state of countries, empirical evidence reveals that France, Sweden, Finland, 
Denmark and Slovenia show the highest provision of childcare services and the highest 
paternity and parental leave across the 27 EU countries. Interestingly, the good 
performance of France in terms of female representation on boards leads to partially 
contradict the evidence of previous research, which has reported that the generosity of 
welfare institutions in countries with French and Germanic legal heritage is significantly 
related to lower level of women on boards (Grosvold and Brammer, 2011). Such a 
result is very consistent with the theoretical assumptions of this study and it underlines 
an important implication: beyond generosity, also gender neutrality of welfare 
institutions needs to be taken into account when assessing the influence of welfare states 
on female representation on boards. As noted by a recent The Economist’s article, “the 
gains from maternity leave would be multiplied if countries extended it to apply fathers, 
too” (The Economist, 2015a, p. 12). Indeed, the aforementioned article reports that 
generous provision of maternity leave harms women, rather than helping them, because 
time off work for childcare leads women to lose skills, experience and promotions. In a 
similar vein, it enhances gender discrimination from employers. It is not by chance that 
the EU countries that show a comparatively higher number of women on boards show 
the same gender-neutral approach to parental leave provision. For instance, Sweden 
grants a bonus to mothers and fathers who share parental leave more equally, while 
France grants bonus to parents that split childcare between them (The Economist, 
2015b, p. 53).  Looking at the gendered nature of labour markets, these countries 
generally show high levels of female employment. To that regard, the analysis of 
necessary conditions has revealed that, although it represents a constant across 
countries, the condition “high level of female employment” holds a perfect consistency 
(1.00). This means that all EU countries that show a higher number of women on boards 
also show high level of female participation in the labour market. In graphical terms, 
this perfect consistency is represented by the presence of all countries below or on the 
main diagonal (see Figure 4.13), meaning that all cases have a membership score in the 
set of the condition that is greater than or equal to their membership score in the set of 
the outcome. Indeed, necessity implies that the condition is a superset of the outcome.  
The second implication regards the lack of the condition “not high level of female 
part-time employment” in the unique configuration detected through the comparison of 
cases. In this way, the discovered configuration partially differs from that derived from 
the theoretical development. Essentially, this condition is not consistent with the other 
conditions for achieving a higher number of women on boards. This lack of consistency 
is related to the presence of countries (i.e., Denmark and France) that show levels of 
female involvement in part-time jobs that are greater than level of female part-time 
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employment in the others. This logical contradiction has led to remove this condition 
from the unique configuration, albeit it is widely recognized that high levels of part time 
employment reflect a disproportional involvement of women in childcare and 
housework. Clearly, such evidence may disguise the intentional choice of women of 
taking part-time job, irrespective of childcare responsibilities, but the lack of more 
exhaustive evidence does not allow for making causal inference about this condition. 
However, with the only exception of this condition, the unique configuration resulting 
from the empirical analysis almost exactly overlaps with the “ideal” conjunction of 
causal conditions that was formulated in Proposition 1. Since this configuration reflects 
theory-based assumptions, relating to the causal relations between complementary 
institutions, it can be conceived as an (almost) “ideal type” of national model for gender 
diversity on boards. To that effect, the farther is a country from this “superior” national 
configuration, the worse its performance in terms of women on corporate boards is 
likely to be. The underlying causal mechanisms imply that the presence of 
complementary institutions, which mutually reinforce their similar structures in an un-
gendered perspective, allows for a more egalitarian distribution of power and 
opportunities between women and men in a given social system. Taken together, these 
findings support that the more the gender equality is embedded in welfare, labour and 
cultural institutions, the greater the number of women that hold board positions will be.  
Finally, the third implication refers to the role of gender quotas for corporate boards 
in the existing configurations. The corresponding remarks are discussed in detail in the 
next paragraph. 
5.2 The role of gender quotas for gender diversity on boards 
The empirical occurrence of a unique configuration of country-level causal 
conditions implicitly leads to contradict the alleged individual sufficiency of gender 
quotas for a higher number of women on boards (Proposition 2). In other words, gender 
quotas for boards of directors “cannot be considered as equally effective and mutual 
substitutes of a “national model” in which gender equality is radically embedded in each 
institutional domain” (Iannotta et al., 2015, p. 12). According with the notion of 
sufficiency, this evidence stems from the presence of EU countries that do not show the 
outcome (a greater number of women on boards), albeit they present the condition (the 
enactment of gender quotas for boards of directors). In detail, these countries are 
Belgium, Spain and Italy, where, reasonably, the implementation of gender quotas at 
board level has been not combined with a national model where gender equality is 
embedded in institutions. For instance, Seierstad et al. (2015) suggest that Italy cannot 
be considered a gender-egalitarian society, as shown by its performance in terms of 
female representation on boards that is rather unsatisfactory, despite gender quotas. On 
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this wake, the existence of complementary institutions that mutually reinforce their 
gendered structures can lead to make not sufficient the enactment of gender quotas at 
board level by itself. In line with Deeg (2007), the introduction of a new regulatory 
policy (such as gender quotas) into a system of complementary institutions might fail to 
achieve the intended objective, because  the existence of institutional complementarities 
and their synergistic effects might slow down the change that was expected from the 
introduction of new regulatory policies (Deeg, 2007). Overall, these findings support 
the claim that gender quotas cannot be very effective if they reinforce negative attitudes 
towards women or if they are not complemented or combined with policies that promote 
women at all levels of their career advancement, and not just at board level (e.g., Adams 
and Kirchmaier, 2013; Bergstø, 2013). In sum, gender quotas can help to increase 
directly the number of women on boards from the top, but they can fail to remove 
barriers and to change cultural attitudes that affect women’s careers for board positions 
from the bottom. Definitively, the alleged existence of two equifinal pathways for a 
greater female representation on corporate boards is not supported by findings. 
Nevertheless, this is the most notable result for this research, since it provides strong 
support to the assumption that a more equal division of gender roles within families, 
labour and cultural institutions can lead to a greater presence of women on boards, more 
than the single enactment of gender quotas does. However, the lack of alternative 
configurations prevents to learn more about the effectiveness of gender quotas in 
combination with other specific national conditions. 
Conversely, empirical evidence confirms that gender quotas for corporate boards are 
not a necessary condition to achieve a higher number of women on boards of directors 
(Proposition 3). This evidence emerges from the presence of EU countries that show the 
outcome (a greater number of women on boards), without showing the condition 
(gender quotas for boards of directors). This means that their national configuration, 
with the conjunction of complementary and gender-neutral institutions, is sufficient to 
promote the presence of women in top management positions, without the need to enact 
gender quotas at board level. In detail, these countries are Slovenia, Denmark and 
Sweden. Interestingly, although these countries show national configurations where 
gender equality is embedded in welfare, labour and cultural institutions, they have 
adopted some forms of regulation for gender diversity on boards. For instance, 
Denmark and Sweden have adopted soft forms of regulation, such as code of good 
governance including board gender recommendation, while Finland and France have 
enacted gender quotas. Slovenia represents the only country that has not enacted any 
form of regulation. Deepening the differences between the national configurations of 
these countries can contribute to clarify the reasons behind the adoption and diffusion of 
gender regulatory policies. Focusing on Sweden, this country displays welfare 
institutions that are really “women-friendly”. For example, maternity and paternity 
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leave are included in a broader parental leave schema, thus emphasizing the role of both 
parents in childbirth and childcare responsibilities. It is widely recognized that gender 
equality is pervasive in Swedish institutions, to the extent that most of literature 
suggests that Sweden does not need to enact formal legal gender quotas (e.g., Teige and 
Wamgnerud, 2009). Indeed, the initiatives of the Swedish government have been 
limited to request that companies guarantee an equal gender distribution on their boards 
of directors (Swedish Corporate Governance Code, section 4, 2010), by specifying later 
some rules concerning the work of nomination committees (Swedish Code revised on 
May 2014, with effect from January 2015). On the contrary, despite Finland presents a 
similar long tradition of gender equality, in 2005 it has enacted gender quotas. 
However, their introduction has been greatly debated (Teigen, 2012). In addition, the 
Finnish Corporate Governance Code (2008), applicable to listed companies, requires 
that both genders shall be represented on the board. There are no penalties for non-
compliance, but a “comply or explain” principle is applied. In a similar vein, although 
the national configuration of France appears to be prone to guarantee a great presence of 
women on boards, this country has introduced gender quotas legislation at board level 
with severe penalties for non-compliant companies. With regard to Denmark, the more 
limited tradition of political gender equality has contributed to the scepticism of this 
country about gender quotas for corporate boards, to the extent that Denmark has opted 
for forms of soft regulation (corporate governance recommendations). Finally, Slovenia 
is the only country that has enacted neither gender quotas, nor specific 
recommendations in the Slovene Corporate Governance Code, while an administrative 
regulation recommends electing at least 40% of women on boards of public enterprises.  
Taken together, such evidence confirms that the adoption of gender quotas for boards 
of directors might be attributable more to reasons of diffusion or social legitimization 
rather than to rational reasons about their actual effectiveness in the existing national 
configurations. Moreover, these findings verify that the diffusion of gender quotas for 
corporate boards has followed a regional pattern (Teigen, 2012). To that regard, Kogut 
and Ragin (2006, p. 47) assert that “diffusion depends upon existing configurations. 
This means that if northern European countries share a thousand years of institutional 
and ideational diffusion, they are more likely to adopt institutions from each other than 
from other regions because the institutional compliance is more likely”. Without doubt, 
since Norway enacted gender quotas on boards, “a snowball started rolling” (Huse and 
Seierstad, 2014, p. 38) and gender quotas legislation has become de facto a socially-
expected policy to promote the number of women in board positions. Therefore, some 
countries have started to follow the Norwegian example. However, such isomorphic 
behaviours have totally neglected the potential ambiguous effects that gender quotas can 
have on firm and/or board performance (see for example, Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; 
Matsa and Miller, 2013). Certainly, the European Union has represented one of the most 
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influential actors in the political debates on the enactment of gender quotas for boards at 
national level (Seierstad et al., 2015). For instance, the EU pressure has played the most 
relevant role in the case of Germany, where scepticism and strong political 
disagreement on gender quotas has always reigned.  
5.3 Contributions of the research 
5.3.1  Theoretical and methodological implications 
Acknowledging the effects that interacting institutions can have on a given outcome 
is very important for both theoretical research and policy recommendations (Amable, 
2000). In line with this observation, this work makes several theoretical contributions to 
extant literature on gender diversity on boards, as well as it presents notable 
implications from a practical perspective.  
First, it addresses the importance of understanding institutional antecedents of female 
underrepresentation on boards for the design of public policies that are effective to 
promote the presence of women on corporate boards. Whilst recognizing the importance 
of this linkage, previous studies in corporate governance research have lacked to 
investigate the relationships between national institutional antecedents and the use of 
public regulatory policies (Seierstad et al., 2015), leaving rather separated these two 
streams of research. To address this gap, this study presents a unique and 
comprehensive conceptual framework that takes into account the interrelated forces 
existing between welfare states, labour markets, national cultures and affirmative action 
policies in shaping women’s career and success. 
 Second, it refines insights from the extant research on gender diversity on corporate 
boards, by theoretically informing and empirically verifying the existence of 
complementarities between the three institutional domains that were previously found to 
mainly affect female representation on boards. In doing so, it develops explicit causal 
arguments that link women on boards to a bundle of multiple complementary 
institutions. Whilst studies with complementarities-based approaches have spread in 
financial (e.g., Amable et al., 2005; Campbell, 2011) and corporate governance research 
(e.g., Aguilera et al., 2008; Garcìa-Castro et al., 2013; Jackson, 2005; Kang and Moon, 
2012; Rediker and Seth, 1995; Weimer and Pape, 1999), they have completely been 
neglected in previous studies of diversity on corporate boards. For this reason, the 
present research offers an important contribution to advance knowledge about the 
interconnections between institutional antecedents of women on boards and their 
consequences on the evaluation of the actual necessity and sufficiency of gender 
regulatory policies. More exhaustively, this study contributes to shed light on why, 
whether, and which institutional conditions determine a multiple conjunctural influence 
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on female representation on boards. Similar complementarities-based approaches might 
be useful to address a plurality of phenomena that concern corporate boards of directors. 
Some examples could concern the composition and the demography of boards of 
directors, as well as the assessment of the effectiveness of corporate governance 
practices. 
 Third, by adopting a multiple theoretical lens and a set-theoretic approach, this work 
responds to several research inquiries aimed: 1) on the one hand, to acknowledge the 
interrelationship among several theories for the subject of women on boards (Terjesen et 
al., 2009); 2) and, on the other hand, to adopt innovative and more qualitative research 
methods in studies of corporate governance (Zattoni et al., 2013). In doing so, it makes 
an important methodological contribution to corporate governance literature. 
Essentially, women on boards are re-framed as the outcome of multiple causal relations 
between complementary institutions and they are analyzed in terms of set-relations. 
Through the implementation of fs/QCA, this work contributes to empirically explore the 
alleged claims of conjunctural causation and equifinality. In detail, fs/QCA has been a 
valuable methodological tool in order to: 1) verify the empirical existence of the 
theoretically derived “ideal type” of national model for supporting the representation of 
women on boards; and 2) to assess the actual necessity and sufficiency of gender quotas 
for boards of directors in the existing national configurations. At the same time, 
considering that theory is pervasive in QCA, this research approach has led to the 
development of robust explanations about the causal mechanisms that link country-level 
causal conditions to women on boards. Finally, adopting fs/QCA as analytical technique 
has allowed for the logical reduction of the emerging causal complexity. Indeed, taking 
a configurational perspective often means facing unspecified and unknown relationships 
among a number of elements in reference to a given outcome. However, through 
fs/QCA, the number of comparisons between national configurations has been 
maximized and then logically reduced in a simpler, as well as unique causal statement.  
 To conclude, this study represents the first attempt to delve into this complexity and 
it contributes to unpack it by taking gender unbalance on corporate boards as the result 
of the presence of gender unbalance in many other complementary national institutions. 
According to Deeg (2007), acknowledging the existence of institutional 
complementarities and their synergistic effects on a given outcome offers important 
theoretical implications. For instance, when institutional complementarities occur, then 
changes in one institution should determine changes also in other complementary 
institutions (Deeg, 2007). By supporting the presence of institutional complementarities 
between welfare states, labour markets and national cultures, this research paves the 
way for further studies that deepen the dynamics of institutional change to foster gender 
diversity on boards. Moreover, studying dynamics implies to know if a sort of hierarchy 
between institutions exists, because the more the change occurs in dominant institutions, 
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the stronger will be its impact on the national outcome at hand (Deeg, 2007). Therefore, 
further research could address the direction of institutional change by starting from the 
three main institutional domains that have been found to be complementary in the 
present study. Finally, future works could deal with the role of actors in changing 
complementary sets of institutions. To that regard, Deeg (2007, p. 622) asserts that “if 
central coordination of actors engaged in changing a complementary set of institutions 
is absent, change in one or more of the institutions will weaken complementarity of the 
system as a whole”. This means that a deepened investigation on the role of state actors 
and their decision-making process for changing welfare, labour and cultural institutions 
is still needed.  
5.3.2 Policy implications 
From a practical point of view, this research presents notable implications for both 
managers and policy makers. As suggested by Fiss (2007), causal complexity is the 
most common form of causality facing a decision maker. For this reason, it is important 
to be most aware of the causes underlying the phenomenon at hand for making a good 
decision. By dealing with this complexity, the present research offers valuable insights 
to better inform public policies aimed to promote gender diversity on boards.  
First, through a deepened review of the literature, it presents a detailed analysis about 
causes and antecedents of the underrepresentation of women on boards. This analysis 
contributes to further political insights into institutional solutions for increasing the 
number of women in board positions. Second, by supporting the presence of 
institutional complementarities between welfare, labour and cultural institutions, it 
contributes to a more rational design of public policies for gender diversity on boards. 
Indeed, the central tenet of this work is that gender relations shape welfare, labour and 
cultural institutional domains because gender itself is an institution embedded in other 
institutions (Martin, 2004; Terjesen et al., 2009). The representation of women on 
boards evokes a problem of access to opportunities and distribution of power in 
societies, and therefore women on boards cannot be separated from the role of women 
in family, labour, welfare and cultural institutions. This means that a more effective mix 
of policies to promote gender diversity on boards may go beyond the enactment of 
gender quotas at board level, and it may require initiatives that deconstruct the presence 
of gender in many other institutions. Indeed, while gender quotas can help to a direct 
increase of women on boards from the top, they can fail to change cultural attitudes that 
continue to affect women’s careers and their rise to board positions from the bottom. 
Moreover, policy initiatives should take into account that the presence of institutional 
complementarities contribute to enhance their stability over time. Therefore, in line with 
Deeg (2007), introducing a new regulatory policy in a set of stable and mutually 
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reinforcing institutions might fail to achieve the intended objectives. Legislative 
initiatives should consider that, if gender persists in other institutions, the introduction 
of gender quotas at board level might be not a sufficient regulatory policy to promote 
female representation on boards of directors.  
Considering that the existence of complementarities between welfare, labour and 
cultural institutions determine synergistic effects on female representation on boards, 
another important implication for policy makers is that, certainly, it may be more 
effective to implement gender policies in all these institutional spheres, rather than just 
at board level. However, it is essential to evaluate the costs that such policies may have 
for nations. It is clear that gender quotas are a near zero-cost policy for nations (Brogi, 
2013) compared to the more expensive policies for welfare states and labour markets, 
but, to that regard, two important aspects need to be underlined. On the one hand, major 
costs for the introduction of welfare provisions or labour policies may be compensated 
from their long-term effectiveness in promoting gender equality in every level of social 
and economic institutions. Some examples of such policies can include: 1) more length-
extended paternity leave or parental leave, in order to promote the importance of both 
mothers and fathers in childcare; 2) a major provision of childcare services to promote 
female employment; or 3) labour policies and incentives aimed to ensure an adequate 
participation of women in labour markets. The relevance of these policies has been 
widely recognized by a recent article published on The Economist (May, 2015), where it 
is asserted: “State meddling in what has historically been regarded as a natural division 
of labour may irk some. But traditional maternity leave, which channels men into 
breadwinning and women into child-rearing, is hardly neutral. And shared parenting 
stands to improve women’s careers, children’s development and perhaps even dads’ life 
satisfaction” (The Economist, 2015b, p. 54). In sum, a more egalitarian share of 
childcare and housework labour between women and men provides benefits to the 
overall society. On the other hand, the absence of costs that gender quotas for boards 
have for nations does not imply a correspondent absence of costs for companies that are 
covered by gender quotas legislation. On the contrary, a number of scholars contend 
that the introduction of board-level gender quotas can have effects on firm performance 
(e.g., Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Matsa and Miller, 2013). Such considerations should 
not be neglected in policy agendas.  
Overall, evidence emerged from this research suggests that the adoption of gender 
quotas across countries appears to be related more to reasons of regional diffusion and 
social legitimization than to rational and efficiency reasons. However, by assessing the 
actual necessity and sufficiency of gender quotas in the existing national configurations, 
this work contributes to stress the importance of more rational driven initiatives for 
gender diversity on boards. Finally, it contributes to better inform policy about which 
mix of public policies may be more appropriate to achieve a higher number of women 
CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
132 
 
on boards and, exactly, in which institutional domains these policies should be 
endorsed.  
5.3.3 Managerial implications 
The evidence that regulatory policies at board level are neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for a higher number of women on boards suggests that policy alone 
cannot solve the challenge of female underrepresentation on boards of directors. The 
role of adaptations by individual actors in changing a complementary set of institution is 
a key issue (Deeg, 2007). Companies and their manager have several options of 
interventions. For instance, beyond voluntary recommendations to encourage gender 
diversity on their boards, companies could take also voluntary initiatives aimed to 
facilitate work-life balance and increase gender equality at every level of firm. 
Generally, when speaking about gender policies, they are often associated with the 
implementation of initiatives for female workers. However, this is not the only pathway. 
An important insight of this research is that the less the gender perspective is embedded 
within institutions, the greater will be the number of women on boards. In other words, 
this means that companies should address the need for gender policies that involve both 
men and women and that aim to reduce the distance between their roles in family and 
work relations. Some example could be a voluntary provision of additional paternity 
leave for male workers; the deconstruction of (especially cultural) obstacles to male 
part-time employment; a wide provision of childcare services, nurseries, and timesaving 
services, and so forth. Overall, in addition to state actors, companies have a prominent 
role in removing the most recurrent barriers that limit women in their career 
advancements and in promoting the presence of women in top management positions. 
Through their initiatives, they may contribute to deconstruct the presence of gendered 
practices especially in labour and cultural institutions.  
5.4 Limitation and Future Research 
This study presents some limitations, which however pave the way to further 
challenges for future research.  
A first limitation concerns the research methodology. In detail, fs/QCA is often 
criticized because of the subjectivism of researcher’s choices. In order to limit 
subjectivism, the criteria for the selection of cases, causal conditions and calibration 
were described in a very transparent and meticulous manner. Moreover, they were 
chosen by making primary reference to external sources of knowledge and information, 
which represent the recommended procedure (e.g., extant research, institutional sources, 
and so forth). In addition, the pervasive role of theory on QCA implicitly leads 
researchers to provide a theoretical justification of their choices, by explaining why, 
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how and which particular conditions are causally related to the outcome of interest. In 
this way, it guarantees the development of robust explanations about the causal 
mechanisms that link country-level causal conditions to women on boards. Finally, an 
important property of QCA is that it enables to identify possible logical contradictions, 
thus allowing to control, albeit not avoid, the problem of omitted variables that can 
make spurious the inferred causality (for example, the case of unobserved sources of 
variation, such as cultural dispositions) (Kogut and Ragin, 2006).  
A second limitation refers to the limited size of the sample. For this reason, 
additional statistical tests have been not provided. Future works could expand the 
number of countries to be involved in the analysis and include both European and non-
European countries. The results of this enlarged comparison may be particularly 
interesting to provide further insights concerning the mechanisms of adoption and 
diffusion of gender regulatory policies for boards of directors. However, for the sake of 
completeness, it is important to understand that “in contrast to standard econometric 
methods, such as regression analysis, the nonparametric, fuzzy set methods (...) make 
sample less of an issue”, because fuzzy set QCA is not based on an assumption that data 
come from a given probability distribution (Fiss, 2011, p. 402).  
Third, this work primarily focuses on institutional environments, regardless of the 
characteristics of national companies and regardless of the differences between systems 
of corporate governance across countries. To that regard, previous research has found 
that legal, cultural and labour environments play the most relevant role in shaping 
female representation on boards (e.g., Adams and Kirchmaier, 2013; Grosvold and 
Brammer, 2011). Although this evidence provides some support for paying main 
attention on the institutional antecedents for women on boards, on the other hand it is 
clear that differences in types of companies and corporate governance systems may 
have some consequences for the analysis. For this reason, future studies could address 
the presence of complementarities also in relation to the characteristics of firms and 
corporate boards and investigate their effects on the number of women in top corporate 
positions.  
Moreover, although the analysis includes differences between the implementation of 
strong and soft regulation for gender diversity on boards, the enforcement of the law 
varies across countries. For instance, the strong enforcement in Norway or France 
determines a direct relationship between the number of women on boards and gender 
quotas. Conversely, the weak enforcement in some other countries may have feeble 
consequences on the number of women on boards. In order to overcome this limitation, 
future works could develop in-depth case studies aimed to explore the role that the 
enforcement of law might have on the actual necessity and sufficiency of gender quotas 
for boards of directors.  
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Finally, it is clear that the conceptual model presented in this research context is 
static in its nature. This is mainly related to the fact that QCA is particularly time 
insensitive, i.e. the order by which conditions are linked through logical AND or OR 
does not matter (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). However, in line with Grandori and 
Furnari (2008, p. 22), “the specification of whether any element, or package of 
elements, is necessary or sufficient, and which elements are substitutable, provide a 
starting basis for developing dynamic models”. When this study investigates the current 
status of complementarities between institutions and it finds support for their existence, 
it is posing the basis for further research which could address the dynamics of 
institutional change for increasing the number of women on boards.  As previously 
noted (see § 5.3.1), further research may investigate the presence of a hierarchy between 
institutions, as well as the direction of institutional change. Taken together, these issues 
constitute a very challenging research agenda on the institutional dynamics that may 
contribute to substantial changes in the numbers of women on boards.  
5.5 Conclusion 
This study has employed a set-theoretic approach using fs/QCA to understand 
whether, why and which country-level conditions are causally and jointly related to 
female representation on boards. In doing so, it has showed the importance of knowing 
the causal antecedents of women on boards to assess the necessity and sufficiency of 
gender regulatory policies at board level. By filling important gaps in extant literature, 
this work contributes to the corporate governance research in several ways. On the one 
hand, it refines and advances previous insights on the institutional view of gender 
diversity on boards. In detail, it theoretically informs and empirically verifies the 
existence of institutional complementarities between welfare states, labour markets and 
national cultures. Moreover, it argues that the more “un-gendered” is the nature of these 
institutions, the greater is the number of women on boards. The findings of the 
qualitative comparative analysis reveal the existence of a unique ideal configuration of 
national attributes that is sufficient to achieve a greater presence of women on boards. 
This is the most notable result for this research, since it provides strong support to the 
assumption that a more equal division of gender roles within families, labour and 
cultural institutions can lead to a greater presence of women on boards, more than the 
single enactment of gender quotas does. Indeed, gender quotas for boards of directors 
are found to be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to achieve a higher number 
of women on boards. Overall, these findings have important policy implications, 
especially with regard to the design of policies (or mix of policies) to promote the 
representation of women in board positions. More rational legislative initiatives should 
consider that the introduction of gender quotas at board level might be not a sufficient 
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regulatory policy to promote female representation on boards of directors if gender 
persists in other institutions. Finally, this study suggests and illustrates several pathways 
for a new research agenda devoted to deepen the dynamics of institutional change for 
increasing the number of women in top corporate positions.  
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CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has discussed the results derived from the qualitative comparative 
analysis between the 27 EU countries. The analysis of individual sufficiency has 
revealed that, taken one at time, the elected national attributes are not sufficient on 
their own for the outcome, while they result sufficient if combined one another. This 
evidence implicitly supports the existence of complementarities between such 
institutional attributes. In detail, the unique configuration resulting from the empirical 
analysis almost exactly overlaps with the “ideal” conjunction of causal conditions that 
was formulated in Proposition 1 (excepted for the condition “high level of female part 
time employment”). Since this configuration reflects theory-based assumptions, 
relating to the causal relations between complementary institutions, it can be conceived 
as an (almost) “ideal type” of national model for gender diversity on boards. To that 
effect, the farther is a country from this “superior” national configuration, the worse its 
performance in terms of women on corporate boards is likely to be. The underlying 
causal mechanisms imply that the presence of complementary institutions, which 
mutually reinforce their similar structures in an un-gendered perspective, allows for a 
more egalitarian distribution of power and opportunities between women and men in a 
given social system. Conversely, the empirical occurrence of a unique configuration of 
country-level causal conditions implicitly leads to contradict the theoretical assumption 
about the individual sufficiency of gender quotas for a higher number of women on 
boards (Proposition 2), while it confirms that gender quotas for corporate boards are 
not a necessary condition to achieve a higher number of women on boards of directors 
(Proposition 3). Taken together, this evidence suggests that the adoption of gender 
quotas for boards of directors might be attributable more to reasons of diffusion or 
social legitimization rather than to rational reasons about their actual effectiveness in 
the existing national configurations. After discussing the results, this chapter has 
presented the main theoretical and practical contributions of the research. The most 
relevant insight is that more rational legislative initiatives should consider that the 
introduction of gender quotas at board level might be not a sufficient regulatory policy 
to promote female representation on boards of directors if gender persists in other 
institutions. Finally, this chapter has illustrated some limitations of the research, thus 
suggesting a new research agenda aimed at investigating the dynamics of institutional 
change for increasing the number of women in top corporate positions. 
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